Case: 20-20079 Document: 00515600175 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/13/2020
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
October 13, 2020
No. 20-20079 Lyle W. Cayce
consolidated with Clerk
No. 20-20102
Summary Calendar
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Lawrence Gaderson, also known as LJ, also known as Head,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:19-CR-134-1
Before King, Smith, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Lawrence Gaderson appeals his conviction and within-guidelines
sentence for possession with intent to distribute a mixture or substance
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-20079 Document: 00515600175 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/13/2020
No. 20-20079
c/w No. 20-20102
containing cocaine base. He contends that the district court erred by
(1) denying his motion to suppress evidence and (2) assigning criminal
history points under the Sentencing Guidelines for prior state convictions
that he is presently challenging on collateral review.
“In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we
review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions
of law de novo.” United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 429 (5th Cir.
2005) (citation omitted). Here, the district court concluded that the police’s
seizure of Gaderson and subsequent discovery of narcotics evidence on
Gaderson’s person were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In
reaching this conclusion, the court determined that the police either had
reasonable suspicion or probable cause that Gaderson engaged in narcotics
distribution.
On appeal, Gaderson challenges only the determination that probable
cause existed to arrest and search him. He does not dispute—at least not in
more than a conclusory fashion—the district court’s determinations that (1)
sufficient reasonable suspicion of criminal activity existed to justify the
investigatory stop at its inception, or (2) the stop, during which the
challenged drugs were discovered, did not exceed its lawful scope.1 See
United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506–07 (5th Cir. 2004); see generally
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). Gaderson has thus waived appeal of the
district court’s reasonable suspicion finding. See United States v. Reagan, 596
1
In a footnote, Gaderson avers that he “assumes for the sake of argument [his]
conduct was suspicious,” but states that he “does not concede that there was reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity to detain him for further investigation.” Gaderson provides
no further argument or briefing on this subject.
2
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No. 20-20079
c/w No. 20-20102
F.3d 251, 254 (5th Cir. 2010); Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff
Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).
Further, Gaderson fails to show that the officers’ use of drawn
weapons, handcuffs, physical force, and verbal commands in detaining him
was unreasonable under the circumstances so as to convert the Terry stop
into an arrest requiring probable cause ab initio. See United States v. Sanders,
994 F.2d 200, 206–08 (5th Cir. 1993). To the contrary, the record contains
extensive testimony about Gaderson’s violent criminal history and the
officers’ concerns that Gaderson might be armed when they approached him.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
See Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d at 429.
Finally, Gaderson’s challenge to the calculation of his sentence is not
ripe for review because he fails to show a sufficient likelihood that the Texas
courts will set aside his challenged 2007 aggravated-assault convictions. See
United States v. Carmichael, 343 F.3d 756, 761 (5th Cir. 2003). We therefore
lack jurisdiction to consider this issue. See United States v. Magana, 837 F.3d
457, 460 (5th Cir. 2016).
The judgment is AFFIRMED in part, and the appeal is
DISMISSED in part for lack of jurisdiction.
3