NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
NOV 2 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHNATHAN ARTHUR FIELDS, No. 19-17490
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-02863-GMS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JUSTIN MCQUEEN, #8063; Police Officer
at Phoenix Police Department,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
JUSTIN WECHSLER; et al.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 26, 2020**
Before: McKEOWN, RAWLINSON, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Johnathan Arthur Fields appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims
arising from Fields’s search, arrest, and imprisonment. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 936 (9th
Cir. 2011). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Thompson v.
Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Fields’s malicious
prosecution claim because Fields failed to overcome the presumption, created by
the prosecutor filing a criminal investigation, that probable cause existed. See
Newman v. County of Orange, 457 F.3d 991, 994-96 (9th Cir. 2006) (plaintiff
bears the burden of rebutting presumption that prosecutor acted with independent
judgment, and “must provide more than an account of the incident in question that
conflicts with the account of the officers involved”); Slade v. City of Phoenix, 541
P.2d 550, 552 (Ariz. 1975) (describing the elements of an Arizona malicious
prosecution claim).
Summary judgment was proper on Fields’s intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim because Fields failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether defendant McQueen’s conduct was “so outrageous in character
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” Mintz
v. Bell Atl. Sys. Leasing Int’l, Inc., 905 P.2d 559, 563 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Summary judgment was proper on Fields’s false imprisonment claim
because Fields failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether there
was no probable cause for his arrest. See Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159
F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (a plaintiff must show there was no probable cause in
order to prevail on a § 1983 claim for false arrest and imprisonment).
Fields’s arguments concerning the district court’s dismissal of other claims
and defendants, and denial of leave to amend, are foreclosed by a prior decision of
this court. See Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768, 771 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[U]nder
the law of the case doctrine, one panel of an appellate court will not as a general
rule reconsider questions which another panel has decided on a prior appeal in the
same case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Fields’s request for appointment of counsel, set forth in his opening brief, is
denied.
AFFIRMED.
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