MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Oct 30 2020, 12:29 pm
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kurt Young Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Nashville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ian McLean
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kenneth H. Palmer III, October 30, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2227
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Alicia Gooden,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
The Honorable Richard
Hagenmaier, Commissioner
Trial Court Cause No.
49G21-1803-F6-9356
Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2227 | October 30, 2020 Page 1 of 23
Statement of the Case
[1] Kenneth H. Palmer, III, (“Palmer”) appeals his conviction, following a jury
trial, for possession of a synthetic drug or a synthetic drug lookalike substance
(“lookalike substance”).1 Palmer was charged by the State and convicted by the
jury of possession of a lookalike substance as a Class A misdemeanor under
INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5, but the trial court entered judgment of
conviction for Palmer’s offense of possession of a lookalike substance under
INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5 as a Class C misdemeanor and then sentenced
him as a Class C misdemeanor.
[2] Palmer argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence at
trial and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. The State
cross appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by entering judgment of
conviction and imposing a sentence on a non-existent offense of possession of a
lookalike substance as a Class C misdemeanor under INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-
11.5. Palmer responds that the State is not authorized to raise its cross-appeal
challenge.
[3] Concluding that Palmer’s challenge to the trial court’s evidentiary ruling is
moot and that the evidence is sufficient to support Palmer’s conviction, we
affirm his conviction. Additionally, we conclude that the State is authorized to
1
IND. CODE § 35-48-4-11.5 (repealed effective July 1, 2019). Palmer committed his offense in March 2018;
therefore, this statute was in effect at the time of his offense.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2227 | October 30, 2020 Page 2 of 23
raise its cross-appeal issue and that the trial court erred by entering a judgment
and imposing a sentence under INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5 as a Class C
misdemeanor. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s imposition of the Class
C misdemeanor judgment and sentence and remand to the trial court with
instructions to enter judgment of conviction on Palmer’s possession of a
lookalike substance under INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5 as a Class A
misdemeanor and to resentence Palmer in accordance with that conviction.
[4] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Issues
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its admission of
evidence.
2. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support Palmer’s
conviction.
3. Cross-Appeal Issue: Whether the trial court erred by entering
judgment of conviction and imposing a sentence on Palmer’s
conviction as a Class C misdemeanor where he had been
charged and found guilty as a Class A misdemeanor.
Facts
[5] On March 15, 2018, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”)
narcotics officers and Lawrence Police Department SWAT members executed a
federal search warrant for documents at a house on Whittier Place in
Indianapolis (“the Whittier house”). One of the officers surveilled the Whittier
house for approximately an hour before the police executed the warrant.
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During that time, the officer saw a few people go into the house for three to
four minutes and then leave.
[6] IMPD Detective Jose Navarro (“Detective Navarro”) was the lead officer on
the execution of the warrant. When the SWAT team entered the Whittier
house, they found Palmer in a child’s bedroom and Salatheo Moss (“Moss”)
near the front part of the house. In the living room, officers saw one bowl that
contained cash and another bowl that contained multiple individually plastic-
wrapped packages of a substance, which was later tested and determined to be a
lookalike substance. Next to these bowls, the officers also saw a scale and a
surveillance video monitor. Because the federal warrant was for documents,
the officers paused their search and then applied for and obtained a search
warrant for narcotics.
[7] The police arrested Palmer and placed him in handcuffs behind his back.2
Detective Navarro read Palmer his Miranda rights and conducted a recorded
interview of him at the scene. During the interview, Palmer told the detective
that he did not live at the Whittier house and that he instead lived on
Catherwood Drive (“the Catherwood address”). Palmer said that he had just
arrived at the Whittier house about twenty minutes prior to the police arriving
and that he had come to visit a female friend, who was not at the Whittier
house at that time. Palmer denied that he had come to the Whittier house to
2
The police also arrested Moss.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2227 | October 30, 2020 Page 4 of 23
use marijuana. He told the detective that he did not use marijuana and had not
used it in a couple of months. Palmer also told the detective that he did not
know what was inside the Whittier house. The police searched Palmer’s pants
pockets and found $240.00 in one pocket and $147.00 in the other pocket. The
police also found a cell phone in Palmer’s back pants pocket. The police took
the items recovered from Palmer’s pockets and placed them into evidence
envelopes.
