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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-10546
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-00235-CG-MU-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
STEPHEN WAYNE COLLINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
________________________
(November 9, 2020)
Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
After entering a written plea agreement, Stephen Wayne Collins pleaded
guilty to possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2256(8)(A). The district court sentenced him to 120
months in prison. He contends that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and
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competent and that the district court erred by not conducting its own inquiry into
the sufficiency of it.
I.
A federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment against Collins,
charging him with three child pornography offenses: advertising it, receiving and
distributing it, and possessing it. Collins, who was represented by counsel, entered
a written plea agreement. He agreed to plead guilty to one count of possessing
child pornography in return for the government moving to dismiss the other two
counts in the indictment.
The terms of the plea agreement provided that Collins had consulted with his
attorney, fully understood his rights, had read the agreement and “reviewed every
part of it with [his] attorney,” and that he “voluntarily agree[d] to it.” He also
acknowledged that he was “certain that he [was] in full possession of his senses
and [was] mentally competent to understand [the agreement] and the guilty plea
hearing which [would] follow.” Collins and his attorney both signed the
agreement.
A week later at the plea hearing, Collins’ attorney informed the court that
the “Marshal’s office” had given him and the prosecution some information about
Collins. Counsel had been informed that Collins had arrived at the courthouse
with a razor blade and suicide note and had attempted suicide. Counsel told the
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court that he had not “had a chance to discuss that with [Collins] to evaluate
whether that does have any impact on his willingness to enter a plea of guilty and
possibly even his mental stability.” He also told the court that he “need[ed] to talk
to [Collins] and see what happened.” The court agreed, instructing defense
counsel to speak with Collins and evaluate his mental stability and willingness to
enter a plea.
Collins and his attorney returned after an eight-minute recess. Defense
counsel explained to the court that “[i]n my discussion with [Collins], there was
nothing . . . that gave me any indication that he would not be competent to go
forward.” The court asked Collins himself if he felt “competent to proceed,” and
Collins said that he was competent. The court then noted Collins’ personal and
educational background and confirmed that he had previously been treated for
post-traumatic stress disorder and bipolar disorder, but it had been more than a
year since he had received any treatment for those conditions.
The district court discussed with Collins the details of his plea agreement.
Collins acknowledged that he had been given enough time to read and discuss it
with his attorney and that he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation of
him. In response to the court’s questions, Collins confirmed that he had spoken to
his attorney about the nature of the plea agreement, the consequences of pleading
guilty, and how the sentencing guidelines worked. He confirmed that he
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understood the terms of the plea agreement, including the consequences of the
limited appeal waiver that was included in it. The court then reviewed with Collins
the rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty, including his right to a jury trial,
his right to remain silent, and his right to put the government to its burden of proof
in a trial. Collins confirmed that he understood those rights and that he was
waiving them.
The court explained to Collins that it was not bound by the sentence
recommended in the plea agreement and confirmed that he understood that “certain
statutory sentencing factors . . . may result in the imposition of a sentence that’s
either greater or lesser than that called for by the sentencing guidelines[.]” After
making sure that Collins understood that he had “retained the right to appeal” only
in limited circumstances, the district court accepted Collins’ plea, finding that
Collins was “fully competent” and “capable of entering an informed plea” and that
the plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and with an awareness of the charges
and the consequences of pleading guilty.
Based on Collins’ criminal history and total offense level, the PSR
calculated an advisory guidelines range of 235 to 293 months in prison. But the
statutorily authorized maximum sentence for his crime was 120 months, see 18
U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2), so that became the top and bottom of his
recommended guideline range, see United States Sentencing Guidelines § 5G1.1(a)
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(Nov. 2018); United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1169–70 (11th Cir. 2010) (en
banc). Collins did not object to any part of the PSR.
The district court imposed a sentence of 120 months in prison and
recommended that Collins be imprisoned at an institution where he could receive
mental health counseling. Collins did not object to the sentence.
After sentencing, the district court granted Collins’ counsel’s request to
withdraw from representing him. Collins filed a notice of appeal, and this Court
appointed appellate counsel. His appellate counsel filed an Anders brief based on
his view that the record showed no arguable issues of merit, and the government
moved to dismiss based on the appeal waiver in Collins’ plea agreement. This
Court conducted its own review of the record and determined that there was an
arguable issue of merit not barred by the appeal waiver: whether Collins was
competent to enter a plea. As a result, this Court denied the government’s motion
to dismiss and ordered briefing on the issue of Collins’ competence to enter a plea
and any other issues counsel deemed appropriate to raise. The order also invited
the government to seek to enforce the appeal waiver as to any issues that might be
barred by it.
II.
Collins contends that the district court should have ordered a competency
hearing even though he did not request one. Before accepting a guilty plea, a
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district court must first ensure the defendant’s competency to enter the plea, “even
in the absence of a demand by the defendant to determine his competency.”
United States v. Wingo, 789 F.3d 1226, 1235 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Cooper v.
Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354, 363 (1996); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378
(1966)). The district court must sua sponte order a competency hearing if it has
“reasonable cause” to believe that a defendant may be incompetent. 18 U.S.C.
§ 4241(a). But even when a defendant does file a § 4241 motion of incompetency,
a district court may rule on it “without benefit of a full dress hearing so long as the
court has no ‘bona fide doubt’ as to the competence of the defendant.” United
States v. Nickels, 324 F.3d 1250, 1251–52 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States
v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464, 1479 (11th Cir. 1986)).
We review only for an abuse of discretion the court’s decision not to conduct
a competency hearing. United States v. Dixon, 901 F.3d 1322, 1341 (11th Cir.
