United States v. Beydoun

                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                                                Fifth Circuit
                                                             F I L E D
                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                      FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                  October 24, 2006

                     _______________________             Charles R. Fulbruge III
                                                                 Clerk
                           No. 05-30841
                     _______________________


                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                Plaintiff-Appellee,

                               versus


                    WAJDI ABDULAZIZ BEYDOUN,
                 also known as Mohamed Beydoun,
                 also known as Wajdi A. Beydoun,
                     also known as Joe Bazzi,

                                                Defendant-Appellant.


         On Appeal from the United States District Court
              for the Western District of Louisiana
                    Docket No. 04-CR-50128-01


Before JONES, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

EDITH H. JONES, Chief Judge:

          Wajdi Abdulaziz Beydoun pled guilty to conspiracy to

traffic in counterfeit goods and trafficking in counterfeit goods.

He now appeals his sentence and restitution order on several

grounds. We AFFIRM his sentence but VACATE and REMAND the district

court’s restitution order.
                                I.    BACKGROUND

             Mr. Beydoun conspired with others to import cigarette

rolling papers falsely trademarked as “Zig-Zags” for resale in the

United States.1       The conspirators purchased low-quality papers

abroad and sent them to Mexico.          They then had booklet covers and

cartons for more expensive Zig-Zag papers printed and sent to

Mexico, where inmates in a women’s prison repackaged the cheap

papers into the counterfeit packages, creating a total of over one

million counterfeit booklets.2         Mexican officials retained fifteen

percent of the booklets as payment for the labor, shipping the

remainder to Beydoun in the United States for sale in Michigan and

Louisiana.

             After being apprehended, Beydoun pled guilty pursuant to

a plea agreement to conspiracy to traffic in counterfeit goods and

trafficking in counterfeit goods.           The Presentence Report (“PSR”)

grouped the offenses together and calculated a base offense level

of eight under the 2004 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines.               See

U.S.S.G. § 2B5.3(a).       The PSR found the infringement amount to be

$1.25     million   for   the   one    million     counterfeit   books,    thus


      1
            Zig-Zag is a registered U.S. Trademark currently registered by
Bollore A France Corporation under U.S. Trademark registration number 610,530.
The North Atlantic Trading Company is the exclusive United States distributor of
Zig-Zag white rolling papers. Blue Zig-Zag rolling papers are not authorized for
distribution in the United States.
      2
            Beydoun contracted with Unicom Grafix to produce one million booklet
covers, all of which were sent to Mexico for repackaging. A small number of the
booklets were damaged in production. Additionally, Unicom contracted with one
of Beydoun’s co-conspirators, Nabil Saad, to produce 250,000 booklet covers,
which were also sent to Mexico.

                                        2
increasing    his   offense       level       by   sixteen.      See      U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(I), § 2B5.3(b)(1)(B).                Beydoun also received a two-

level increase because the offense involved the manufacture and

importation of infringing items, see U.S.S.G. § 2B5.3(b)(3), and a

three-level     reduction    for    acceptance         of   responsibility,      see

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, resulting in a total offense level of twenty-

three. Combined with his criminal offense history of I, this level

resulted in a sentencing range of forty-six to fifty-seven months

imprisonment.       The     PSR    also       recommended     $1.85    million    in

restitution, based on one million infringing items and a retail

value of $1.85 per authentic Zig-Zag booklet.

          At sentencing, the government presented the testimony of

an FBI agent, Larry Reichardt, and an intelligence officer for the

U.S. Attorney’s Office, David Hudson, regarding the quantity of

infringing items.    The witnesses testified to information obtained

from the owner of the print shop that manufactured the booklets and

packaging and a former print-shop employee, Manual Bracamonte, who

helped arrange the repackaging in Mexico and the shipments across

the border, regarding the number of booklets printed and shipped.

The government also produced a chart listing the various print

orders, totaling one million.

          Beydoun argued that only 32,640 booklets should have been

counted to calculate the infringement amount used to enhance the

sentence and determine restitution, rather than one million.                     Only

the lower number was conclusively proven to have been shipped for

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distribution.      He further argued that restitution should not have

been based on the average retail price of Zig-Zag booklets, but

should have taken into account profits and losses.                   The district

court overruled Beydoun’s objection concerning the infringement

amount, but set restitution at only $566,267, the value of the

impact of one million infringing items on the legitimate sellers’

profits, not the $1.85 million recommended by the PSR.                           The

district   court    further   sentenced         Beydoun    to   forty-six   months

imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $200 special

assessment.    Beydoun now appeals.