[8] During the execution of the narcotics search warrant, the officers found
marijuana and lookalike substances throughout the house as well as various
items that suggested a drug dealing environment. The house contained video
monitors in multiple rooms of the house, and these monitors provided live
footage from security cameras that had been placed in four locations outside of
the house. These video monitors were located in the living room, the kitchen,
the main bedroom, and the basement.
[9] In the main bedroom, the police found mail with Palmer’s name on it.
Specifically, the envelope contained a T-Mobile bill, dated January 4, 2018.
The envelope was addressed to Palmer at the Catherwood address, and it was
located on top of the dresser. The police also found more than forty-six grams
of marijuana in a mason jar on top of a dresser and a gun in the top dresser
drawer. Additionally, the officers found a lookalike substance in two different
locations of the main bedroom. Specifically, they found a large baggie
containing almost 200 grams of a lookalike substance inside a cooler-type bag
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2227 | October 30, 2020 Page 5 of 23
containing an Air Jordan logo, and they found a much smaller amount of the
lookalike substance underneath the bed.
[10] Aside from the main bedroom and living room, the officers also found
marijuana and a lookalike substance in other areas of the Whittier house.
Specifically, in the basement, they found a trash bag filled with knotted baggies
containing more than 100 grams of a lookalike substance, and, in the bathroom,
they found more than six grams of a lookalike substance in a laundry bag and a
gram of marijuana in the linen closet. Additionally, the officers found scales
and baggies in multiple rooms of the Whittier house and ammunition in the
basement.
[11] While still at the Whittier house, Palmer asked an officer to get his shoes and
his jacket, which were both in the main bedroom. An officer got Palmer’s Air
Jordan shoes and his Chicago Bulls jacket and searched them before he gave
them to Palmer. The officer found a “knotted baggie” in Palmer’s jacket
pocket, and Palmer told the officer that it was a “dime” bag of “marijuana[.]”
(Tr. Vol. 2 at 209). The substance was later tested and found to be a synthetic
drug lookalike substance.
[12] Shortly thereafter, Palmer asked an officer if he could make a few phone calls,
and the officer agreed to let him do so. The officer took Palmer’s cell phone
from the evidence envelope and, because Palmer was still handcuffed, asked
Palmer for his passcode so the officer could unlock the phone. Palmer’s phone,
which was an Android phone, used a passcode that was a design made on a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2227 | October 30, 2020 Page 6 of 23
square full of dots. Palmer instructed the officer how to make the design, and
the officer drew the design on the envelope. The officer opened the phone and
held it up so that Palmer could make three phone calls. The officer then put
Palmer’s phone back into the evidence envelope.
[13] The State ultimately charged Palmer with: Count 1, Level 4 felony unlawful
possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon; Count 2, Level 6 felony
dealing in marijuana weighing more than 30 grams; Count 3, Level 6 felony
possession of marijuana with a prior drug conviction; Count 4, Class A
misdemeanor dealing in a synthetic drug or a synthetic drug lookalike substance
(based on possession with intent to deliver); and Count 5, Class A misdemeanor
possession of a synthetic drug or a synthetic drug lookalike substance. 3
[14] Thereafter, in December 2019, the police obtained a search warrant to search
Palmer’s phone. The officer unlocked the phone by using the passcode that
Palmer had previously given to the police. When a police officer searched the
phone, he saw that Palmer had a Gmail address. Because Google collects
location data via GPS, cell phone tower, and Wi-Fi (“Google location data”)
from a person’s device when the person accesses his or her Gmail account, the
police, in April 2019, sought and obtained a search warrant to get Google’s
location data associated with Palmer’s phone. Police obtained the Google
3
The State filed an initial charging information in March 2018 and then an amended information in June
2018.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2227 | October 30, 2020 Page 7 of 23
location data to show that Palmer actually lived at the Whittier house and not
the Catherwood address.
