NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 13 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICKIE L. HILL, No. 19-15378
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:16-cv-00644-MMD-
CBC
v.
DANNY HOLLAND; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees,
and
TIMOTHY FILSON; et al.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 9, 2020**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Nevada state prisoner Rickie L. Hill appeals pro se from the district court’s
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal claims. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung,
391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hill’s failure-to-
protect claim because Hill failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether defendants Southworth, Holland, and Byrne were deliberately indifferent
to an excessive risk to Hill’s safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994) (a prison official is deliberately indifferent if the prison official “knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hill’s retaliation
claim because Hill failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
Southworth, Holland, and Byrne took an adverse action against Hill because of his
protected conduct. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009)
(elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim in the prison context).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hill’s equal
protection claim because Hill failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether Southworth, Holland, and Byrne intentionally discriminated against Hill
on the basis of his membership in a protected class. See Furnace v. Sullivan, 705
F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (plaintiff alleging an equal protection claim must
show that defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate based upon
2 19-15378
plaintiff’s membership in a protected class).
The district court properly dismissed Hill’s claims against defendant Filson
because Hill failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Filson personally
participated in a constitutional violation. See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113,
1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (standard of review for dismissal for failure to state a claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011)
(pleading requirements for establishing supervisory liability).
We reject as unsupported by the record Hill’s contention that the district
judge erred by failing to consider Hill’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (deadline for party to serve and
file objections to magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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