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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RONALD CHARLES RICHARDS :
:
Appellant : No. 1238 WDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 28, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0000344-2013
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 10, 2020
Appellant Ronald Charles Richards appeals from the order dismissing his
petition challenging the application of Subchapter I1 of the Sexual Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) as an untimely Post Conviction
Relief Act2 (PCRA) petition. Appellant claims that his petition is not subject to
the PCRA and argues that the application of Subchapter I violates ex post facto
and double jeopardy constitutional protections. We affirm.
The background to this appeal is as follows. On December 1, 2012,
Appellant restrained the complainant in an abandoned building, sexually
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.51-9799.75 (eff. Feb. 21, 2018).
2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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assaulted her, and took her purse. A criminal complaint was filed that same
day.
On May 20, 2013, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to
aggravated indecent assault and indecent assault,3 among other offenses.
That same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant. Pursuant to the plea
agreement, the trial court imposed a term of five to twelve years’
imprisonment. The trial court also informed Appellant of the lifetime
registration requirement under the former version of SORNA (SORNA I).4
Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
On July 17, 2017, nearly four years after Appellant was sentenced, our
Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017)
(plurality). The Muniz Court applied the framework established in Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) to conclude that SORNA I was
“punitive in effect.” Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1218. Based on that analysis, the
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3 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3125(a)(1) and 3126(a)(2), respectively.
4 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41 (eff. 2012). There is no indication that the
trial court found Appellant to be a sexually violent predator. Act 152, or
Megan’s Law III, see 2004, Nov. 24, P.L. 1243, No. 152, was in effect at the
time Appellant committed the underlying offenses. However, SORNA I had
taken effect at the time of his plea, and by its terms, applied to Appellant.
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13(1) (eff. 2012) (noting that SORNA I would apply to
an individual who was convicted of a sexually violent offense on or after
December 20, 2012, the effective date of SORNA I). We note that on
December 16, 2013, our Supreme Court held that Act 152 was
unconstitutional for violating the single-subject rule. Commonwealth v.
Neiman, 84 A.3d 603, 616 (Pa. 2013).
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High Court held that retroactive application of SORNA I constituted an ex post
facto violation when applied to a defendant who committed a sexual offense
before December 20, 2012, the effective date of SORNA I. See id. at 1223;
see also Commonwealth v. Lippincott, 208 A.3d 143, 150 (Pa. Super.
2019) (en banc).
In response to Muniz, the General Assembly amended SORNA I to
include Acts 10 and 29 of 2018 (SORNA II). See 2018, Feb. 21, P.L. 27, No.
10 (Act 10); see also 2018, June 12, P.L. 140, No. 29, (Act 29). SORNA II
divides sex offender registrants into two distinct subchapters – Subchapter H,
which includes individuals who were convicted of a sexually violent offense
that occurred on or after December 20, 2012, and Subchapter I, which
includes individuals who were convicted of a sexually violent offense that
occurred “on or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012,” or who
were required to register under a former sexual offender registration law on
or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012, and whose registration
requirements had not yet expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(c) and 42
Pa.C.S. § 9799.52, respectively.
In April 2018, Appellant filed a pro se motion challenging his registration
requirements. The trial court regarded the motion as Appellant’s first PCRA
petition and appointed counsel. On June 12, 2018, Appellant’s counsel filed
an “Amended PCRA Petition and/or Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus”
(amended petition). In his amended petition, Appellant claimed that he could
“not be subjected to any registration requirements upon release.” Am. Pet.,
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6/12/18, at 7 (unpaginated) (emphasis in original). Appellant asserted that
the former versions of Megan’s Law “no longer existed” and Subchapter I
supplanted SORNA I for certain sex offense registrants. Id. According to
Appellant, Subchapter I was punitive and violated federal and state ex post
facto principles because it contained substantially similar registration and
notification requirements as those found unconstitutional by Muniz in SORNA
I. Id. at 13-17. Appellant emphasized that the Muniz Court found that a
“defendant’s ‘fundamental right to reputation’ under the Pennsylvania
Constitution, and the fact that SORNA registration (particularly the Megan's
Law website) affected that right, was critical to the Court's rulings that the
Pennsylvania Constitution affords more ex post facto protections than the
federal constitution[] in this context . . . .”5 Id. at 29.
