NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 22 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WENJUAN BAO, No. 17-71399
Petitioner, Agency No. A205-793-061
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 19, 2020**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: WALLACE, BEA, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Wenjuan Bao, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks
review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that dismissed her
appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her application for asylum and
withholding of removal. She alleges past persecution and a fear of future persecution
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
due to her involvement with the political movement Falun Gong and a website she
created criticizing the Chinese Communist Party. The IJ denied her application
based on (1) an adverse credibility finding and (2) Bao’s failure to establish her
eligibility for either asylum or withholding of removal, even if credible. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.
The BIA reviews an IJ’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). We review the BIA’s decision for substantial evidence.
Yali Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2017). Here, the BIA adopted
and affirmed the IJ’s decision and also added its own discussion, citing Matter of
Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994). We therefore review the decisions
of both the IJ and the BIA. See Joseph v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1235, 1239–40 (9th Cir.
2010).
Beginning with the issue of Bao’s credibility, the IJ must consider “the totality
of the circumstances,” though it does not matter “whether an inconsistency,
inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The IJ did so here. Bao told a “much more compelling” story of
persecution in her hearing than in her initial application, which failed to mention her
mother’s five-day detention, beating, and routine visits by the police, or to include
the photos Bao later submitted as evidence of her mother’s injuries. Bao’s testimony
was also full of inconsistencies, including the contradiction between her expressed
2
fear of making phone calls to China due to the possibility of government
eavesdropping, and her claim that she called a Chinese lawyer to discuss the possible
legal ramifications of her conduct.
These facts are sufficient to uphold the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.
See Lizhi Qiu v. Barr, 944 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2019) (“We must uphold an
adverse credibility determination ‘so long as even one basis is supported by
substantial evidence.’” (citation omitted)). And, as the IJ found, Bao’s prior
dishonesty in obtaining her visa—including bringing a fake husband to her
interview—“lowers her credibility considerably.” See Singh v. Holder, 643 F.3d
1178, 1181 (9th Cir. 2011) (“An asylum applicant who lies to immigration
authorities casts doubt on his credibility and the rest of his story.”). On these bases,
we conclude that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s
adverse credibility determination. At the very least, we are not “compelled to
conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Without credible testimony or
sufficient corroborating evidence,1 Bao’s claims for asylum and withholding of
1
Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s determination that Bao did not provide
sufficient corroborating evidence. We agree that: (1) Her mother’s letters are
inconsistent, given that the first letter omits any mention of the police visits that
happen “every few weeks” according to the second letter; (2) Bao’s three-year
delay in submitting the photos of her mother’s injuries “lends itself to the
conclusion that the photos may have been staged . . . or digitally altered”; and (3)
Bao’s friends’ letters about visiting Bao’s website are inconsistent with Bao’s
testimony that her “colleagues and friends in China could not view [her website].”
3
removal must fail. Yali Wang, 861 F.3d at 1009.
Even had the IJ found Bao credible, substantial evidence also supports the
BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s denial of Bao’s application for asylum and withholding
of removal on the basis that Bao failed to prove past persecution or a well-founded
fear of future persecution. See Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 654–57 (9th Cir. 2000).
Although Bao lost her job on account of her involvement with Falun Gong, that is
insufficient to compel a finding of past persecution. See, e.g., Nagoulko v. INS, 333
F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003) (“That [Petitioner] was fired from her job as a
kindergarten teacher because of her religious beliefs, while discriminatory, is not the
type of economic deprivation that rises to the level of persecution.”). Nor are we
compelled to find a well-founded fear of future persecution, given that Bao “has
maintained a low profile in the United States” and her website (on which she bases
her fear of persecution) “is not popular” and “was only accessible for a short period
in China.”
Petition DENIED.
4