FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
OCT 14 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PRIMITIVO CANO-JIMENEZ, No. 19-70075
Petitioner, Agency No. A077-439-795
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 5, 2020**
Seattle, Washington
Before: GRABER and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and FREUDENTHAL,***
District Judge.
Primitivo Cano-Jimenez petitions for review of an Immigration Judge's
(“IJ”) determination that he has not established a reasonable fear of persecution
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Nancy D. Freudenthal, United States District Judge for
the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation.
and so is ineligible for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 extends to
“petitions for review of reasonable fear determinations made in connection with
the reinstatement of expedited removal orders.” Ayala v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 1012,
1018 (9th Cir. 2017). We deny the petition.
Cano-Jimenez, a citizen of Mexico, was initially removed from the United
States through expedited procedures in 1999. Later that year, he reentered the
United States where he remained until the Department of Homeland Security took
him into custody in 2018. At that time, his expedited removal order was reinstated.
During removal proceedings, Cano-Jimenez expressed a fear of returning to
Mexico and was referred to an asylum officer. The asylum officer determined that
Cano-Jimenez did not have a reasonable fear of returning to Mexico.
The crux of his claims involves one of his children—a dual U.S. and
Mexican citizen—who is severely disabled. Cano-Jimenez fears that his disabled
son would be discriminated against or institutionalized if his family returned to
Mexico with him. He says that mistreatment of his son would amount to his own
persecution because “[w]hatever [his] son goes through, [he] will suffer what is
happening.” Evidence in the record indicates that in Mexico some institutions
mistreat disabled patients. On review to the IJ, Cano-Jimenez identified three
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potential particular social groups (“PSGs”) in support of his withholding of
removal claim, all of which were variations of “parents or family of disabled
Mexican citizens.” The IJ upheld the asylum officer's negative fear determination.
Substantial evidence supports the IJ's determination that Cano-Jimenez will
not face persecution or torture upon returning to Mexico. The IJ found that he
failed to prove a nexus between harm and a protected ground because, even if the
purported PSGs are cognizable, the evidence did not show that Cano-Jimenez
would be harmed. Instead, his claim was premised on the potential persecution of
his disabled son. This circuit has not recognized imputing potential persecution
facing a U.S. citizen child to his or her parent. See Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d
1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (declining to reach the issue “of whether
Petitioners, parents of a U.S. citizen child likely to face persecution in her parents’
native country, may derivatively qualify for asylum”); Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364
F.3d 1013, 1021 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining to decide “whether an alien may assert
a derivative torture claim on behalf of her [U.S.] citizen children”).
Without this theory, all that remains of Cano-Jimenez’s claims is a general
fear of violence in Mexico and a concern that he may be ridiculed because of his
relationship to his disabled son. Neither theory supports the requested relief.
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Accordingly, the IJ's determination that Cano-Jimenez would not be subject to
persecution or torture upon return to Mexico is supported by substantial evidence.
PETITION DENIED.
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