IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
GENE and MARALEE BOUMA,
husband and wife, No. 80853-2-I
Appellants, DIVISION ONE
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SILVERADO COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION, a Washington
nonprofit corporation,
Respondent.
APPELWICK, J. — The Boumas appeal from summary judgment and an order
awarding attorney fees to the Association. The Boumas contend the trial court
erred in declining to grant their motion for summary judgment, granting the
Association’s motion for summary judgment, and granting the Association’s motion
for attorney fees. We affirm.
FACTS
Gene and Maralee Bouma own Gene Bouma Development, Inc. In the
early 2000s, Bouma Development developed rural property in Whatcom County
into two eight lot residential subdivisions, Silverado East and Silverado West. The
Boumas sold off lots 1-7 on each property, which are each about one acre in size.
They retained ownership of lot 8 in Silverado East and lot 8 in Silverado West. At
32 and 33 acres, the two lots are much larger and more rural than the lots the
Boumas sold off.
No. 80853-2-I/2
In 2000 and 2001, as part of the initial development of the two subdivisions,
Bouma Development recorded covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) for
each subdivision. The Silverado West CC&Rs included restrictive covenants
recorded on November 28, 2000 that created the Silverado Community
Association (Association) and gave it certain authorities, such as maintaining
common areas. The CC&Rs governing both subdivisions created identical
procedures for amendment, providing that they “may be amended in whole or in
part signed by not less than Sixty percent (60%) of the owners of the lots affected
by [the CC&Rs].” Acting as declarant, Bouma Development adopted and recorded
several amendments to the original CC&Rs in 2007 and 2008.
On May 22, 2015, the other members of the Association recorded a new
set of comprehensive CC&Rs entitled “Amended and Fully Restated Declaration
of Covenants Conditions, and Restrictions of the Subdivisions of Silverado West
and Silverado East” (2015 CC&Rs). The Boumas did not agree to the new CC&Rs,
however, they were signed by all other owners in the subdivisions.
On January 19, 2017, the Boumas filed a complaint against the Association.
They asserted that the 2015 CC&Rs violated chapter 64.38 RCW, exceeded the
authority granted in the original covenants, and clouded their title to lot 8 Silverado
East and lot 8 Silverado West. They requested quiet title for both lots 8 and
declaratory relief that the 2015 CC&Rs were void and unenforceable.
The Boumas then filed a motion for summary judgment on April 10, 2018,
seeking to have the 2015 CC&Rs declared void in whole or in part.
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No. 80853-2-I/3
On July 12, 2018, the trial court denied the Boumas’ motion. The court held
that the Association had the authority to adopt the 2015 CC&Rs and found the
Boumas’ claims regarding specific provisions to be unpersuasive and
unsupported.
On January 10, 2019, the Association moved for summary judgment. On
November 13, 2019, the trial court entered an order granting the motion and
dismissing the Boumas’ claims with prejudice. On December 9, 2019, the
Association filed a motion for attorney fees and costs. The trial court granted the
motion, holding the Boumas were liable under RCW 68.38.050 and the 2015
CC&Rs.
The Boumas appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Competing Motions for Summary Judgment
This court reviews summary judgment rulings de novo, construing all facts
and reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Blue Diamond Grp., Inc. v. KB Seattle 1, Inc., 163 Wn. App.
449, 453, 266 P.3d 881 (2011). A trial court must grant a motion for summary
judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). The moving party has the initial
burden to show the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Blue Diamond,
163 Wn. App. at 453.
This dispute involves two competing motions for summary judgment. The
Boumas moved for summary judgment determining the 2015 CC&Rs were invalid.
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The trial court denied their motion.1 The Association then moved for summary
judgment determining the CC&R amendments were valid, and the trial court issued
an order granting their motion.2 By virtue of filing their motions seeking summary
judgment each party asserted there were no disputes over material facts. Thus,
our consideration of the two motions involves a single analysis limited to questions
of law as to the adoption and meaning of the amendments.
The Boumas argue the trial court erred on several grounds in denying their
motion for summary judgment. They further argue the court erred in granting the
Association’s motion for summary judgment. These arguments are without merit.