                              II.     DISCUSSION

                                A.    Sentence

           This court reviews a district court’s interpretation and

application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual

findings for clear error.           United States v. Villaneuva, 408 F.3d

193, 202-03 & n.9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 268 (2005).

A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is plausible in

light of the record read as a whole.              Id. at 203.

           Beydoun argues that the district court erred in basing

the sixteen-level        increase    in   his    base     offense   level   on   the

production    of   one   million,     rather     than     approximately     32,000,

counterfeit booklets.       He contends that the court improperly used

the amount of intended loss, rather than actual loss, to determine

the number of infringing items. However, the PSR, the parties, and


                                          4
the district court used the terms “loss” and “intended loss”

interchangeably at sentencing. Beydoun cannot show any effect from

the use of the varying terms.

               Moreover,   Beydoun       is    incorrect     that     he       is     only

accountable for the number of infringing items the government can

prove he actually sold.         The offense of trafficking in counterfeit

goods,    to    which    Beydoun   pled       guilty,   is   complete          when    one

“intentionally traffics or attempts to traffic in goods or services

and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such

goods and services....” 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a).                     The term traffic

means    to    “transport,      transfer,      or   otherwise    dispose        of,     to

another...or      to    make,   import,       export,   obtain    control        of,    or

possess, with intent to so transport, transfer, or otherwise

dispose of.”       Id. § 2320(e)(2).           Under this definition, even if

Beydoun    never    sold    a   single    infringing       booklet,       he    remains

accountable for the full amount, as he admits he caused infringing

items to be produced with the intent to sell them.

               The government adduced sufficient proof as to the number

of   booklets      trafficked      by    Beydoun.        Under      the    copyright

infringement guideline, “[i]n a case in which the court cannot

determine the number of infringing items, the court need only make

a reasonable estimate of the infringement amount using any relevant

information, including financial records.”                 See U.S.S.G. § 2B5.3,

Application note 2(E).           At sentencing, Officer Hudson testified

that Bracamonte, the print-shop employee who assisted Beydoun, told

                                          5
Hudson that the printer had produced one million booklet covers,

and Mexican prisoners had repackaged all one million, save a

negligible amount damaged in assembly.             He also testified that

eighty-five percent of the completed booklets were sent back to

Beydoun, with the remaining fifteen percent being retained by

prison officials to pay for the labor.             The papers retained by

Mexican officials were eventually distributed in Mexico or Arizona

by prison officials.       Hudson acknowledged that the two recovered

invoices from the printer showed the receipt of only fifty-two

cartons in the United States, which, by weight, would account for

97,000 counterfeit booklets, but testified that the other invoices

had been purged from the records before 2002.          He further testified

that other invoices stated that one million booklet covers had been

ordered, of which 960,500 were printed, paid for, and shipped for

packaging.

            The district court found clear and convincing evidence

that at least 850,000 booklets had been repackaged.3           Guided by the

methodology of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v.

Guerra, 293 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002),4 and the Seventh Circuit's


      3
            As 850,000 booklets would be sufficient to put Beydoun in the $1
million to $2.5 million sentencing guideline range, the court did not need to
determine whether the amount was 850,000 or 960,500.
      4
            In Guerra, which involved counterfeit cigars, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the number of “infringing items” should be determined by looking at:
“(1) how close the defendants came to completing additional sales; (2) whether
there was a reasonable likelihood of generating revenue corresponding to the
amounts assigned....” 293 F.3d at 1293. The mere potential to form a component
of a finished product is insufficient, absent a finding that the defendants had
a “reasonable likelihood of actually completing the goods.” Id. at 1294.

                                      6
decision in United States v. Sung, 51 F.3d 92 (7th Cir. 1995),5 the

court considered Beydoun’s intent and found a reasonable likelihood

that at least 960,000 booklets had been repackaged and that the

entire order of one million booklets would be produced.                      Evidence

that it was likely that the entire amount would have been produced,

but for the government’s intervention, was sufficient to sentence

Beydoun for the entire amount.              Thus, based on the retail value of

$1.25 per package,6 the court correctly calculated the amount of

loss       at     $1.25     million,   and       the   sixteen-level       sentencing

enhancements         for     infringement        amounts   over     $1   million    was

warranted.

