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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
ERIN LYNN MAPLES :
:
Appellant : No. 1778 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 21, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-03-CR-0000431-2018
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED OCTOBER 14, 2020
Appellant, Erin Lynn Maples, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Armstrong County Court of Common Pleas, following her bench
trial convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”)—general
impairment, operating a motor vehicle without required financial
responsibility, and failure to drive at a safe speed.1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
the night of March 30, 2018, and in the early morning hours of March 31,
2018, Appellant consumed alcohol at both a bar and her home. On her way
to work later on the morning of March 31, 2018, Appellant drove her motor
vehicle off the road and crashed. The Commonwealth subsequently charged
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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1), 1786(f), and 3361, respectively.
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Appellant with DUI—general impairment, operating a motor vehicle without
required financial responsibility, failure to drive at a safe speed, and careless
driving. Appellant proceeded to a bench trial on August 14, 2019.
In its opinion, the trial court accurately and concisely summarized the
trial evidence as follows.
On the evening of March 30, 2018, [Appellant], along with
several friends, were drinking at a bar in East Brady, Clarion
County, Pennsylvania. [Appellant] drank several beers and
shots of liquor at the bar and left at approximately 12:00
midnight. [Appellant] admitted to being intoxicated when
she left. After walking a short distance home, she
consumed another beer and went to bed around 2:30 a.m.
Approximately three and one-half hours later, or
approximately 6:00 a.m., [Appellant] awoke for work. She
left her residence at approximately 6:30 a.m., traveling
westbound along State Route 68 in Bradys Bend Township,
Armstrong County. At the time, [Appellant] was employed
in Butler, Pennsylvania, where she was expected to arrive
by 7:00 a.m. Approximately five minutes after leaving her
residence, [Appellant]’s vehicle slid off of Route 68 and hit
an embankment. Upon impact, [Appellant] cut her lip when
her face hit the steering wheel. [Appellant] secured a ride
from the accident scene to the home of Charles Leroy, one
of the friends with whom she had been drinking the prior
evening. After she arrived at Leroy’s residence, [Appellant]
and Leroy returned to the accident scene in Leroy’s vehicle.
Leroy removed [Appellant]’s vehicle from the embankment,
and the two then returned to Leroy’s residence.
[Appellant] went with Leroy into his garage. [Appellant] and
Leroy both testified that Leroy then gave [Appellant] vodka
to wash out her mouth, which she did. They both also
testified that [Appellant] then poured approximately four to
five more shots of vodka into a cup and drank it.7 Leroy
then transported [Appellant] to Armstrong County Memorial
Hospital (“ACMH”) for treatment. Around 7:45 a.m.,
Trooper Travis M. Trimbur of the Pennsylvania State Police
(“PSP”) Kittatinning Barracks, was dispatched to ACMH.
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Upon his arrival at ACMH, Trooper Trimbur went to the
emergency unit where [Appellant] was being treated for the
injury to her lip. Trooper Trimbur waited approximately 25
minutes while [Appellant] received treatment before
speaking with her. Leroy was present at the hospital, and
Trooper Trimbur spoke briefly with him about what had
happened. Neither Leroy nor [Appellant] disclosed at that
time that [Appellant] had [drunk] vodka in Leroy’s garage.
7 Leroy testified that [Appellant] “chugged” the vodka
from the cup. [Appellant] testified that she drank it
over a period of five to ten minutes.
During his conversation with [Appellant], Trooper Trimbur
noticed a smell of alcohol emanating from her person and
that her eyes were bloodshot. He then asked [Appellant]
whether she had been drinking. She responded that she
had been drinking beer and shots of liquor the night before,
but had stopped drinking before she went to bed around
2:30 a.m. She did not indicate that she had been drinking
after the accident and did not mention that she had washed
her mouth with or [drunk] vodka at Leroy’s home. Trooper
Trimbur then performed the horizontal gaze nystagmus
(“HGN”) test on [Appellant] and administered a preliminary
breath test (“PBT”). Trooper Trimbur placed [Appellant]
under arrest and transported her from ACMH to the
Kittatinning PSP barracks, where she underwent an
intoxilyzer breath test at 9:15 a.m. At no time from the
point she left ACMH to the time she underwent the
intoxilyzer test did [Appellant] consume alcohol. The test
indicated a BAC of 0.198 percent.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed January 7, 2020, at 2-4) (internal record citation
omitted). The trooper who administered the intoxilyzer test to Appellant at
the barracks testified that Appellant “seemed to be very upset and very
apologetic for her being there.” (N.T. Trial, 8/14/19, at 44-45). After
Appellant’s release from custody, “Trooper Trimbur then returned to the scene
of the accident, where he observed skid marks on the road at the location
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where he believed [Appellant] had crashed.” (Trial Court Opinion at 4).