2018). “An abuse of discretion can occur where the district court applies the
wrong law, follows the wrong procedure, bases its decision on clearly erroneous
facts, or commits a clear error in judgment.” United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d
1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2005).
The district court acted within its discretion by accepting Collins’ statements
that he was competent and not ordering a competency hearing to explore the matter
any further. In deciding whether there is reasonable cause to question a
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defendant’s competency, district courts should consider the defendant’s demeanor
in the courtroom, any irrational behavior, and any medical opinion about his
competence. See Wingo, 789 F.3d at 1236.
During the plea colloquy, Collins did not argue or suggest that he was not
competent. That in itself “can be persuasive evidence that competency is not in
doubt.” Id. at 1238 (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 799 F.2d 649, 655 (11th
Cir. 1986)). Not only that, but Collins and his attorney repeatedly and
unambiguously assured the district court that he was competent to proceed. And
Collins provided consistent and appropriate answers to the district court’s
questions; demonstrated an understanding of the indictment, plea agreement,
appeal waiver, and consequences of a guilty plea; and represented that he had
discussed those matters with his attorney.
Despite his insistence to the district court that he was competent, Collins
argues that court had reasonable cause to believe that he was not. He bases his
argument on the report of his suicide attempt on the morning of his plea hearing
and his statement about his bipolar and PTSD diagnoses. But a defendant is not
incompetent based solely on suicidal ideations or mental illness or disability.
Because at their core, competency determinations have “a modest aim: [they]
seek[] to ensure that [the defendant] has the capacity to understand the proceedings
and to assist counsel.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993).
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After being informed that the Marshal’s Service had reported to counsel that
Collins had attempted suicide, the district court recessed the proceeding so that
defense counsel could confer with Collins and determine his “willingness to enter
a plea of guilty” and “his mental stability.” The proceeding resumed only after
Collins and his attorney told the court they were ready to proceed. Both Collins
and his attorney assured the court that Collins was competent to continue with the
plea hearing. Nothing that occurred at the hearing gave the court reasonable cause
not to believe the assurances about Collins’ competence that it had heard. See 18
U.S.C. § 4241(a).1
The district court acted within its discretion by accepting Collins’ assurances
about his competency and proceeding with the plea hearing without conducting a
separate, “full dress” competency hearing. Nickels, 324 F.3d 1250, 1252
1
Collins points to certain information contained in his PSR. But it was prepared after his
guilty plea was accepted and before his sentence hearing. As part of the preparation for the
report, a probation officer interviewed him, and Collins told the officer that he needed mental
health treatment and that his medications were not controlling his mental health issues. Collins
also reported that he had attempted suicide in 2001 (17 years before). He equivocated when
asked if he was experiencing renewed suicidal ideations: “‘I don’t want to say either way or [jail
officials] will make me spend the night in the chair.’” The interviewing officer reported that
“Collins communicated appropriately and appeared to understand the gravity of his current legal
situation.” Collins concedes on appeal that he revealed that information only after the plea
hearing, at his presentence interview. As a result, the information could not have given the
district court reasonable cause to conclude that a competency hearing should be ordered. See
Tiller v. Esposito, 911 F.2d 575, 576 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that a district court must decide
whether to inquire into a defendant’s competency based on “what it knew at the time of the trial
or plea hearing”).
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III.
Going beyond the issue of whether the district court should have held a
competency hearing, Collins contends that even without one the court should have
raised the competency issue on its own and found that he did not knowingly and
voluntarily enter his guilty plea because he was not competent to do so. He did
not, however, raise that issue in the district court. We ordinarily review de novo
the voluntariness of a guilty plea. United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1352
(11th Cir. 1993). But when a defendant fails to object in the district court to an
alleged Rule 11 violation or raise the competency or voluntariness issue, we review
only for plain error. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002); United States
v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003). Under that standard, the
defendant must show that: “(1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; (3) it
affected [his] substantial rights; and (4) it seriously affected the fairness of the
judicial proceedings.” United States v. Rodriguez, 627 F.3d 1372, 1380 (11th Cir.
2010) (citation and quotations omitted).
A defendant’s guilty plea must be knowing and voluntary in order to be
constitutionally valid. United States v. Brown, 117 F.3d 471, 476 (11th Cir.1997).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 sets out procedures that the district court
must follow when accepting guilty pleas, with the goals of ensuring that: (1) the
guilty plea was free from coercion; (2) the defendant understood the nature of the
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charges; and (3) the defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty.
United States v. Presendieu, 880 F.3d 1228, 1238 (11th Cir. 2018).
The court did not err, much less plainly err, in finding that Collins was
competent to plead guilty and that his guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily
entered. For the reasons we have already discussed, the record establishes that
Collins understood the nature of the charges and the consequences of pleading
guilty. See United States v. DePace, 120 F.3d 233, 238 (11th Cir. 1997).
AFFIRMED.
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:
Given the applicable abuse of discretion standard, I agree on this record that
the district court did not commit reversible error in failing to sua sponte conduct a
competency hearing. Cf. United States v. Pope, 146 F. App’x 536, 539-40 (2d Cir.
2005). Nevertheless, as a matter of best practices, I believe that defense counsel and
the district court should have done more given that Mr. Collins sought to commit
suicide on the very day that he entered his guilty plea. First, it is difficult to
understand how defense counsel could determine, from an eight-minute
conversation with a client who attempted to kill himself (and who had PTSD and
bipolar disorder), that Mr. Collins was competent. Indeed, counsel told the district
court nothing about the suicide attempt. Second, it is similarly hard to fathom why
the district court, knowing some of Mr. Collins’ mental issues, did not ask any
questions about the suicide attempt during the plea colloquy or continue the hearing
to make sure that there were no problems.
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