NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 22 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-10032
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 1:12-cr-00012-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WEI LIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of the Northern Mariana Islands
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 20, 2020**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: WALLACE, BEA, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Wei Lin pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit sex trafficking,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c). Lin appeals from his 120-month sentence,
arguing that the district court erred in applying United States Sentencing Guideline
§ 2G1.1(c) for the first time on resentencing. He also challenges the district
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We have jurisdiction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. As relevant here, § 2G1.1(c) applies if an offense involves conduct
described in 18 U.S.C. § 2242. U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1(c). Conduct described in § 2242
includes “causing another person to engage in . . . a sexual act with another person
by threatening or placing the victim in fear (other than by threatening or placing
the victim in fear that any person will be subject to death, serious bodily injury, or
kidnapping). . . .” U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1, cmt. n.4(B).
Lin argues that “fear” as used in § 2242 must be construed narrowly to mean
fear of bodily harm, excluding other types of fear such as fear of deportation. We
need not decide whether “fear” under § 2242 includes fear other than fear of bodily
harm because the district court correctly found that Lin threatened his victims with
physical violence to force them to engage in commercial sex. We review the
district court’s factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Yi, 704 F.3d
800, 805 (9th Cir. 2013).
The victims all told very similar stories in their written statements. Lin lured
the victims to travel to Saipan under the false promise of lawful employment and
charged them thousands of dollars in fees. Once the victims arrived in Saipan, Lin
took their passports and told them that they would be “hostesses” who had sex with
customers. They were afraid of Lin because, among other things, he threatened
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them with physical harm. The victims’ statements were consistent with one
another, and they were also corroborated by statements of other witnesses. For
example, Yanchun Li (Lin’s co-conspirator) signed a plea deal in which Li
admitted that the conspirators caused the victims to engage in commercial sex acts
by “verbally abusing them; threatening them with physical violence; and falsely
claiming to have favorable relationships with corrupt government officials.” The
district court properly considered the victims’ and Li’s hearsay statements because
they were accompanied by at least “some minimal indicia of reliability.” United
States v. Berry, 258 F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Petty,
982 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1993)). Based on the substantial evidence showing
that Lin threatened his victims with physical harm, the district court did not clearly
err in finding that clear and convincing evidence1 supported that Lin threatened his
victims with physical harm to cause them to engage in commercial sex.
We are unpersuaded by Lin’s remaining arguments challenging the
application of § 2G1.1(c). Lin does not identify any case that has held the
government violated due process by relying on a new guideline during
resentencing. Indeed, such a position goes against our general rule that “[o]n
remand, the district court generally should be free to consider any matters relevant
1
The parties agree that the government needed to present clear and convincing
evidence to support the application of § 2G1.1(c) because it greatly increased Lin’s
base offense level from 14 to 30.
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to sentencing, even those that may not have been raised at the first sentencing
hearing, as if it were sentencing de novo.” United States v. Matthews, 278 F.3d
880, 885–86 (9th Cir. 2002). Lin cannot rely on the Sixth Amendment’s speedy
trial guarantee, as the Supreme Court has held that the right does not apply once
the defendant has pleaded guilty. See Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609,
1617–18 (2016). Lin also argues that the defense of laches bars the government
from requesting the application of a new sentencing guideline on resentencing.
But he fails to identify any case that has applied laches in the criminal context, and
he offers no convincing policy reason why laches should apply.
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the district court did not err in
applying § 2G1.1(c) on resentencing.
2. Lin argues that his guilty plea cannot stand because his attorney failed
to inform him accurately of the sentencing range he faced. The district court
denied Lin’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the record shows that Lin
understood his sentencing exposure before pleading guilty. We review the district
court’s denial for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Garcia, 909 F.2d 1346,
1348 (9th Cir. 1990).
The district court did not abuse its discretion. The record shows that
although Lin’s attorney provided him with an erroneous sentencing prediction, Lin
was well-aware that he was facing a potential sentence of up to life in prison. See
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id. (“[I]t is well established that an erroneous prediction by a defense attorney
concerning sentencing does not entitle a defendant to challenge his guilty plea.”).
Lin’s plea agreement clearly informed him that he faced a “maximum statutory
sentence [of] life imprisonment,” and that “the Court [had] not yet determined a
sentence and that any estimate of the advisory sentencing range . . . the defendant
may have received from the defendant’s counsel . . . is a prediction, not a promise,
and is not binding on . . . the Court.” The colloquy between the court and Lin
during the change of plea hearing also shows that he was aware of his sentencing
exposure. Finally, Lin’s own declaration shows that his attorney advised him that
the maximum potential sentence was life in prison.
AFFIRMED.
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