[15] Palmer then filed a motion to suppress the Google location data. Palmer
argued, in relevant part, that this evidence should be suppressed because the
officers had violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights by failing to give
him a Pirtle advisement before he gave them the passcode to his phone. The
trial court held a hearing on Palmer’s motion to suppress in August 2019.
During the hearing, Palmer argued that his Fourth Amendment rights had been
violated because there had been a warrantless search. To support his Fifth
Amendment argument, Palmer relied on Seo v. State, 109 N.E.3d 418 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2018), trans. granted, which was a case dealing with the Fifth Amendment
protection against compelled self-incrimination. The parties acknowledged that
the Indiana Supreme Court had already granted transfer on Seo at the time of
the hearing.4
[16] During the suppression hearing, Detective Navarro testified the officers had not
given Palmer a Pirtle warning before they had asked for Palmer’s passcode
because the officers were not searching Palmer’s phone and were instead simply
letting him make some phone calls. The State argued that, unlike in Seo,
Palmer’s Fifth Amendment right had not been violated because Palmer had not
been compelled to give his phone passcode. The trial court agreed with the
4
The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer on December 6, 2018 and later issued its opinion on June 23,
2020. See Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952 (Ind. 2020).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2227 | October 30, 2020 Page 8 of 23
State that Palmer had not been compelled to give his passcode, making the facts
of Palmer’s case distinguishable from Seo. The trial court pointed out that
Palmer had first been advised of his Miranda rights and had given a full
statement to police before he had “volunteered the information to the
policeman so that he could make a call[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 19). The trial court
also noted that the police had obtained a search warrant to search the phone.
The trial court denied Palmer’s motion to suppress.
[17] The trial court held a two-day jury trial in August 2019. Prior to trial, the
parties discussed the fact that INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5—the statute under
which the State had charged Palmer with possession of a lookalike substance in
Count 5—and INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-10.5—the statute under which the
State had charged Palmer with dealing in a lookalike substance in Count 4, had
been repealed effective July 1, 2019. Palmer moved to dismiss Counts 4 and 5.
The State argued against the dismissal, noting that the law regarding these
lookalike substances had been moved to different statutes and that lookalike
substances were now categorized under new terminology. The trial court
pointed out that the law in effect at the time of Palmer’s offense would control.
The trial court asked Palmer if he had any case law to support his argument,
and he “concede[d]” that he had not done any research into it. (Tr. Vol. 2 at
45). The trial court denied Palmer’s request to dismiss the two counts.
[18] As an alternative to dismissal, Palmer sought to have the trial court reduce the
level of the offenses to Class C misdemeanor based an application of the
doctrine of amelioration, stating that there were some statutes relating to
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possession of and dealing in a lookalike substance offenses that classified the
offenses as Class C misdemeanors. The trial court indicated that it was going to
apply the law in effect at the time of the offense but that Palmer could re-raise
the issue at the end of the presentation of evidence if he had case law to support
the argument to reduce the offense. The trial court also stated that it could
consider the sentencing aspect of the amelioration argument at sentencing.
[19] During the jury trial, in regard to Counts 4 and 5, the State’s case was based on
the premise that the material at issue was a lookalike substance, not a synthetic
drug. Additionally, the State sought to prove that Palmer had constructive
possession of the gun, marijuana, and lookalike substances inside the Whittier
house. Palmer’s theory of defense was that the State could not show that he
had possessed the gun, marijuana, and lookalike substances in the Whittier
house as charged because he did not live there and had merely been visiting
inside the house.
[20] The various officers who had been involved in executing the search warrants at
the Whittier house and the forensic chemist who had tested the substances
found in the house and in Palmer’s pocket testified to the facts above. In its
attempt to show that Palmer actually lived at the Whittier house and not the
Catherwood address, the State introduced the Google location data from
Palmer’s phone for the specific period of March 8, 2018 to March 15, 2018.
Palmer objected to this evidence, asserting the same objection as in his motion
to suppress. The officer who had processed the Google location data testified
that the data showed that Palmer had spent time at both the Whittier house and
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the Catherwood address during that week but that Palmer had spent “more”
time at the Whittier house than the Catherwood address. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 150).
