NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
OCT 23 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JINYAN NI, No. 18-71075
Petitioner, Agency No. A200-800-265
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 21, 2020**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: WALLACE, BEA, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Jinyan Ni seeks review of the decision of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (Board) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her
applications for asylum and withholding of removal on adverse credibility grounds.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review final orders of removal.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
“We review factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, for
substantial evidence.” Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2014).
“Factual findings ‘are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).
“When the BIA conducts its own review of the evidence and law rather than
adopting the IJ’s decision, our review is limited to the BIA’s decision, except to
the extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d
1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In affirming the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, the Board relied on
the IJ’s findings that Ni’s testimony was inconsistent or implausible. See id. at
1044 (holding that under the totality of the circumstances standard, an IJ may rely
on inconsistencies and “any other relevant factor”). The Board cited the
inconsistency between Ni’s testimony and her asylum officer’s notes for whether
Ni knew that her visa application contained false information, and her changing
testimony regarding whether her son had contact with his father. The Board also
highlighted the implausibility of Ni’s testimony that she learned she was one to
two months pregnant based on a urine test. The IJ was not compelled to accept
that a urine test is probative of the gestation period. Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d
969, 974 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that an IJ must consider but need not accept
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explanations for inconsistencies). Lastly, the Board cited Ni’s unclear testimony
regarding the date when her household registration booklet was revised to reflect
that she was divorced and the reason why the booklet was issued six years after her
marriage and her son’s birth, as well as Ni’s failure to provide any explanation on
appeal.
Accordingly, the record does not compel the conclusion that the adverse
credibility determination was erroneous. The petition for review is DENIED.
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