A. Adoption of the 2015 CC&R Amendments
The CC&Rs governing both subdivisions created identical procedures for
amendment, providing that they “may be amended in whole or in part signed by
not less than Sixty percent (60%) of the owners of the lots affected by [the
CC&Rs].”3 The Association properly followed the amendment process. The 2015
1 The Boumas contend the trial court erred in denying summary judgment
on specific provisions that they argued were unreasonable, because the
Association did not submit specific facts in rebuttal. But, the motion posed legal
rather than factual questions.
2 The Boumas argue it is improper to rely on the order denying the Boumas’
motion in ruling on the Association’s motion. Though the summary judgment
motions were filed at separate times, the Boumas’ response to the Association’s
motion for summary judgment listed the evidence they relied upon as “this brief,
their brief in support of their earlier motion for summary judgment, the declaration
of Gene Bouma, the second declaration of Gene Bouma, and all other pleadings
and papers filed in this matter.” The response brief mirrored their arguments in
support of their earlier motion, and all other evidence had been previously
available. There were no questions of material fact.
3 The Boumas and their company, Bouma Development, drafted the original
CC&Rs and were involved in the previous amendments to the CC&Rs. The
language that we are interpreting to determine whether the amendments are
proper is language that was originally drafted and prepared by the Boumas.
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No. 80853-2-I/5
CC&Rs were signed by every owner in Silverado East and Silverado West aside
from the Boumas, far surpassing the necessary 60% threshold.
The Boumas argue even if the Association was authorized to amend the
restrictive covenants, it was not authorized to adopt new restrictions. The trial
court considered the language of the existing CC&Rs, including section 5.2 that
provides “any amended or supplemental declaration shall be enforceable,” as
evidencing the intent to allow new restrictions.4 We agree.
Nonetheless, the Boumas contend the amendments were ineffective
because their signatures were required. Absent their signatures, they argue the
statue of frauds was violated. Under the statute of frauds for real estate, RCW
64.04.010, “[e]very conveyance of real estate, or any interest therein, and every
contract creating or evidencing any encumbrance upon real estate, shall be by
4 In addition the trial court relied on section 3.3:
The Court concludes that the covenants authorize the Association to
adopt new restrictions. First, under paragraph 3.3, the covenants
expressly provide for new restrictions, although in a technically
infeasible way.
The Association may adopt bylaws and rules and
regulations as it deems necessary or advisable for
transaction of business. Such bylaws and rules and
regulations are incorporated by reference as if fully set
forth herein and each lot owner shall be required to
abide by the rules and regulations.
(Restrictive Covenants ¶ 3.3) ([emphasis] added). The [emphasized]
language attempts to merge restrictive covenants with bylaws and
rules and regulations, which is problematic. But significant here is
that the Developer intended the Association to adopt new bylaws and
rules that would then have the force of restrictive covenants. This is
clear evidence that the Developer intended the Association to adopt
new restrictions as the residential development evolved.
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No. 80853-2-I/6
deed.” Every deed “shall be in writing, signed by the party bound thereby, and
acknowledged.” RCW 64.04.020. The Boumas rely on Bakke v. Columbia Valley
Lumber Company, 49 Wn.2d 165, 169, 298 P.2d 849 (1956), for the assertion that
their signatures had to be on the CC&Rs. But, that case concerned an easement,
that was held to have been properly voided by the respondent wife, who had not
signed the instrument. Id. at 170-71. The other cases relied upon by the Boumas
to argue that the 2015 CC&Rs are invalid for failure to satisfy the statute of frauds
are similarly inapplicable. They do not cite to any caselaw involving CC&Rs
amended by a homeowners’ association following an expressly provided
amendment process. This argument is without merit.
We affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the Association had the authority
to adopt the 2015 CC&Rs and that the amendment process was properly followed.
B. Specific Provisions
Amendments to restrictive covenants in Washington are subject to an
additional requirement, even where power is exercised consistently and
reasonably, whether the restriction is new or merely modified. Wilkinson v.
Chiwawa Cmtys. Ass’n, 180 Wn.2d 241, 256, 327 P.3d 614 (2014). The Supreme
Court has held that “when the general plan of development permits a majority to
change the covenants but not create new ones, a simple majority cannot add new
restrictive covenants that are inconsistent with the general plan of development or
have no relation to existing covenants.” Id. And, this court held in Shafer v. Board
of Trustees of Sandy Hook Yacht Club Estates, Inc., 76 Wn. App. 267, 273-74,
883 P.2d 1387 (1994), that “an express reservation of power authorizing less than
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No. 80853-2-I/7
100 percent of property owners within a subdivision to adopt new restrictions
respecting the use of privately owned property is valid, provided that such power
is exercised in a reasonable manner consistent with the general plan of the
development.”