[21] After the State rested, Palmer moved for judgment on the evidence. He argued,
in part, that the charges relating to the lookalike substance should be dismissed
because there was “nonexclusive constructive possession” in this case and that
the State had “failed to have something more than proximity.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at
156). The State argued that Palmer’s argument should be denied because he
“had a baggie in his own jacket pocket that he [had] thought was marijuana”
but that ended up being a lookalike substance. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 156-57). The trial
court denied Palmer’s motion.
[22] During closing arguments, the State argued that Palmer was guilty of
possession of lookalike substance in Count 5 because he had “actual
possession” of a “dime bag” of the lookalike substance in his pocket. (Tr. Vol.
3 at 160, 161). When arguing the elements of Count 4—which was based on
possession of a lookalike substance with intent to deliver—the State argued that
Palmer’s actual possession of the lookalike substance in his pocket could
support the possession element of Count 4. It then argued that the jury needed
to decide whether Palmer had intended to consume that lookalike substance in
his pocket or deliver it to someone else. The State alternatively argued that
Palmer had constructive possession of the large quantities of lookalike
substances found in the house and that he had the intent to deliver.
Additionally, the State relied upon constructive possession to argue that Palmer
was guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm in Count 1, dealing in marijuana
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(based on possession with intent to deliver) in Count 2, and possession of
marijuana in Count 3. When arguing that Palmer had constructive possession,
the State pointed, in part, to the items found in plain view in the house, the
evidence of drug dealing, Palmer’s personal items found at the house, and the
Google location data placing Palmer at the house for “a significant amount of
time[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 167).
[23] During Palmer’s closing argument, his counsel argued that this case was “very
simple” and that it came down to the State being required to prove “possession
of three items[:] the gun; marijuana; and a look alike synthetic drug.” (Tr. Vol.
3 at 176). Defense counsel argued that the State could not show that Palmer
had constructive possession of those items because it could not show that
Palmer knew the items were there or that he had intent to control them.
Palmer’s counsel told the jury that if the State had not proven both that Palmer
knew the items were there and that he had the ability to control them, then it
“must return verdicts of not guilty.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 178). When discussing the
lookalike substance found in Palmer’s jacket pocket, counsel questioned why
the officers had not found the substance when they had searched the bedroom.
Counsel also questioned why Palmer would ask for the jacket if he knew that it
had drugs in it. Defense counsel then stated that it “[d]oesn’t make any sense”
and that it “ain’t proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 178).
[24] Palmer offered lesser-included jury instructions on Count 4 and 5, and the trial
court gave those instructions. Specifically, the lesser-included instruction for
Count 4 provided that, if the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
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that Palmer had knowingly or intentionally possessed the lookalike substance
with intent to deliver as required to find him guilty of Class A misdemeanor
dealing in synthetic drug lookalike substance, then it could consider whether he
had committed dealing in a lookalike substance as a Class A infraction, which
required the State to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that Palmer
had possessed, with intent to deliver, a synthetic drug lookalike substance. The
lesser-included instruction for Count 5 provided that, if the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Palmer had knowingly or intentionally
possessed the lookalike substance as required to find him guilty of Class A
misdemeanor possession of a synthetic drug lookalike substance, then it could
consider whether he had committed possession of a lookalike substance as a
Class B infraction, which required the State to prove by the greater weight of
the evidence that Palmer possessed synthetic drug lookalike substance.
[25] The jury found Palmer guilty of Class A misdemeanor possession of a synthetic
drug lookalike substance in Count 5 and guilty of the lesser-included infraction
of Count 4. The jury determined that Palmer was not guilty of Counts 1, 2, and
3.
[26] During the sentencing hearing, the parties returned to their discussion regarding
the July 2019 repeal of INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5, the statute under which
the State had charged Palmer in Count 5 for his March 2018 offense and under
which the jury had convicted him. Palmer asked the trial court to enter
judgment of conviction on the Class A misdemeanor possession of a lookalike
substance in Count 5 as a Class C misdemeanor. Palmer argued that the trial
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court should enter judgment of conviction and sentence Palmer as a Class C
misdemeanor because under a different statute, INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-4.6, a
person who knowingly or intentionally possesses a substance represented to be
a controlled substance commits a Class C misdemeanor. See I.C. § 35-48-4-
4.6(c). Palmer did not provide the trial court with any caselaw to support his
request for a lesser judgment and sentence.