Immediately following trial, the court convicted Appellant of DUI—
general impairment, operating a motor vehicle without required financial
responsibility, and failure to drive at a safe speed. The court sentenced
Appellant on November 21, 2019, to an aggregate term of five (5) days to six
(6) months’ incarceration, plus costs and fees.2 On December 3, 2019,
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The court ordered Appellant on
December 4, 2019, to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal; Appellant timely complied on December 19, 2019.
Appellant raises one issue for our review:
Did the trial court err in finding [Appellant] guilty of Driving
Under the Influence of Alcohol or Controlled Substance—
General Impairment, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1), where the
Commonwealth failed to introduce sufficient evidence to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] operated
her motor vehicle at a time when, due to the consumption
of a sufficient amount of alcohol, she was rendered
incapable of safely driving[?]
(Appellant’s Brief at 8).
Appellant argues the trial evidence was insufficient to support her
conviction for DUI. Appellant insists the Commonwealth failed to prove that
at the time of the accident she was operating her vehicle while under the
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2 On November 22, 2019, the court corrected typographical errors in the
original sentencing orders, which had mistakenly indicated that Appellant had
pled guilty to operating a motor vehicle without required financial
responsibility and failure to drive at a safe speed.
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influence of alcohol. Appellant claims the results of the intoxilyzer test are
incredible. Specifically, Appellant contends that her consumption of five beers
and two shots between 10:00 p.m. and midnight the night before the crash
could not have caused her to have a BAC of 0.198 percent at approximately
9:00 a.m. the next morning. Appellant maintains the Commonwealth
introduced no evidence disputing that she had consumed four to five shots of
vodka after the crash and before going to the hospital. As well, Appellant
avers the evidence showed she lost control of and crashed her vehicle because
her car slid on black ice, not because she was intoxicated. Appellant concludes
this Court should reverse her DUI conviction and vacate the judgment of
sentence. We disagree.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
a conviction, we analyze:
[W]hether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to
enable a reasonable [fact finder] to find every element of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Commonwealth v. Cousar, 593 Pa. 204, 217, 928 A.2d
1025, 1032 (2007)[, cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1035, 128 S.Ct.
2429, 171 L.Ed.2d 235 (2008)]…. In applying this standard,
we bear in mind that the Commonwealth may sustain its
burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence; that the
entire trial record should be evaluated and all evidence
received considered, whether or not the trial court’s rulings
thereon were correct; and that the trier of fact, while
passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of
the proof, is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.
See id., 928 A.2d at 1032–33; Commonwealth v. Chmiel,
585 Pa. 547, 574, 889 A.2d 501, 517 (2005)[, cert. denied,
549 U.S. 848, 127 S.Ct. 101, 166 L.Ed.2d 82 (2006)].
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Commonwealth v. Reed, 605 Pa. 431, 436, 990 A.2d 1158, 1161 (2010),
cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1020, 131 S.Ct. 549, 178 L.Ed.2d 402 (2010) (internal
citation omitted).
Section 3802 of the Motor Vehicle Code provides:
§ 3802. Driving under influence of alcohol or
controlled substance
(a) General impairment.—
(1) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual
physical control of the movement of a vehicle after
imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the
individual is rendered incapable of safely driving,
operating or being in actual physical control of the
movement of the vehicle.
* * *
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).
“Subsection (a)(1) is a general provision and provides no specific
restraint upon the Commonwealth in the manner in which it may prove that
an accused operated a vehicle under the influence of alcohol to a degree which
rendered [an accused] incapable of safe driving.” Commonwealth v.
Loeper, 541 Pa. 393, 402-03, 663 A.2d 669, 673-74 (1995).