                   Finally, relying on United States v. Cho, 136 F.3d 982

(5th       Cir.    1998),    Beydoun   contends        that   the    district      court

erroneously considered his intent, when many of the booklets had

not yet been repackaged or shipped.                Beydoun argues that under Cho,

the reference in § 2B5.3 (infringement guidelines) to the table in

§ 2B1.1 (theft/fraud guideline) does not incorporate the commentary

on loss theories, which encompasses consideration of intended or




       5
            In Sung, which involved counterfeit hair care products, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that, for purposes of calculating the loss, the court must
determine whether the defendant had “any reasonable expectation” of being able
to sell the infringing items. 51 F.3d at 95.
       6
            Arguably, the retail value of the authentic booklets, $1.85, should
have been used rather than the retail value of the counterfeit booklets, $1.25.
However, the outcome would not change, as either amount puts the infringement
amount between U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I)’s $1 million and $2.5 million range for
a sixteen-level enhancement. The government did not object to the district court
using the lesser amount.

                                             7
speculative losses.7 However, the district court determined, based

on the testimony of Officer Hudson, that 850,000 booklets were

assembled (and thus “made or controlled” by Beydoun, meeting the

statutory definition of trafficked).               This number alone would

supply an infringement amount of $1,062,500, which exceeds the $1

million minimum for the sixteen-level increase.              The distinction

between actual and intended loss is thus inconsequential.                       The

district court did not clearly err in calculating the defendant’s

final offense level.

                              B.    Restitution

            The court ordered Beydoun to pay $566,267 in restitution

pursuant   to   the    Mandatory    Victims    Restitution       Act    (“MVRA”),

18 U.S.C. § 3663A, basing the amount on the lost profits for one

million counterfeit booklets.              Under the MVRA, defendants are

required   to   make   full   restitution      for    offenses    in    which   an

identifiable     victim    has     suffered    a     pecuniary    loss.         Id.

§ 3663A(c)(1)(B).       The burden of proof is on the government to

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence the amount of loss

sustained by a victim.        Id. § 3664(a), (e).          The MVRA does not

permit restitution awards to exceed a victim’s loss.                   See United

States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107, 117 (2d Cir. 2006).                  A district


      7
            In Cho, this court held that the retail value of the counterfeit
items, not the loss resulting from the defendant’s trademark infringement,
determined the sentence enhancement under the fraud/deceit table. While § 2B5.3
references the table in the fraud/deceit guideline, only that table was
incorporated by reference, not the accompanying prefatory materials or
commentary. 136 F.3d at 984.

                                       8
court’s fact-finding as to the amount of restitution under the MVRA

is reviewed for clear error.   See United States v. Cihak, 137 F.3d

252, 264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 847, 119 S. Ct. 118

(1998). A reviewing court will reverse a restitution award only if

the defendant shows that it is probable that the sentencing court

failed to consider one of the mandatory factors and that failure

influenced the court.   United States v. Schinnell, 80 F.3d 1064,

1070 (5th Cir. 1996).

          The district court calculated the amount of restitution

by multiplying one million booklets by the legitimate sellers’

gross profit per booklet, as evidenced by the testimony of its

corporate officer.   Beydoun argues that the district court erred

both in using the one million booklet amount and in using a lost

gross profit, rather than net profit, multiplier.

          In this case, the government demonstrated loss based on

the value of diverted sales, offering evidence of the legitimate

sellers’ lost gross profits for booklets of authentic Zig-Zag

papers.   However, the government did not contend that all one

million booklets were distributed or sold.   The government’s proof

was sufficient to establish a violation of the trafficking statute

and support a sentence enhancement, but it was insufficient to

establish that the actions caused the victims an actual loss.   See

18 U.S.C. § 3664(e); see also United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d

1044, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Dawson, 250 F.3d 1048,

1050 (7th Cir. 2001) (a victim “should not receive anything more in

                                 9
restitution than is required to make [it] whole”); United States v.