The interpretation of language contained in a restrictive covenant is a
question of law. Green v. Normandy Park Riviera Section Cmty. Club, Inc., 137
Wn. App. 665, 681, 151 P.3d 1038 (2007). Restrictive covenants are interpreted
to give effect to the intention of the parties to the agreement incorporating the
covenants and to carry out the purpose for which they were created. Id. at 683.
The Boumas assert that the amendments are not consistent with the
general development plan and impose unreasonable disparate impacts on their
property. The trial court addressed their challenges to individual sections of the
amendments in its order denying summary judgment. It reasoned as follows:
The Boumas next contend that various specific provisions are
unreasonable and conflict with the general plan of development. The
Court finds these arguments unpersuasive as a matter of law.
1. Listing [Bouma Development] as Grantor
The Boumas argue that the 2015 covenants incorrectly list
Gene Bouma Development, Inc. as a Grantor and Grantee for the
recorded covenants, invalidating them. This is a scrivener’s error
and does not invalidate the covenants. Because the Boumas own
their lots subject to covenants their company recorded, and the
Association properly adopted amendments to these covenants, their
property remains bound. The legal description of the property, not
the name of the owner in the recording summary, determines the
covenant’s binding effect.
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No. 80853-2-I/8
2. References To The Common and Recreation Easement
Areas
The Boumas assert that the Association attempted to turn an
easement into fee ownership in the 2015 covenants. This is an
unreasonable reading of one paragraph in the covenants and
ignores references to the easement elsewhere. In paragraph 1.4.2,
the 2015 covenants identify the “common areas” within Lot 8 of the
Silverado East Plat and Lot 8 of the Silverado West Plat. The
Boumas claim that the Association is trying to assert full ownership
of the areas, rather than the easement that currently exists.
According to the Boumas, “the easement areas are not ‘common
areas’ or ‘common properties’ owned by the Association.” (Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment at 6). In its Response and at oral
argument, counsel for the Association confirmed that the Association
does claim ownership of the property or anything other than the
recorded easements.
In the Plats for the Silverado East and West, the Developer
conveyed over both Lots 8 “common and recreational easement area
for the drainage, wells, and utilities purposes for both the Silverado
West Plat and Silverado East Plat.” These are not simply utility
easements but rather are both common and recreational areas for
the developments. If the purpose of the easements is ambiguous,
any uncertainty comes from the original plats, not the 2015
covenants. The easement areas are listed as common areas, which
the Association may use and must maintain.
Elsewhere in the 2015 covenants, the Association makes
clear that it owns and maintains easements on Lot 8. (2015
Restrictive Covenants ¶ 2.5) (“use the Lot 8 Common Areas as a
common and recreational easement area”). This description
duplicates that on the Plats. The court therefore finds no grounds to
invalidate the references to the “common and recreational easement
area” as a common area.
3. Paragraph 2.1, Reservation of Easements
The Boumas claim that paragraph 2.1 of the 2015 covenants
“attempts to broadly combine all easements together for all purposes
and broaden their scope overall.” (Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment
Motion at 7). In paragraph 2.1 the 2015 covenants identify the
existence of easements “on the face of the Plat” and do not attempt
to create or convey additional or expanded easements. The Court
finds no grounds to invalidate this paragraph.
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No. 80853-2-I/9
4. Paragraph 2.3, Drainage Easement
The Boumas allege that Paragraph 2.3 creates drainage
easements over any portion of any lot, outside the current areas set
aside for the stormwater system and drainage. The Court agrees
that the first sentence of paragraph 2.3 is broad in the abstract, but
that any dispute over its meaning is hypothetical. The Boumas
provide no evidence that the Association has attempted to create a
drainage area or easement outside the current system, and without
an actual justiciable dispute, the Court will not presume an invalid
use of the covenant.
5. Paragraph 2.5, Lot 8 Common Areas
The Boumas argue that paragraph 2.5 of the 2015 covenants
improperly expands the easements over Lots 8 to include “signage,
lighting, and electrical purposes.” In the original covenants, the
Association has responsibility to maintain and repair street lights and
decorative lights located within common areas, and in each of the
shared well agreements, the Association has authority to make
emergency repairs to the water systems on Lots 8, including the
pump houses. Furthermore, in sections 6 and 7 of the 2015
covenants, the Association has responsibility to repair and maintain
the water systems serving the various lots.
