MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Oct 30 2020, 10:29 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Elaine Parran Boyd J. Kirk LeBlanc
Indianapolis, Indiana Nelson A. Nettles
Amanda M. Hendren
LeBlanc Nettles Law, LLC
Brownsburg, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Mariah Ridley, October 30, 2020
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-SC-425
v. Appeal from the Marion Small
Claims Court
Kroger,1 The Honorable Kimberly J. Bacon,
Appellee-Defendant. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49K03-1905-SC-2359
1
We recognize that the proper designation for Appellee is “Kroger Limited Partnership.” See Appellee’s
App. p. 30. However, for the sake of consistency with the filings in this case, we use the name prescribed by
Ridley in her notice of claim.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-SC-425 | October 30, 2020 Page 1 of 6
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Mariah Ridley appeals a small claims judgment in her favor, arguing that the
damages awarded are inadequate.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In June 2017, Mariah Ridley was shopping inside her neighborhood Kroger
when an employee accidently pushed “a large yellow mechanical device” over
Ridley’s right foot. Appellee’s App. p. 13. She sustained a small cut to the top
of her foot and bruising around the wound. Conf. Ex. Vol. pp. 9–10. Ridley—
who was in school for nursing at the time—iced the foot for two days, but it
“got worse.” Tr. p. 16. So, she had x-rays taken and was diagnosed with a
sprain. Over the next several months, Ridley twice saw an orthopedic surgeon.
The first time, she was more specifically diagnosed with a mid-foot sprain,
which the surgeon told her takes “longer to heal than a regular sprain.” Id. at
20. She then returned to the surgeon a second time because she “was still
having pain,” though it was “[v]ery minimal.” Id. at 22.
[4] In May 2019, Ridley filed a small claims court action against Kroger in which
she requested $5,000 in damages. Kroger subsequently sent Ridley a qualified
settlement offer of $1,800 to settle the claim. But she did not accept, and the
case proceeded to a bench trial.
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[5] During trial, Ridley orally amended—without objection—the amount of
damages sought to $8,000, which is the maximum allowed by statute. Ind.
Code § 33-34-3-2. Kroger admitted liability; and Ridley testified about the
injury, her subsequent treatment, and the lingering effects. Ridley submitted
medical bills showing that she owed $275.46, and she testified that she spent
about $30 on orthotics and bandages. The remaining amount requested was
general damages for “pain . . . suffering . . . the scar” and “the bruises.” Tr. p.
29. The court took the matter under advisement.
[6] About a month later, the court entered judgment in favor of Ridley, directing
Kroger to pay $1,775.46 plus costs. Ridley appeals that decision.2
Standard of Review
[7] Ridley challenges the amount awarded in the judgment issued by the small
claims court.3 The court here issued a general judgment, which will be affirmed
2
Ridley’s counsel spends a majority of the argument section in the Appellant’s Brief focusing on events after
the court entered judgment in her client’s favor. See Appellant’s Br. at 8, 12–18. While we are aware of this
tangled procedural history, it does not affect today’s decision. Our motions panel resolved much of the post-
judgment dispute when it denied Kroger’s motion to dismiss Ridley’s appeal. Kroger does not ask us to
revisit that decision, and thus we consider the parties’ arguments on the merits. See Milbank Ins. Co. v. Ind. Ins.
Co., 56 N.E.3d 1222, 1228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). To the extent any confusion remains on Kroger’s motion to
recoup $1,000 under Indiana Code section 34-50-1-6, a preceding section of that chapter explicitly provides
that it “does not apply to small claims actions,” id. § -1. And as for Ridley’s counsel’s claims of “remarkably
adverse acts” by the court as well as hints of “bias or prejudice” by the judge, Appellant’s Br. at 8, 12, 18, our
review of the record finds no support for these assertions. In fact, counsel’s characterizations barely toe the
line between zealous advocacy and a baseless, inappropriate attack on the judge’s integrity.
3
Several portions of the Appellant’s Brief do not conform with our appellate rules: a majority of the factual
statements are not supported by record citations, Ind. Appellate Rule 22(C); the “Statement of the Case”
section is not supported by record citations, App. R. 46(A)(6)(a); and the “Statement of the Facts” section is
neither supported by record citations, nor is it “stated in accordance with the standard of review,” App. R.