Messner, 107 F.3d 1448, 1455 (10th Cir. 1997) (the district court

abused its discretion in ordering restitution absent proof of the

amount of loss to the victims).          The court may not award the victim

a windfall.      United States v. Arutunoff, 1 F.3d 1112, 1121 (10th

Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Stanley, 309 F.3d 611, 613

(9th   Cir.     2002)   (MVRA   does    not    allow    “double      recovery   by   a

victim”).

              The district court did not believe it was necessary to

calculate the actual amount placed into commerce and sold to

determine the appropriate amount of restitution.                  The judge found

that the one million figure was “a goal or a target” and based

restitution on that amount.           Because, however, there was no actual

loss to the legitimate sellers if the booklets were never placed

into commerce and sold, this was in error.               Thus, we must remand to

the district court to re-analyze the government’s evidence and

determine the number of items actually shipped back to Beydoun in

the    United    States   and   put     into   the     market   to    compete   with

legitimate Zig-Zag papers.

              Beydoun also contends that the district court erred in

basing restitution on the legitimate sellers’ gross, rather than

net, lost profits. Because the purpose of the MVRA is to compensate

a victim for its losses, the appropriate measure in this commercial

setting is lost net profit.            On remand, the district court should



                                         10
determine the amount of net profits the legitimate sellers lost as

a result of Beydoun’s actions and limit restitution to that amount.

                                         C.   Crawford

               At     trial,        Officer            Hudson     testified          about     his

conversations with Beydoun’s co-conspirator, Bracamonte, and the

print    shop       owner       regarding     the        number    of   booklets       printed,

repackaged,         and    sent     to   Beydoun.          The     court      relied    on   this

testimony to establish the number of counterfeit goods for both

sentencing and restitution purposes. Beydoun asserts that, because

the Guidelines calculation of infringement amount involves fact-

bound    determinations            capable        of    increasing      his    sentence,       the

court’s    reliance          on    hearsay    testimony           violated     his     right   of

confrontation under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct.

1354 (2004).           Crawford concerned testimonial hearsay that was

introduced at trial; unaddressed by Crawford is whether the Sixth

Amendment       right       to     confront       witnesses        applies      similarly       at

sentencing.           This court’s            pre-Crawford precedent rejected a

confrontation right at sentencing.                       See United States v. Navarro,

169 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 1999).                     Two unpublished opinions held that

Crawford       does       not     extend      a        defendant’s      rights       under     the

Confrontation Clause to sentencing proceedings.                            See United States

v. Leatch, 111 F.App’x 770 (5th Cir. 2004)(unpublished); United

States    v.        Salas,       2006    WL   1307500       (5th     Cir.      May     8,    2006)

(unpublished).            Although this court’s unpublished opinions are not



                                                  11
precedential, their position on this issue comports with that of

the majority of our sister circuits.         See, e.g., United States v.

Katzopoulos, 437 F.3d 569, 576 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v.

Luciano, 414 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v.

Martinez, 413 F.3d 239, 243-44 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v.

Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Chau,

426 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005). Following these authorities,

we conclude that there is no Crawford violation when hearsay

testimony is used at sentencing, rather than at trial.

                         D.    Registration

          For the first time on appeal, Beydoun argues that the

Zig-Zag booklets did not bear an “®” symbol or state “Reg. U.S.

Pat.,” as required for recovery of damages or restitution.          See

15 U.S.C. § 1111, 18 U.S.C. § 2320(c).       Contrary to his assertions,

however, both the legitimate and counterfeit Zig-Zag booklets

clearly contain the “®” symbol.      This argument is meritless.

                              E.    Booker

          Beydoun argues for the first time on appeal that the

restitution order pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act

of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A-3664, violates his Fifth and Sixth

Amendment rights under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125

S. Ct. 738 (2005).   As Beydoun concedes, this issue is foreclosed

by United States v. Garza, 429 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2005).

                         III.      CONCLUSION


                                    12
          Because there was sufficient evidence to support the

sixteen-level enhancement, Beydoun’s sentence is AFFIRMED.               The

restitution   order,   however,   is    VACATED   and   REMANDED   for   the

district court to determine the amount of actual loss suffered by

the legitimate sellers of Zig-Zag rolling papers.




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