[27] The trial court asked the State if it objected to Palmer’s request, and the
prosecutor stated that it did. The State pointed out that INDIANA CODE § 35-
48-4-11.5 was the statute in effect at the time of Palmer’s offense. The State
also noted that, since the time that INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5 had been
repealed, the State had not charged lookalike substance cases under INDIANA
CODE § 35-48-4-4.6 as mentioned by Palmer and had, instead, been charging
these cases under INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-7, which provided that a person
who knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled substance analog
commits possession of a controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor. See I.C.
§ 35-48-4-7(a). The State argued that the trial court should enter judgment and
sentence on Palmer’s conviction as a Class A misdemeanor.
[28] The trial judge, stating that he thought “this fits under the definition of a C
misdemeanor” and that he would “give [Palmer] the benefit of that[,]” entered
judgment of conviction on the Class A misdemeanor conviction in Count 5 as a
Class C misdemeanor. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 202). Specifically, the trial court entered
judgment of conviction for the offense of possession of a lookalike substance
under INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5 but did so as a Class C misdemeanor. The
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trial court also vacated Palmer’s infraction determination in Count 4 for double
jeopardy purposes. The trial court then sentenced Palmer on his reduced Class
C misdemeanor conviction to sixty (60) days, with six (6) days executed and
fifty-four (54) days suspended, to be served at the county jail. Palmer now
appeals.
Decision
[29] Palmer argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the Google
location data into evidence and that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction. The State cross appeals, arguing that trial court erred by entering
judgment of conviction and imposing a sentence on Palmer’s conviction under
INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5 as a Class C misdemeanor where he had been
charged and found guilty as a Class A misdemeanor. We will review each
argument in turn.
1. Admission of Evidence
[30] Palmer first challenges the admission of evidence during his jury trial. 5 The
admission and exclusion of evidence falls within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and we review the admission of evidence only for an abuse of
discretion. Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1272 (Ind. 2002). An abuse of
5
Palmer raises the issue in the context of the denial of his motion to suppress. Because Palmer is appealing
following a completed trial, the issue is “‘more appropriately framed’” as one of whether the trial court
abused its discretion by admitting the evidence during the trial. Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 206 n.1 (Ind.
2010) (quoting Washington v. State, 784 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)), reh’g denied. Therefore, we
will treat his appellate issue as a challenge to the admission of evidence.
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discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864,
871 (Ind. 2012), reh’g denied.
[31] Palmer challenges the admission of the Google location data, which he
acknowledges “was used at trial to support the State’s argument that Palmer
lived at the [Whittier house] location where the raid took place.” (Palmer’s Br.
11). Palmer argues that the officer’s failure to give him a Pirtle warning before
he gave the officer his passcode to his phone was in violation of Fifth
Amendment rights.
[32] We need not, however, address Palmer’s challenge to the admission of the
Google location data because it is moot. “[W]hen we are unable to provide
effective relief upon an issue, the issue is deemed moot, and we will not reverse
the trial court’s determination where absolutely no change in the status quo will
result.” Sainvil v. State, 51 N.E.3d 337, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citations
omitted), trans denied. Our review of the record reveals that the challenged
evidence was not used to support Palmer’s possession of a lookalike substance
conviction, which is his sole conviction and which was based on evidence that
he had actual possession of a lookalike substance in his jacket. Instead, the
State introduced the Google location data as evidence that Palmer lived in the
Whittier house and that he constructively possessed the gun, marijuana, and
lookalike substances found inside the house. The jury, however, found Palmer
not guilty of the charges relating to constructive possession. Accordingly, we
will not review Palmer’s challenge to the admission of this evidence. See, e.g.,
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id. (declining to review a defendant’s moot challenge to a prosecutor’s comment
about the defendant’s ownership of a gun because the jury acquitted the
defendant of the carrying a handgun charge and because no effective relief
could be granted).