46(A)(6)(b). We caution Ridley’s counsel to comply with these rules in the future.
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if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Hutchison v.
Trilogy Health Services, LLC, 2 N.E.3d 802, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). On review,
we will not reweigh evidence or evaluate witness credibility; we consider only
the evidence that supports the judgment, together with all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom. Id. This deferential standard is particularly important for
small claims actions, where trials are informal, and the sole objective is
“dispensing speedy justice between the parties according to the rules of
substantive law.” Ind. Small Claims Rule 8(A); Morton v. Ivacic, 898 N.E.2d
1196, 1199 (Ind. 2008).
Discussion and Decision
[8] Ridley argues that the trial court erred in not awarding her the full $8,000 in
damages that she requested. More specifically, she asserts that “the trial court’s
judgment failed to comport with the evidence in this case.” Appellant’s Br. at
18. We disagree. Ridley fails to acknowledge evidence in the record that
supports the trial court’s decision to award a lesser amount. And we find that
the amount of damages awarded properly fell within that evidence. See Bowman
v. Kitchel, 644 N.E.2d 878, 879 (Ind. 1995).
[9] Ridley’s $8,000 in requested damages can be broken down into three categories:
(1) $275.46 for outstanding medical bills; (2) $30 for out-of-pocket expenses;
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-SC-425 | October 30, 2020 Page 4 of 6
and (3) $7,694.54 for pain and suffering.4 In calculating her pain-and-suffering
damages, she requested a specific amount per day from June 2017—after the
accident— through January 2018—when she had her third and final doctor
appointment. Ridley sought $75 per day for June; $50 per day for July; $30 per
day for August through November; and $20 per day for December through
January. When Ridley was asked how she arrived at the June figure, she
responded, “I’m not sure. But it[’]s based on the amount of pain that I was
experiencing.” Tr. p. 39. She then confirmed that she used the same reasoning
to calculate the other daily amounts.
[10] The trial court, as the factfinder, could have credited Ridley’s subjective
valuations and awarded her the full amount requested; but it did not. Instead,
the court awarded $1,775.46—the amount of her outstanding medical bills plus
an additional $1,500. And the decision to award a lesser amount than Ridley
requested is supported by the evidence favorable to the court’s decision.
[11] That evidence reveals that Ridley’s pain diminished quickly and significantly.
Two days after the injury, she described her pain level as “moderate.” Tr. p. 33.
About seven months later, at her third and final doctor’s visit, she described her
pain as a “one” on a scale of one-to-ten. Id.; Conf. Ex. Vol. pp. 45. Then at
trial, Ridley explained, “for the most part, my foot feels really good.” Tr. p. 24.
4
Ridley actually calculated $8,250 in general damages for pain and suffering, but she waived the amount in
excess of $8,000 to fall within the jurisdiction of the small claims docket.
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[12] The evidence favorable to the court’s decision also undercuts Ridley’s request
for damages based on embarrassment caused by scarring and anxiety over
potential adverse effects on her nursing career. At trial, she acknowledged that
the scar had faded and does not cause as much embarrassment now. Tr. pp. 22,
39. And the court was able to compare photos of the cut taken the day of the
incident and photos of the small scar taken about two months later. Conf. Ex.
Vol. pp. 9–12. Regarding Ridley’s anxiety, she clarified that she “didn’t really
think about” changing careers. Tr. p. 23. And though she was concerned that
the injury may affect her ability to work as a floor nurse, it did not; at the time
of trial, that was her current occupation.
[13] In short, the evidence favorable to the court’s decision supports its judgment
awarding Ridley $1,775.46 in damages—an amount less than the $8,000 she
requested. To conclude otherwise would require us to reweigh the evidence
entirely in her favor, which we will not do. See Jasinski v. Brown, 3 N.E.3d 976,
979 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Thus, there is no error.
Conclusion
[14] The amount of damages awarded by the court is consistent with the evidence
presented.
[15] Affirmed.
Bradford, C.J., and Najam, J., concur.
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