Maintenance implies both access and the ability to install
necessary lights, signs and electrical systems. Like any grant of
easement, however, the scope of the rights depend on the purpose
of the easement. Since the Boumas provide no evidence that the
Association has installed lights, signs or electrical systems unrelated
to its maintenance obligations, the Court will not speculate on
whether the Association has acted outside the scope of the
easement grants.
6. Paragraph 3.2, Recreational Vehicles
The Boumas complain that the 2015 covenants restrict the
ability of an owner to live in an RV [(recreational vehicle)] on a lot, “if
it complied with the county codes.” (Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment
Motion at 12). Under paragraph 3.2 owners may keep RVs on their
property as long as they are reasonably screened from view. The
covenants limit out-of-county guests to a 6-week stay in an RV
parked at an owners’ home. Because Silverado is a residential
development, not an RV park, the Court fails to see how the
restrictions on permanent RV living violates the general plan of
development. There are no grounds to find it invalid.
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No. 80853-2-I/10
7. Paragraph 3.4, Animals
The Boumas assert that Paragraph 3.4 of the 2015 covenants
contain more extensive restrictions on animals that the original
covenants. The original covenants banned keeping any livestock or
poultry, but the Association later amended the covenants to allow the
Boumas on Lot 8 “for personal use, hobby and activity raise and keep
farm animals”. (2008 Amendment to ¶2.6). The 2015 covenants do
not include this amendment, which is within the authority of the
Association to approve or deny. If the Boumas want to keep farm
animals on Lot 8, they should persuade their fellow owners to
approve an amendment, as they did before. The Court finds no
grounds to invalidate this covenant.
8. Paragraphs 3.9 & 3.10, Fencing
The Boumas complain that the 2015 covenants impose
restrictions that “are much more onerous and limit a lot of owner’s
ability to use and fence their property how they choose.” (Plaintiffs’
Summary Judgment Motion at 13). The original covenants required
Architectural Control Committee approval for any proposed fencing
and limited an owner’s right to install fences of any height or
composition. The 2015 covenants further refine these limits. This is
no reason to invalidate the covenant.
9. Paragraphs 3.12, 3.14, 3.15, 3.18, and 3.23
The Boumas raise general objections to use restrictions in
section 3, arguing that [they] restrict the owners’ freedom to use their
property how they choose. (Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Motion at
14). Yet that is the effect of a restrictive covenant. The Developer
obtained plat approval for Silverado East and West—and sold the
lots—based on this being a planned residential development,
protected by a homeowners’ association. The fact that the
Association now imposes restrictions that the Boumas do not like
does not invalidate the plan of development or the Association’s
authority. Like any owner in Silverado, the Boumas have the right
and responsibility to participate in the Association by amending the
covenants or assuring they are enforced fairly. The Court finds no
grounds to invalidate these covenant sections.
10. Paragraphs 4.2.1, 4.2.3, and 4.5
The Boumas Object to restrictions on garages, outbuildings,
and landscaping, arguing they are more detailed and restrictive.
They also contend that even though a 2008 amendment placed
restrictions on Lot 8 east, the 2015 covenants cannot place similar
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No. 80853-2-I/11
restrictions on Lot 8 west. None of these arguments are persuasive
or invalidate the respective covenants.
11. Section 5, Architectural Control Committee
The Boumas complain that the 2015 covenants change the
composition of the Architectural Control Committee [(ACC)] and
expand its powers. Other than asserting that this is a fundamental
change in the scheme of development, they do not prove how these
changes are unreasonable or specify how they contradict the general
plan of development. The purpose of an ACC is to assure that all
construction contributes to, rather than detracts from, the harmony
of the residential neighborhood. The Court finds no grounds to
invalidate these amendments.
12. Consolidating Maintenance [o]f [t]he Water Systems
The Boumas take issue with the owners’ desire to have the
Association, rather than each lot owner, maintain the various shared
wells serving the development. Much like individual owners hiring a
company to service and maintain the wells, the owners can
reasonably have the Association take responsibility for the system
maintenance and assess themselves to pay for it. The Court finds
these provisions reasonably adopted and consistent with the general
plan of development. There are no grounds to invalidate them.
