United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT September 21, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-11098
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER KEITH COLVIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:04-CR-381-ALL
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Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Christopher Keith Colvin appeals the sentence imposed
following the revocation of his supervised release following his
conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. For
the first time on appeal, he argues that the district court erred
by imposing a sentence outside the guidelines sentence range
without explicitly referencing the sentencing factors set forth in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He maintains that explicit reference to the
sentencing factors enumerated in § 3553(a) was required by this
court in United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir.),
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 05-11098
-2-
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 43 (2005). He asserts that Mares is
applicable to this case because sentences imposed upon the
revocation of supervised release should be reviewed for
reasonableness following United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005). Because Colvin did not raise this issue below, we review
for plain error. See United States v. Vontsteen, 950 F.2d 1086,
1091, 1093 (5th Cir. 1992).
Assuming arguendo that the Booker reasonableness standard
applies to sentences imposed following the revocation of supervised
release, the district court was still not required to “engage in
robotic incantations that each statutory factor [had] been
considered.” United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court gave
a fact-specific reason for the sentence it imposed that was
consistent with the sentencing factors contained in § 3553(a), and
this was sufficient. See id. Accordingly, the district court did
not commit error, plain or otherwise, by not explicitly referencing
the sentencing factors set forth in § 3553(a).
To the extent that Colvin argues that the sentence imposed was
unreasonable or plainly unreasonable, he has failed to properly
brief the issue and, therefore, waived it. See Trevino v. Johnson,
168 F.3d 173, 181 n.3 (5th Cir. 1999).
AFFIRMED.