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5Specifically, Appellant quoted the following portion of the lead opinion in
Muniz discussing how SORNA I violated the Pennsylvania constitution:
To summarize, we find the following to be consequential to our
analysis of the relative protections afforded by the state and
federal ex post facto clauses: the right to be free from ex post
facto laws is an ‘inherent’ and fundamental Article I right under
the Pennsylvania Constitution; this Court has previously
recognized . . . there is some divergence between the state and
federal ex post facto clauses; SORNA[ I]’s registration and online
publication provisions place a unique burden on the right to
reputation, which is particularly protected in Pennsylvania; other
states have also found the retroactivity of registration laws
unconstitutional under their state constitutions, partly due to
reputation concerns; and both the state and offender have an
interest in the finality of sentencing that is undermined by the
enactment of ever-more severe registration laws. For those
reasons, we find Pennsylvania’s ex post facto clause provides even
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Appellant further claimed that the application of Subchapter I would
violate federal and state double jeopardy principles. Id. at 21-25.
Furthermore, he argued that Muniz nullified his registration requirements and
that the enforcement of Subchapter I would impose a second punishment for
the same criminal offense. Id. at 25.
Additionally, Appellant asserted that the PCRA court had jurisdiction to
consider his petition under the PCRA. Appellant noted that he was “currently
serving a sentence of imprisonment and is otherwise subject to a criminal
punishment in the form of Subchapter I registration and reporting
requirements as a result of [the trial court’s] sentence.” Id. at 4. Appellant
further asserted that Muniz recognized a new constitutional right that was
held to apply retroactively and that he filed his pro se petition within sixty
days of the creation of Subchapter I. Id. Alternatively, Appellant argued that
the PCRA court had jurisdiction to grant relief under a trial court’s habeas
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greater protections than its federal counterpart, and as we have
concluded SORNA’s registration provisions violate the federal
clause, we hold they are also unconstitutional under the state
clause.
Am. Pet., 6/12/18, at 78 (quoting Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1223). We note that
the passage quoted by Appellant was authored by Justice Dougherty in the
lead opinion joined by Justices Baer and Donohue. However, Justice Wecht,
joined by Justice Todd, filed a concurring opinion agreeing that SORNA I was
unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania constitution, but disagreeing that the
Pennsylvania constitution provided greater protections than the federal
constitution. Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1224 (Wecht, J. concurring).
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corpus powers or the court’s inherent authority to correct an illegal sentence
or a patent error. Id.
On August 3, 2018, the PCRA court issued a notice of its intent to dismiss
Appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). Appellant
did not respond. On August 28, 2018, the PCRA court dismissed the petition.
Appellant timely appealed and contemporaneously filed a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. The PCRA court filed
an opinion concluding that Appellant’s amended petition constituted an
untimely PCRA petition. PCRA Ct. Op., 11/27/18, at 4.
Of relevance to this appeal, we briefly note that on July 21, 2020, our
Supreme Court issued its decision in Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d
602 (Pa. 2020). The Lacombe Court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider challenges to sex offender
registration requirements outside the confines of the PCRA. Id. at 617-18.
Further, the Lacombe Court noted that Subchapter I was “markedly different
from the version of SORNA invalidated in Muniz.” Id. at 606. Accordingly,
the Lacombe Court applied the same Mendoza-Martinez framework
employed by the Court in Muniz, ultimately concluding that “Subchapter I is
nonpunitive and does not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto laws.” Id. at 605-06.
Additionally, we note that our Supreme Court recently vacated this
Court’s decision in Moore, in which we held that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.63, the
internet notification provision of Subchapter I, violated the federal ex post
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facto clause, but was severable from the remainder of Subchapter I.
Commonwealth v. Moore, 222 A.3d 16 (Pa. Super. 2019), vacated, 42 WAL
2020 (Pa. filed Oct. 6, 2020) (per curiam order) (vacating and remanding in
light of Lacombe).
Appellant presents the following issues for review:
1. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in ruling that it lacked
jurisdic[ti]on to adjudicate the merits of the [amended
petition]?
2. Whether the [PCRA] court erred by not ruling that Subchapter
I . . . is unconstitutional under the federal and state ex post
facto and double jeopardy clauses?
Appellant’s Brief at 5 (full capitalization omitted).
