In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-19-00196-CR
JEFFREY MICKENS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 123rd District Court
Panola County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2018-C-082
Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Stevens
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jeffrey Mickens was indicted for two counts of aggravated kidnapping, as well as
murder, attempted capital murder of a peace officer, and aggravated assault. Mickens waived his
right to a jury trial and, in a single proceeding, pled guilty to all five indictments. The trial court
sentenced Mickens to twenty years’ imprisonment for the aggravated assault and eighty years’
imprisonment for all remaining offenses and ordered that the sentences run concurrently.
In this case, we address Mickens’s appeal of his conviction for aggravated kidnapping of
Barbara.1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.04. Mickens argues that (1) the trial court erred
when it failed to admonish Mickens about the advantages and disadvantages of self-
representation; (2) Mickens’s jury trial waiver was invalid because it failed to comport with
Article 1.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure; (3) Mickens’s guilty plea was invalid
because the trial court failed to properly admonish him of the advantages and disadvantages of
self-representation, the rights he would be waiving, or the range of punishment; (4) Mickens’s
right to double jeopardy was violated because his conviction for aggravated assault was
precluded by his conviction of aggravated kidnapping; and (5) the trial court erred in assessing
court costs on all five of Mickens’s convictions.
As discussed in our opinion in cause number 06-19-00195-CR, we find no error in
Mickens’s first two points of error and find (1) that Mickens was competent to waive, and
intelligently and knowingly waived, his right to counsel, after being sufficiently admonished and
(2) that Mickens knowingly and intelligently waived his right to jury trial. As to Mickens’s third
1
To protect the confidentiality of the child involved, we refer to all parties by pseudonym. See TEX. R. APP. P.
9.8(b)(2).
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and fourth points of error, we find that Mickens knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty and that
his right against double jeopardy was not violated upon his conviction for aggravated kidnapping
and aggravated assault. We also modify the judgment and delete the trial court’s assessment of
court costs for this case, where costs were assessed in the first conviction. In all other ways, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment, as modified.
I. Mickens’s Waiver of His Right to Counsel Was Valid
For this issue, we direct the reader to our opinion in Mickens v. State, cause number 06-
19-00195-CR, issued on even date herewith. We explained in that opinion why we overruled
Mickens’s complaint that the trial court did not warn him sufficiently about his waiver of counsel
in compliance with Faretta v. California.2 For the same reasons explained in cause number 06-
19-00195-CR, we likewise overrule that point of error in this appeal.
II. Mickens’s Jury Trial Waiver Was Valid
For this issue, we direct the reader to our opinion in Mickens v. State, cause number 06-
19-00195-CR, issued on even date herewith. We explained in that opinion why we overruled
Mickens’s complaint that his jury trial waiver was invalid because it failed to comport with
Article 1.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. For the same reasons explained in cause
number 06-19-00195-CR, we likewise overrule that point of error in this appeal.
III. Mickens’s Plea of Guilty Made Voluntarily and Freely
In our opinion in Mickens v. State, cause number 06-19-00195-CR, we described the
analysis for determining whether a plea of guilty is made freely and voluntarily. We direct the
2
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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reader to our opinion in that case for a detailed summary of the events at Mickens’s trial and the
law we applied to those events.
In brief, we consider the totality of the circumstances viewed in light of the entire record.
Griffin v. State, 703 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Fluellen v. State, 443 S.W.3d 365,
368 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.). “[T]he record must affirmatively disclose that a
defendant . . . entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily.” Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 747 n.4 (1970); see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243–44 (1969); see also
Davison v. State, 405 S.W.3d 682, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The trial court must admonish
the defendant in substantial compliance with the requisites of Article 26.13 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13 (Supp.).
As in cause number 06-19-00195-CR, the trial court accepted Mickens’s plea of guilty to
the instant charge of aggravated kidnapping after Mickens stated he pled guilty because he was
in fact guilty. Mickens had not been forced or threatened to plead guilty. His plea was made
freely and voluntarily. Moreover, Mickens understood the crime was a first-degree felony with a
punishment range of five to ninety-nine years or life incarceration. Per the analysis in cause
number 06-19-00195-CR and the admonishments particular to Mickens’s plea to this charge, we
find his plea to the charge of aggravated kidnapping was made freely and voluntarily. See id. As
a result, Mickens’s third point of error is overruled.
IV. Mickens’s Right Against Double Jeopardy Was Not Violated
Mickens’s double-jeopardy argument is only made to his conviction in cause number 06-
19-00199-CR. We address his argument in our opinion in that cause number.
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V. Court Costs
In his last point of error, Mickens correctly points out that, while court costs were
properly assessed against him in Mickens v. State, cause number 06-19-00195-CR, the trial court
erred when it also assessed court costs in this case. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
102.073 (where defendant convicted of two or more offenses in a single criminal action, court
costs may only be assessed once). The State agrees that this was error.
“This Court has the power to correct and modify the judgment of the trial court for
accuracy when the necessary data and information are part of the record.” Anthony v. State, 531
S.W.3d 739, 743 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v.
State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d)). “The authority of an appellate court to reform incorrect
judgments is not dependent upon the request of any party, nor does it turn on the question of
whether a party has or has not objected in the trial court.” Id. (quoting Asberry, 813 S.W.2d at
529–30). We, therefore, modify the trial court’s judgment by deleting the inclusion of court
costs.
VI. Conclusion
As modified, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Scott E. Stevens
Justice
Date Submitted: August 26, 2020
Date Decided: October 9, 2020
Do Not Publish
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