The types of evidence that the Commonwealth may proffer
in a subsection 3802(a)(1) prosecution include but are not
limited to, the following: the offender’s actions and
behavior, including manner of driving and ability to pass
field sobriety tests; demeanor, including toward the
investigating officer; physical appearance, particularly
bloodshot eyes and other physical signs of intoxication; odor
of alcohol, and slurred speech. Blood alcohol level may be
added to this list, although it is not necessary….
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* * *
Regardless of the type of evidence that the Commonwealth
proffers to support its case, the focus of subsection
3802(a)(1) remains on the inability of the individual to drive
safely due to consumption of alcohol—not on a particular
blood alcohol level.
Commonwealth v. Segida, 604 Pa. 103, 115-16, 985 A.2d 871, 879 (2009).
Instantly, at the conclusion of trial the court explained on the record its
rationale for convicting Appellant of DUI—general impairment:
Well, much of this depends on credibility of the issue about
drinking the vodka in the garage. I can’t say that this is
impossible, but I don’t find that to be sufficiently credible to
create a reasonable doubt. The reasons why; first of all, the
idea of having an injured mouth and wanting to drink vodka
and a lot of vodka, doesn’t seem to me to make any sense.
As [the prosecutor] pointed out in his questioning, it would
be quite painful to put vodka into an open wound.
Not only that; even if I were to believe that [Appellant]
rinsed her mouth out or even had a shot, [Appellant] is
asking me to find she got herself to two and a half times the
legal limit by drinking that vodka. I don’t find that makes
any sense. To top it off, neither [Appellant] nor Mr. Leroy
saw fit to mention anything about that, even as [Appellant]
was being taken into custody and placed under arrest for
DUI. That does not seem to make any sense that neither
one of them might possibly bring up the fact that she had a
coffee cup full of vodka after she was driving.
Also the fact that [Appellant] was apologetic when she was
submitting to the breathalyzer, I think is consistent with the
fact that she had knowledge of her guilt and the vodka story
came up after the fact. While I can’t conclude that it is
impossible, it doesn’t impress me as being sufficient to
overcome the Commonwealth’s case.
(N.T. Trial at 75-76).
Additionally, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court addressed
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Appellant’s sufficiency claim as follows:
Although it is true that no one observed the accident or
[Appellant]’s condition when it occurred, there clearly is
sufficient evidence in the record, which the [c]ourt found to
be credible, establishing that [Appellant] was intoxicated at
the time she drove. It is undisputed in the record that
[Appellant] was drinking and intoxicated when she left the
bar around midnight. She then walked home and kept
drinking until sometime before she went to bed at 2:30 a.m.
It also is undisputed that she drove her vehicle and slid off
the road at approximately 6:30 a.m. When Trooper Trimbur
began speaking with [Appellant] in the emergency room
sometime after 8:00 a.m., he noticed signs of impairment,
including a smell of alcohol on [Appellant]’s person and her
bloodshot eyes. He also administered the horizontal gaze
nystagmus test and a PBT, both of which indicated
intoxication. After she was taken into custody, [Appellant]
underwent an intoxilyzer breath test, which indicated a BAC
of 0.198 percent. These facts, considered as a whole, are
clear and sufficient circumstantial evidence establishing that
[Appellant] was intoxicated to a degree that rendered her
incapable of driving safely when she drove and wrecked her
car at approximately 6:30 a.m.
With regard to [Appellant]’s and Leroy’s testimony that
[Appellant] drank approximately five shots of vodka after
returning to Leroy’s residence, the [c]ourt found this
testimony to be not credible and stated the reasons for so
finding on the record. The [c]ourt did not err in discrediting
this testimony, which it continues to conclude was
insufficient to create reasonable doubt regarding
[Appellant]’s intoxication at the time she drove her vehicle.
(Trial Court Opinion at 6-7) (internal citations omitted). We agree with the
trial court’s rationale.
The trial testimony established the indicia of intoxication necessary for
the court as factfinder to conclude that Appellant was unable to drive safely
at the time she crashed her vehicle. See Segida, supra; 75 Pa.C.S.A. §
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3802(a)(1). The trial court was free to discredit Appellant’s and Mr. Leroy’s
testimony that she drank vodka in Mr. Leroy’s garage after the accident but
before going to the hospital. See Reed, supra. Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, sufficient
evidence supported Appellant’s DUI—general impairment conviction. See id.
Accordingly, Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim fails, and we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/14/2020
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