IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 79627-5-I
)
Respondent, )
)
v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
MICHAEL JOHN PAULSON, )
)
Appellant. )
PER CURIAM — Michael Paulson was convicted by a jury of one count of
second degree assault following an incident in which he strangled his wife in front
of his two minor children. As part of his judgment and sentence, the trial court
imposed a ten-year no-contact order prohibiting Paulson from having contact with
his children. Paulson appealed, contending that the no-contact order violated his
fundamental right to parent and that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue
that the no-contact order was excessive in scope and duration. The State
concedes that the trial court did not explain on the record how the scope and
duration of the no-contact order was reasonably necessary to prevent harm to
the children or whether it considered less restrictive alternatives. See, e.g. State
v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 32, 195 P.3d 940 (2008) (crime-related prohibitions
affecting fundamental rights must be “narrowly drawn” and there must be “no
reasonable alternative way to achieve the State's interest.”).
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
79627-5-I/2
We accept the State’s concession. We remand to the trial court for further
analysis and factual findings as to the scope and duration of the no-contact
order. On remand, the trial court shall also strike the community custody
supervision fee from the judgment and sentence.
In a pro se statement of additional grounds, Paulson asserts he was
denied due process because his incarceration prevented him from accessing
important evidence such as bank records that he wished to present at trial, and
that a statement he wished to offer was excluded at his criminal trial but admitted
during his dissolution trial. But these claims rely on evidence outside the record,
which we do not consider in a direct appeal. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322,
338, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). Paulson next argues that his wife’s testimony at trial
was inconsistent and therefore not credible. But we do not review a jury's
credibility determinations. State v. Myers, 133 Wn.2d 26, 38, 941 P.2d 1102
(1997). Finally, Paulson contends that his attorney was ineffective for failing to
retain experts in the areas of strangulation and firearms. But to prevail on an
ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show that (1) counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on
consideration of all the circumstances and (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced the trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,104 S. Ct. 2052,
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Paulson’s conclusory assertions do not establish either
deficient performance or prejudice. See RAP 10.10(c) (while citations to the
record are not required for review, “the appellate court is not obligated to search
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the record in support of claims made in a defendant's statement of additional
grounds for review.”).
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WE CONCUR:
-3-
State Of Washington v. Michael John Paulson
Combined Opinion