13. Paragraph 6.3, Building on the Lot 8 Easement Areas
The Boumas object to the 2015 covenant provision that
prohibits construction of any single family residence on the Lot 8
common areas. In 2008, the Association amended paragraph 2.2 to
prohibit building and “outbuilding on lot 8 . . . north of deer creek OR
within 200 feet to the south of Deer Creek.” (2008 Amendment at 2).
The Boumas did not object to this restriction and in fact recorded the
amendment for the Association. Here the Boumas argue that the
Association cannot unilaterally place such a restriction on the Bouma
Lots. Because current easements over the Lot 8 common and
recreational easement area most likely foreclose constructing any
structures on the area, the Court declines to rule on this provision.
Any dispute remains hypothetical.
14. Section 7, Association Powers
Finally, the Boumas object to the expanded powers of the
Association, worrying that it would “allow the Association to come
onto any lot, anywhere, and do almost anything.” (Plaintiffs’
Summary Judgment Motion at 19). The Court disagrees. The
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provisions in Section 7 are standard for homeowners’ associations
under RCW 64.38.020, and permit the Association to fund its
obligations under the covenants. In paragraph 3.2 of the original
covenants, the Declarant provided “no diminution or abatement of
assessments shall be claimed or allotted by reason of any alleged
failure of the association to take some action or perform some
function required to be taken or performed by the Association under
this Declaration.” (Restrictive Covenants ¶ 3.2) (emphasis added).
The ability to assess its members was implied.
The Court finds no grounds to invalidate these covenant provisions.
(Last alteration in original.)
We share the view of the trial court, that the Boumas failed to show as a
matter of law that any portion of the amendments were inconsistent with the
general development plan, imposed unreasonable disparate impacts on their
property, or were otherwise invalid.
We affirm the denial of summary judgment to the Boumas and the grant of
summary judgment to the Association.
II. Attorney Fees and Costs
Finally, the Boumas argue the trial court awarded attorney fees and costs
to the Association in error. They argue the Association filed an untimely motion,
did not file a motion to enlarge time, it did not do so due to excusable neglect, and
that there were no claims subject to the attorney fees provision in the 2015 CC&Rs.
The issue of whether a party is entitled to fees is a question of law we review
de novo. O’Neill v. City of Shoreline, 183 Wn. App. 15, 21, 332 P.3d 1099 (2014).
The amount of an award of reasonable attorney fees is a matter within the trial
court’s discretion. Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 108 Wn.2d 38, 65, 738 P.2d 665
(1987). A trial court abuses its discretion only when its decision is manifestly
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No. 80853-2-I/13
unreasonable, or when its discretion is exercised on untenable grounds or for
untenable reasons. TMT Bear Creek Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. PETCO Animal
Supplies, Inc., 140 Wn. App. 191, 214, 165 P.3d 1271, (2007).
CR 54(d)(2) states,
Claims for attorneys’ fees and expenses, other than costs and
disbursements, shall be made by motion unless the substantive law
governing the action provides for the recovery of such fees and
expenses as an element of damages to be proved at trial. Unless
otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, the motion must
be filed no later than 10 days after entry of judgment.
CR 6(b) provides procedures for enlarging the time specified in this rule. Where
the motion is made after the expiration of the temporal limitation, the court may
“permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable
neglect.” CR 6(b)(2).
On November 13, 2019, the court filed the order granting summary
judgment in favor of the Association. By this time, counsel of record for the
Association had changed jobs. New counsel learned of the November 13, 2019
order on November 20, 7 days after it was filed. The Association offered a
declaration to this effect in support of its motion for attorney fees and costs. The
Association filed its motion for attorney fees on December 9, 2019, 26 days after
the summary judgment order.
The parties dispute whether the Association, as the prevailing party, had to
file a motion for an award of attorney fees within 10 days in compliance with CR
54(d). Our Supreme Court recently held that a summary judgment order resolving
all substantive legal claims constitutes a “final judgment” pursuant to RAP
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2.2(a)(1). Denney v. City of Richland, 195 Wn.2d 649, 651, 462 P.3d 842 (2020).
Further, the Denney court reasoned that Washington courts have held a summary
judgment order to be a final judgment despite later entry of a money judgment in
previous cases. Id. at 656. It reasoned, an order granting summary judgment
“falls within this court’s definition of final judgment.” Id. at 657. We hold the order
granting summary judgment to the Association was a final judgment for the
purposes of CR 54(d)(2).
