NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1765-18T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KENNETH HOUSEKNECHT,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted October 5, 2020 – Decided October 21, 2020
Before Judges Sabatino and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Gloucester County, Indictment No. 89-08-
0605.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Cody T. Mason, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Carol M. Henderson, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Kenneth Houseknecht appeals the trial court's November 29,
2018 decision denying his motion to correct an allegedly illegal life sentence
imposed on him in 1991. He contends the life sentence is illegal because he was
only the age of fourteen at the time of the offenses. The trial court rejected his
argument and we affirm that determination.
This is the pertinent background. After being waived to adult court as a
fourteen-year-old juvenile pursuant to the then-applicable waiver statute,
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in July
1991. The State's proofs showed that defendant stabbed his twelve-year-old
neighbor ninety-five times. He was sentenced in September 1991 to an
aggregate term of life imprisonment, with thirty years of parole ineligibility. His
convictions and sentence were upheld on direct appeal in the 1990s, an d
thereafter reaffirmed on applications for post-conviction relief.
In 2015, the Legislature repealed N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26, and replaced it with
Section 26.1, L. 2015, c. 89, §§ 1-7. The new waiver statute raised the age at
which a juvenile could be waived to adult court by a motion from the
prosecutor’s office from fourteen to fifteen years old. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-
26.1(c)(1).
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The Legislature declared that Section 26.1 "shall take effect on the first
day of the seventh month following enactment." L. 2015, c. 89, § 7. That
effective date was March 1, 2016.
Defendant moved in the Criminal Part to correct an illegal sentence in July
2018, claiming he was entitled to resentencing as a juvenile in the Family Part
because N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(1) should retroactively apply to his
case. Defendant was not yet fifteen at the time of the murder.
Judge M. Christine Allen-Jackson denied defendant’s motion in a written
opinion and accompanying order. The judge relied on this court’s opinion
in State v. Bass, 457 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2018), where we held that the new
waiver statute did not retroactively apply to "concluded cases which have
already passed through the proverbial 'pipeline.'" Id. at 12.
On appeal, defendant presents the following arguments for our
consideration:
POINT I.
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE LAW
BARRING THE WAIVER OF 14-YEAR-OLDS
FROM FAMILY COURT TO ADULT COURT IS
REQUIRED BECAUSE THE LAW IS PROCEDURAL
AND AMELIORATIVE IN NATURE, AND
BECAUSE RETROACTIVITY IS NEEDED AS A
MATTER OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS.
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A. The Court failed to consider the procedural nature of
the waiver law, which requires retroactivity.
B. The Court and Bass Panel's conclusion that the
Legislature did not intend for the Waiver Law to apply
to cases that have passed through the "Proverbial
Pipeline" ignore the Law's Ameliorative purpose in no
longer treating 14-year-olds like adults.
C. Retroactive application of the Waiver Law is
required as a matter of fundamental fairness.
The Supreme Court’s recent June 2020 opinion in State v. J.V., 242 N.J.
432 (2020), squarely decides the retroactivity issue in this appeal. The Court
in J.V. held that N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1 does not retroactively apply to cases
where the juvenile was waived to adult court and sentenced before Section
26.1’s effective date in March 2016. As the Court plainly instructed, “[w]e hold
that a juvenile who was waived to adult court, pled guilty, and was sentenced
long before Section 26.1 became effective cannot claim the benefit of the
new juvenile waiver statute.” Id. at 448.
The trial court's denial of resentencing relief to defendant in this case is
consistent with the holdings in J.V. and Bass. Defendant's arguments fail as a
matter of law.
Affirmed.
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