In his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in
dismissing his amended petition as an untimely PCRA petition. Appellant
contends that trial courts “clearly have jurisdiction to hear and decide the
merits of challenges to the retroactive application of sex offender registration
statutes.” Id. at 10. The Commonwealth, referring to several of this Court’s
previous decisions, responds that the trial court properly concluded
Appellant’s petition was an untimely PCRA petition. See Commonwealth’s
Brief at 21-22; Intervenors’ Brief at 43-44.6
The threshold issue of whether a petitioner must raise a claim for post-
conviction relief under the PCRA raises a question of law. See
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6 The Office of the Attorney General and the Pennsylvania State Police have
also submitted an intervenors’ brief.
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Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 497 (Pa. 2016). Our standard
of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Id. at 496-97.
As discussed previously, in Lacombe, our Supreme Court explicitly
rejected the proposition that claims involving the application of sexual
offender registration requirements must be raised in a timely PCRA petition.
See Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 617-18. Initially, the Lacombe Court explained
that it had previously considered challenges to the sexual offender registration
statutes that were raised in filings outside of the PCRA. Id. (citing, in part,
Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1208; Commonwealth v. Martinez, 147 A.3d 517, 523
(Pa. 2016); A.S. v. Pa. State Police, 143 A.3d 896, 903 n.7 (Pa. 2016)).
Further, the Lacombe Court recognized that “frequent changes to
sexual offender registration statutes, along with more onerous requirements
and retroactive application, complicate registrants’ ability to challenge new
requirements imposed years after their sentences become final.” Lacombe,
234 A.3d at 617. Further, under the PCRA, a petitioner could be ineligible for
relief based on timeliness grounds or because their sentence has expired. Id.
Therefore, the Lacombe Court concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction
to consider Lacombe’s petition for relief. Id. at 618. In so doing, our Supreme
Court declined to find that “the PCRA, or any other procedural mechanism, is
the exclusive method for challenging sexual offender registration statutes.”
Id.
Here, in light of Lacombe, we agree with Appellant that the trial court
had jurisdiction to consider his challenges to his sex offender registration
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requirements. See id. at 618. Therefore, we are constrained to conclude that
the trial court erred in treating Appellant’s petition as an untimely PCRA
petition.
In his remaining claim, Appellant argues that Subchapter I is
“unconstitutional under the federal and state ex post facto and double
jeopardy clauses.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. Appellant contends that “[t]he
similarities between the SORNA [I] scheme of sexual offender registration and
Subchapter I are remarkable , and the modest differences are not sufficiently
meaningful to distinguish Subchapter I from SORNA [I] for purposes of ex post
facto analysis.” Id. at 17 (some formatting altered). As to his double
jeopardy claims under United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions,
Appellant asserts:
The bottom line is that if this Honorable Court accepts the
arguments that [Appellant’s] reporting requirements were
nullified (if only temporarily) by [Muniz] decisions, and that
Subchapter I is, in its operation and effect, a criminal punishment
or penalty, then it necessarily follows that Subchapter I
effectuates a second punishment upon the defendant.
Id. at 37 (emphasis in original).
The Commonwealth responds, in relevant part, that Subchapter I is not
punitive and, therefore, “does not violate either the Pennsylvania
Constitution’s or the United States’ Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clauses.”
Commonwealth’s Brief at 24 (some formatting altered). The Commonwealth
continues that Appellant’s “double jeopardy claim must [also] fail because he
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is not being ‘punished’ twice for the same offense.” Id. at 67; see also
Intervenors’ Brief at 42-43.
Here, like in Lacombe, Appellant’s Subchapter I claims are based on
his underlying argument that like SORNA I, Subchapter I is punitive under the
analysis set forth in Muniz. In light of our Supreme Court’s holding in
Lacombe, we conclude Appellant is not entitled to relief. Id. Accordingly,
we affirm.7
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/10/2020
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7 We note that recently, in Commonwealth v. Smith, --- A.3d ---, 1011 MDA
2019 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 28, 2020) this Court declined to address an
appellant’s claims that “SORNA registration requirements violate his due
process rights because he committed his crimes as a juvenile and because
SORNA imposed an irrebuttable presumption of recidivism for juvenile
offenders.” Smith, 1011 MDA 2019 at 2. The Smith Court remanded the
matter to the trial court for further proceedings. Id. at 6. However, under
the circumstances of the instant case, and because Lacombe is dispositive of
Appellant’s arguments, we conclude that remand is unnecessary.
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