A court may enlarge deadlines after they have passed only if the party’s
lateness was the result of excusable neglect. Clipse v. Commercial Driver Servs.,
Inc., 189 Wn. App. 776, 787, 358 P.3d 464 (2015). The Boumas argue the
“excusable neglect” exception is unavailable, because the Association never filed
a motion to enlarge time under CrR 6(b). However, in Corey v. Pierce County, 154
Wn. App. 752, 774, 225 P.3d 367 (2010), this court held that a party’s claim was
barred by the 10 day filing limitation in CR 54(d) where she had not shown
“excusable neglect or reason for delay” in filing for attorney fees, contemplating
the standard absent a CR 6(b) motion. An attorney quitting because he changed
jobs is outside of the Association’s control. The Association provided declarations
to this effect demonstrating the reason for the delay. We hold the trial court’s
decision to rule on the motion despite the delay was reasonable in light of showing
of excusable neglect by the Association.
The Association was awarded fees under RCW 64.38.050 and the 2015
CC&Rs. The Boumas argue this is not an enforcement case, and therefore relief
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No. 80853-2-I/15
under the CC&Rs is inappropriate.5 The Boumas rely on Meresse v. Stelma, 100
Wn. App. 857, 999 P.2d 1267 (2000), to support their argument against a fee
award. The Meresses, the original plaintiffs, alleged the subdivision owners had
adopted amendments to the restrictive covenants that were invalid. Id. at 868-69.
They sought attorney fees against their homeowners’ association. Id. They were
not entitled to fees where the homeowners’ association exceeded its authority, but
were not in violation of the instrument. Id. at 869. Nor was the homeowners’
association entitled to attorney fees where it was rightly challenged for exceeding
its authority. Id. at 868-69. Meresse is distinguishable. The applicable attorney
fee provision was narrower in Meresse.
The 2015 CC&Rs provide, “the prevailing party in any litigation involving the
enforcement of any provision of this [2015 CC&R] shall be entitled to judgment and
any remedy in law or equity . . . and for the reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs
incurred in such litigation but such prevailing party.” The Boumas argue that this
is not an enforcement case, and therefore the court is unable to award attorney
fees under this provision. But, the CC&Rs also say, “The provisions contained in
[the CC&Rs] or any amended or supplemental declaration shall be enforceable by
proceeding for prohibitive or mandatory injunction.” Bouma’s complaint sought
declaratory relief. It sought enforcement of the preamendment CC&Rs. The trial
5 The Boumas raise the issue of lack of claims subject to the provisions in
the 2015 CC&Rs for the first time on appeal, which they acknowledge. This court
may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court. RAP
2.5(A). However, we may nonetheless address the issue if we so choose. Smith
v. Shannon, 100 Wn.2d 26, 38, 666 P.2d 351 (1983).
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No. 80853-2-I/16
court did not err in concluding that the CC&Rs provide an appropriate basis to
award fees.
Chapter 64.38 RCW relates to homeowners’ associations. The Boumas’
motion for summary judgment sought a ruling, as a matter of law, that the 2015
CC&Rs were invalid and unenforceable, brought pursuant to chapter 64.38 RCW.
RCW 64.38.050 provides that “any violation of the provisions of this chapter
entitles an aggrieved party to any remedy provided by law or in equity. The court,
in an appropriate case, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing
party.” Neither the Association nor the trial court identified a violation of the chapter
by the Boumas in bringing their challenge to the amendments. An award of fees
under the statute was error, but has no consequence given the award was also
under the 2015 CC&Rs.
The Boumas further argue the trial court record does not support the
attorney fees. The court held the Boumas were liable under the 2015 CC&Rs and
RCW 64.38.050 in the amount of $32,434.50. The Boumas did not object to the
hourly rate provided by the Association. The Boumas requested that the fees
should “should be reduced by $1,066.00 for time spent on an unsuccessful motion
to compel and $6,585.00 for time for [Brad] Swanson that it has failed to prove is
reasonable.” They argued it was not clear that Swanson’s time was spent on work
related to the lawsuit. The court awarded the amount requested by the
Association. The Boumas do not demonstrate any abuse of discretion by the trial
court regarding the amount awarded.
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The trial court did not err in the award of attorney fees.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR
17