United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT August 30, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-61192
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSE TORRELLAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 4:05-CR-00021
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Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jose Torrellas, who entered a conditional guilty plea to one
count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), appeals the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress. We review factual findings
made by a district court on a motion to suppress for clear error,
and we review the district court’s ultimate conclusions on Fourth
Amendment issues de novo. United States v. Santiago, 310 F.3d
336, 340 (5th Cir. 2002). Finding no error, we affirm.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 05-61192
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Torrellas was stopped for speeding by Officer Chris Read of
the Meridian Police Department’s Interstate Crime Enforcement
unit. There is no question that the stop was justified or that
Officer Read could, consistent with the Fourth Amendment,
question Torrellas regarding his itinerary and then perform a
computer records check. See United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d
500, 507-08 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
In addition, the district court correctly applied our six-
factor test to determine whether Torrellas voluntarily consented
to the search. See United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 438
(5th Cir. 1993). Although much of the exchange between Officer
Paxson and Torrellas regarding consent is muffled, both officers
testified that Torrellas volunteered to allow them to search his
car when Officer Paxson asked whether he had contraband in the
car. They also testified that Torrellas twice confirmed his
consent when Officer Paxson asked whether Torrellas “had a
problem” with the officers searching the car. There was no
evidence of any coercive procedures employed to obtain the
consent; to the contary, Torrellas volunteered to allow a search
in response to a question about contraband. In a similar vein,
Torrellas was cooperative, further indicating that his consent
was voluntary. Although there is no direct evidence that
Torrellas knew that he could withhold consent, there is likewise
nothing to suggest that Torrellas believed that he was required
to consent. The district court appropriately concluded that
No. 05-61192
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Torrellas was not unintelligent, which is evident from the
videotape and supported by the district court’s prior interaction
with Torrellas. Finally, the district court permissibly drew the
inference that Torrellas believed that the drugs would not be
found. Given the record, we cannot say that the district court
erred in concluding that Torrellas’s consent was voluntary.
Given that Torrellas consented to the search while the records
check was being run, the fact that the officers did not inform
him that the check was “clean” before searching in no way
vitiated his consent; there is nothing to suggest that his
consent was in any way predicated on the records check, and the
officers were justified by his consent to search the car.
We reject Torrellas’s assertion that his consent did not
include the trunk or the speaker box located in the trunk.
Torrellas’s general consent to search the car for drugs justified
searching wherever drugs might be concealed. See Florida v.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 820-24 (1982). In addition, Torrellas specifically told
Officer Read that he could open the box.
Torrellas also contends that the evidence should be
suppressed because he was stopped solely based on the fact that
he is Hispanic. With respect to Torrellas’s Fourth Amendment
claim, it is beyond cavil that the officers’ subjective
motivations for the stop are irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment
No. 05-61192
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analysis. See United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 432
(5th Cir. 2005).
Torrellas’s claim that the alleged racial profiling violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments also fails. Although whether suppression is an
appropriate remedy for an Equal Protection Clause violation is an
open question, see United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420,
434 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1449 (2006), we
need not answer that question here, because Torrellas has failed
to provide evidence of any discriminatory motives by the
officers. Rather, he offers nothing more than speculation and
innuendo, much of which is colored by his mistaken assertion that
the officers worked for Immigration and Customs Enforcement and
were searching for illegal aliens rather than enforcing traffic
laws.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.