2. Sufficiency of Evidence
[33] Palmer argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for
possession of a lookalike substance.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is
the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess
witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether
it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure,
when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence,
they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.
Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-
finder would find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence
overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The
evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn
from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Additionally, our Indiana
Supreme Court has explained that “when determining whether the elements of
an offense are proven beyond a reasonable doubt, a fact-finder may consider
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both the evidence and the resulting reasonable inferences.” Thang v. State,
10 N.E.3d 1256, 1260 (Ind. 2014) (emphasis in original).
[34] At the time of Palmer’s offense, INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5, the statute
under which he was charged and convicted, provided that “[a] person who
knowingly or intentionally possesses a synthetic drug or synthetic drug
lookalike substance commits possession of a synthetic drug or synthetic drug
lookalike substance, a Class A misdemeanor.” I.C. § 35-48-4-11.5(c).
[35] Palmer asserts that “[i]n this case, no reasonable jury could have found [him]
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of possession of a synthetic or
lookalike drug.” (Palmer’s Br. 16). Specifically, Palmer argues that there is
insufficient evidence to show that he constructively possessed the lookalike
substances found in the house. We need not address the constructive
possession argument because our review of evidence presented in this jury trial
reveals that Palmer had actual possession of a lookalike substance. Specifically,
the State presented evidence that, inside Palmer’s jacket pocket, he had a bag of
a substance that was later determined to be a lookalike substance. Palmer
suggests that there was insufficient evidence to show that he possessed the
lookalike substance found in his jacket pocket because he had told the police
officer that it was marijuana. Such argument is nothing more than a request to
reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146.
From the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have reasonably determined
that Palmer possessed a lookalike substance. Accordingly, we affirm Palmer’s
conviction.
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3. Cross-Appeal Issue
[36] The State raises a cross-appeal issue, arguing that the trial court erred by
entering judgment of conviction and imposing a sentence on Palmer’s
possession of a lookalike substance conviction under INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-
11.5 as a Class C misdemeanor where he had been charged and found guilty of
the offense as a Class A misdemeanor. Before its July 2019 repeal and at the
time of Palmer’s March 2018 offense, INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5 provided
as follows:
(a) As used in this section, “synthetic drug lookalike substance”
has the meaning set forth in IC 35-31.5-2-321.5(a)(2).
(b) A person who possesses a synthetic drug or synthetic drug
lookalike substance commits possession of a synthetic drug or
synthetic drug lookalike substance, a Class B infraction.
(c) A person who knowingly or intentionally possesses a synthetic drug or
synthetic drug lookalike substance commits possession of a synthetic drug
or synthetic drug lookalike substance, a Class A misdemeanor.
However, the offense is a Level 6 felony if the person has a prior
unrelated conviction under this section or under section 10.5 of
this chapter.
(Emphasis added.)
[37] Here, the trial court entered judgment of conviction for Palmer’s offense of
possession of a lookalike substance under INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5 but did
so as a Class C misdemeanor and then imposed a sentence for that Class C
misdemeanor. The State asserts that the trial court should have applied the
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statute in effect at the time of Palmer’s offense, INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5,
which provided that Palmer’s possession of the lookalike substance was a Class
A misdemeanor. The State also argues that the trial court’s judgment of
conviction and sentence are improper because the trial court entered a judgment
of conviction for a “non-existent offense of possession of a synthetic drug or
lookalike as a Class C misdemeanor.” (State’s Br. 25).
[38] Palmer makes no argument that the trial court properly entered a judgment of
conviction and sentence for his possession of a lookalike substance under
INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5 as a Class C misdemeanor when he had been
convicted of a Class A misdemeanor. Instead, Palmer challenges the State’s
ability to raise this cross-appeal challenge and argues that the State’s cross-
appeal is not authorized by INDIANA CODE § 35-38-4-2, the statute that sets
forth the circumstances under which the State is permitted to appeal in a
criminal case (“the State’s appeal statute).6
6
INDIANA CODE § 35-38-4-2 provides:
Appeals to the supreme court or to the court of appeals, if the court rules so provide, may be taken
by the state in the following cases:
(1) From an order granting a motion to dismiss one (1) or more counts of an indictment or
information.
