J-S45042-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CLINTON DUNN :
:
Appellant : No. 102 EDA 2020
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 12, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0009554-2009
BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 27, 2020
Clinton Dunn (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order dismissing as
untimely his serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The PCRA court summarized the pertinent procedural history:
On March 14, 2011, [Appellant] voluntarily, intelligently, and
knowingly entered a negotiated guilty plea to the charges of
Unlawful Contact with a Minor (F1), Statutory Sexual Assault (F2),
Incest (F2), and Corruption of Minors (M1) on bill of information
CP-51-CR-0009554-2009. Following the plea, th[e trial court]
imposed the negotiated sentence of [two-and-a-half to five] years
of incarceration on the Corruption of Minors charge and deferred
the remainder of sentencing until October 14, 2011 for the
completion of a report by the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board.
On October 14, 2011, th[e trial court] found [Appellant] to be a
sexually violent predator and subsequently imposed the
negotiated aggregate sentence of [17½ to 50] years of
incarceration.
PCRA Court Opinion, 11/12/19, at 1 (unnumbered).
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Appellant did not pursue a direct appeal. In the ensuing years,
beginning in March 2013, Appellant filed numerous untimely and unsuccessful
PCRA petitions. On July 3, 2019, Appellant filed a pro se motion challenging
his designation as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Pennsylvania
Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§
9799.10-9799.41, and requesting relief from SORNA’s registration
requirements. The PCRA court properly construed the motion as a PCRA
petition.1
On August 14, 2019, the PCRA court issued notice of intent to dismiss
Appellant’s petition without further proceedings pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule
of Criminal Procedure 907. On August 26, 2019, Appellant filed a response.
On November 12, 2019, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition. This
timely appeal followed.2
____________________________________________
1 The PCRA provides that “the action established in this subchapter shall be
the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompassing all other
common law remedies for the same purpose that exists when this subchapter
takes effect ....” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. Our Supreme Court has held that “the
PCRA subsumes all forms of collateral relief, including habeas corpus, to the
extent a remedy is available under such enactment.” Commonwealth
v. West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007) (emphasis in original). Further,
this Court has stated that “claims challenging application of SORNA’s
registration provisions . . . are properly considered under the PCRA.”
Commonwealth v. Greco, 203 A.3d 1120, 1123 (Pa. Super. 2019).
2 The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal or issue an opinion as provided in Pennsylvania Rule
of Appellate Procedure 1925, presumably because “the reasons for the order
. . . already appear of record.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(1).
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Appellant presents several issues for our review, which he states as
follows:
A. DID APPELLANT RECEIVE A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL PLEA
AGREEMENT[?]
B. IS THE MEGAN’S LAW REQUIREMENT OF LIFE TIME
UNCONSTITUTIONAL[?]
C. WAS THERE ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE FOR APPELLANT AT
THE TIME THIS AGREEMENT WAS DRAFTED[?]
D. DID INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL PLAY A ROLE
IN APPELLANT ACCEPTING THE AGREEMENT[?]
E. HAS APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BEEN
VIOLATED[?]
F. IS THERE A FAVORABLE SOLUTION TO THIS CASE AT
BAR[?]
G. IS THE LIFETIME MEGAN’S LAW BEEN FOUND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL[?]
H. HAS THE SEXUAL VIOLENT PREDATORY STATUS BEEN
DEEMED UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND COURTS MAY NO
LONGER HOLD SEXUAL VIOLENT PREDATORY HEARINGS[?]
I. HAS ALL FOUR VERSIONS OF MEGAN’S LAW BEEN DEEMED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL[?]
J. IS THE APPELLANT SERVING AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE AND
OBLIGATION WHICH VIOLATES NUMEROUS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS[?]
K. SHOULD APPELLANT BE RE-SENTENCED TO A LESSER
TIME[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 7 (unnumbered).
Before we address Appellant’s substantive claims, we must determine
whether we have jurisdiction. “Pennsylvania law makes clear no court has
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jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition.” Commonwealth v. Monaco,
996 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003)). A petitioner must file a PCRA
petition within one year of the date on which the petitioner’s judgment became
final, unless one of the three statutory exceptions applies:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A petitioner must file a petition invoking one of
these exceptions “within one year of the date the claim could have been
presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). If a petition is untimely, and the
petitioner has not pled and proven an exception, “neither this Court nor the
trial court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply
do not have the legal authority to address the substantive claims.”
Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006)).
Here, the PCRA court explained that because Appellant did not pursue a
direct appeal, his judgment of sentence “became final on November 13, 2011,
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thirty (30) days after th[e trial court] imposed sentence on October 14, 2011;
thus, the deadline for a PCRA petition was November 13, 2012.” PCRA Court
Opinion, 11/12/19, at 4 (unnumbered); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3)
(stating that a judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct
review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United
States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time
for seeking the review”). As Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition on July
3, 2019, it is facially untimely, and we lack jurisdiction to reach the merits of
the appeal unless Appellant has pled and proven one of the three timeliness
exceptions. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); see also Derrickson, 923 A.2d
at 468.
Our review of the record reveals that Appellant has made no attempt to
plead or prove any timeliness exception in his PCRA petition, nor does he
attempt to do so on appeal. See Motion, 7/3/19; see also Appellant’s Brief
at 2-14. Within his petition, Appellant claims ineffective assistance of counsel
and assails SORNA; however, Appellant does not claim that he has satisfied
an exception to the PCRA’s time bar. Likewise, in his brief, Appellant argues,
inter alia, that he was charged with the wrong crimes, his plea was invalid, his
sentence was harsh, the sentencing judge “lacked competency,” and his
counsel was ineffective — all without reference to the statutory exceptions to
the PCRA time bar set forth in Section 9545(b)(1). See id. Accordingly, we
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lack jurisdiction and authority to address Appellant’s substantive claims. See
Derrickson, 923 A.2d at 468.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/27/2020
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