NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROSA JARAMILLO HUICOCHEA, Nos. 18-71361 & 19-71442
Petitioner, Agency No. A202-097-786
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 16, 2020**
San Francisco, California
Before: WARDLAW and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and EATON,*** Judge.
Rosa Jaramillo Huicochea (“Jaramillo”), a citizen and native of Mexico,
petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
affirming the order of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her applications for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
***
Richard K. Eaton, Judge of the United States Court of International Trade,
sitting by designation.
Torture (“Torture Convention”). We have jurisdiction under § 242 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). 8 U.S.C. § 1252. While we review
legal questions de novo, findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence,
Hamazaspyan v. Holder, 590 F.3d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 2009), meaning that those
findings must be upheld unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We deny the petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Jaramillo
failed to show past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
an enumerated ground. On the record in this case, the BIA properly upheld the IJ’s
finding that the harms visited on Jaramillo, her husband, and her husband’s
nephews were attributable to general organized-crime activity and violent
conditions, rather than to their membership in a particular family. Jaramillo stated
that “members of an organized crime” group killed two of her husband’s nephews
because they refused to join the group. She further testified at the hearing that she
came to the United States “[b]ecause there’s a lot crime in my state of Guerrero,”
and she acknowledged that the gangs “target everybody that they think they can get
money from.” Likewise, her husband testified he was afraid to go back to Mexico
“[b]ecause of the crime that exist[s] in Mexico” and a fear of the “bad people” in
Mexico. We have held that the “desire to be free from harassment by criminals
motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a
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protected ground,” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010), and the
BIA properly upheld the IJ’s finding that this was such a case. Accordingly,
substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of Jaramillo’s claims for asylum
and withholding of removal.
2. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of withholding or
deferral of removal under the Torture Convention. To qualify for such relief, “an
applicant bears the burden of establishing that she will more likely than not be
tortured with the consent or acquiescence of a public official if removed to her
native country.” Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2020).
In contending that she is likely to be tortured, Jaramillo relies on country-
conditions reports, as well as on the threats and extortion against her and her
husband and on the violence against her husband’s nephews. On this record, we
cannot say that the BIA erred in upholding the IJ’s finding that Jaramillo failed to
show that it was more probable than not that she, in particular, would be tortured
with the acquiescence of the Mexican government. Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600
F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (“generalized evidence of violence and crime in
Mexico is not particular to [the petitioner] and is insufficient to meet this standard”
for relief under the Torture Convention).
3. Jaramillo also challenges the BIA’s denial of her motion to reopen her
proceedings on the ground that the IJ lacked “jurisdiction to commence and
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conduct removal proceedings in [her] case because the Notice to Appear charging
document filed with the Immigration Court was defective in that it failed to specify
a time and date for her removal hearing.” However, this argument is foreclosed by
our decision in Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2019), in which we
held that “‘a notice to appear that does not specify the time and place of an alien’s
initial removal hearing vests an [IJ] with jurisdiction over the removal proceedings
. . . so long as a notice of hearing specifying this information is later sent to the
alien.’” Id. at 1161 (citation omitted). In this case, Jaramillo was served with her
assertedly incomplete notice to appear on August 5, 2014 and was thereafter served
on October 29, 2014 with a notice of hearing, stating the date and time of her
hearing. Thus, under Karingithi, jurisdiction properly vested in the immigration
court.
The petition for review is DENIED.
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