(2) From an order or judgment for the defendant, upon the defendant's motion for discharge
because of delay of the defendant's trial not caused by the defendant's act, or upon the
defendant's plea of former jeopardy, presented and ruled upon prior to trial.
(3) From an order granting a motion to correct errors.
(4) Upon a question reserved by the state, if the defendant is acquitted.
(5) From an order granting a motion to suppress evidence, if the ultimate effect of the order is to
preclude further prosecution of one (1) or more counts of an information or indictment.
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[39] We recognize that “[t]he legislature has enumerated several situations in which
criminal appeals by the State ‘may be taken[.]’” Hardley v. State, 905 N.E.2d
399, 401 (Ind. 2009) (citing INDIANA CODE § 35-38-4-2). There are, however,
limited circumstances where the State can raise an appeal issue that is not
specifically contained in the State’s appeal statute. For example, “when the
State claims that a trial court failed to sentence a defendant in accordance with
statutory requirements, the State may raise that claim for the first time on
appeal.” Stephens v. State, 818 N.E.2d 936, 939 (Ind. 2004). See also Hardley,
905 N.E.2d at 403 (holding that “the State may challenge an illegal sentence
‘for the first time on appeal’”) (quoting Stephens, 818 N.E.2d at 939). Our
supreme court also explained that, although not falling within the State’s appeal
statute, the State may “present claims of illegal sentence on appeal when the
issue is a pure question of law that does not require resort to any evidence
outside the appellate record” because “such a challenge is the substantial
equivalent of a statutory motion to correct erroneous sentence” under Indiana
Code § 35-38-1-15. Hardley, 905 N.E.2d at 403.
(6) From any interlocutory order if the trial court certifies and the court on appeal or a judge
thereof finds on petition that:
(A) the appellant will suffer substantial expense, damage, or injury if the order is erroneous
and the determination thereof is withheld until after judgment;
(B) the order involves a substantial question of law, the early determination of which will
promote a more orderly disposition of the case; or
(C) the remedy by appeal after judgment is otherwise inadequate.
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[40] Here, the State is essentially arguing that the trial court’s Class C misdemeanor
judgment and resulting sentence was illegal because the offense of possession of
a lookalike substance under INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5 as a Class C
misdemeanor did not exist and that the trial court, therefore, could not legally
enter a judgment of conviction for a nonexistent crime.
[41] We agree with the State that the trial court did not have statutory authority to
enter a judgment of conviction for the offense of possession of a lookalike
substance under INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5 as a Class C misdemeanor. The
State charged Palmer under INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5 with possession of a
lookalike substance as a Class A misdemeanor, and the jury found him guilty of
that offense as a Class A misdemeanor. As written at the time of Palmer’s
offense, INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5 contained only the classification of a
Class A misdemeanor for a person’s knowing or intentional possession of a
synthetic drug or synthetic drug lookalike substance. Therefore, the trial court
did not have statutory authority to enter the judgment of conviction for
Palmer’s knowing or intentional possession of the lookalike substance under
INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5 as a Class C misdemeanor. Because the trial
court erroneously entered a judgment and imposed a sentence on Palmer’s
possession of a lookalike substance conviction under INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-
11.5 as a Class C misdemeanor, we reverse the trial court’s imposition of the
Class C misdemeanor judgment and sentence and remand to the trial court with
instructions to enter judgment of conviction on Palmer’s possession of a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2227 | October 30, 2020 Page 22 of 23
lookalike substance under INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5 as a Class A
misdemeanor and to resentence Palmer in accordance with that conviction.7
[42] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Bradford, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.
7
We express no recommendation of the sentence to be imposed. Indeed, we recognize that, even under the
sentencing statutes for Class A misdemeanors, the trial court has may ultimately sentence Palmer to the same
sentence. See IND. CODE § 35-50-3-2 (providing that “[a] person who commits a Class A misdemeanor shall
be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than one (1) year”).
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