FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
OCT 15 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STACY L. PARKER, No. 19-35615
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:17-cv-06050-TLF
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Theresa Lauren Fricke, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 6, 2020
Seattle, Washington
Before: GRABER and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and FREUDENTHAL,**
District Judge.
Stacy L. Parker appeals from the district court’s judgment affirming the
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claim for disability
benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Nancy D. Freudenthal, United States District Judge for
the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation.
1. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) did not err by not ordering a
psychological evaluation. No provider suggested that Parker had mental health
issues during the relevant period, nor are there observations that created ambiguity
about her mental health. See Reed v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 838, 842 (9th Cir. 2001)
(noting that a case “normally require[s] a consultative examination” if “additional
evidence needed is not contained in the records,” or if there is “an ambiguity or
insufficiency in the evidence that must be resolved” (internal quotations marks and
alterations omitted)).
2. The ALJ permissibly interpreted the medical evidence. The testifying
medical expert reasonably found that Parker’s probable diagnosis of fibromyalgia
was not supported by recorded exams or laboratory findings. The ALJ’s decision
to give the expert’s testimony significant weight was therefore supported by
substantial evidence. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002).
3. The ALJ gave “clear and convincing reasons” to discredit Parker’s
testimony regarding the extent, severity, and limiting effect of her physical
impairments on the grounds that it was inconsistent with her daily activities and the
treatment she received. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir.
2014). For example, the ALJ reasonably found Parker’s report to one doctor that
she is unable to exercise due to pain inconsistent with her report to another doctor
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just a few days later that she was faithfully performing her physical therapy
exercises. Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s finding that Parker’s
testimony regarding her mental impairments was inconsistent with the medical
evidence.
4. The ALJ gave “germane reasons” for discrediting the testimony of
Parker’s friend. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005). The lay
witness testimony regarding Parker’s physical impairments was inconsistent with
the activities Parker was able to do. The record lacks evidence of mental
impairments, so the lay witness’s testimony was inconsistent on that issue, as well.
5. Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions regarding
the medical and lay evidence, we find no error in the ALJ’s residual functional
capacity determination. Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 1987).
AFFIRMED.
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