FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
OCT 21 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CARLOS FRANCISCO MENDOZA- No. 18-72444
PEREZ,
Agency No. A206-428-616
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted October 7, 2020
Seattle, Washington
Before: GRABER and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and FREUDENTHAL,**
District Judge.
Petitioner Carlos Mendoza-Perez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, seeks
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order affirming the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Nancy D. Freudenthal, United States District Judge for
the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation.
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his request for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Petitioner is
not eligible for asylum or withholding or removal because he failed to establish
a nexus between the harm he experienced and a protected ground. See Zetino v.
Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An alien’s desire to be free from
harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members
bears no nexus to a protected ground.”). We are not compelled to find that the
harm Petitioner suffered bore a nexus to his family membership. The agency
permissibly found that MS-13 targeted Petitioner for extortion because the gang
believed the family had money. See Leon-Hernandez v. INS, 926 F.2d 902, 904
(9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from
the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being
supported by substantial evidence.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed,
Petitioner’s own testimony and the testimony of his mother support this
conclusion.
Additionally, the record lacks evidence that Petitioner “was politically or
ideologically opposed to the ideals” of MS-13—or gangs generally—or that he was
attacked because of those beliefs. Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir.
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2009) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds by
Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
2. The record compels a finding contrary to the BIA’s statement that
Petitioner offered only “general,” rather than individualized, evidence concerning
the possibility of torture. The IJ credited Petitioner’s testimony, and the
particularized evidence compels a finding that he likely would be killed if returned
to El Salvador. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010) (standard
of review); cf. Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam). For example, Petitioner demonstrated that MS-13 carried out prior death
threats, killing Petitioner’s father and uncle. The gang threatened Petitioner
personally, found him after he moved, and forcibly tattooed him with his family
name so other members could identify him as a target.
Remand is required, though, for the BIA to consider whether the government
would acquiesce in any such potential torture. Thus, we grant and remand the
petition as to Petitioner’s claim for CAT relief.
PETITION DENIED IN PART, GRANTED AND REMANDED IN
PART. The parties shall bear their own costs.
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