NIMS, Judge: This case is before us on respondent's motion for summary judgment. Respondent filed the motion on March 1, 1983, pursuant to Rule 121. 1
Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioner's 1979 Federal income tax and a
Petitioner resided in Dover, New Hampshire, when he filed the petition in this case.
In his petition, petitioner stated as follows:
5. The facts upon which Petitioner relies in the previous paragraphs, as the basis of his case, are as follows:
A. That the determination of the gross income and its allocation was based on the arbitrary assumption of an agent of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, without verification, substantiation or basis.
B. That no expenses or exemption were allowed by respondent of know [sic] expenses and deductions.
C. That the Fraud Penalty asserted,Additionally, the Petitioner sets forth the issue, whether Petitioner's salary was (or is) a proper subject from whence to exact a federal income (excise) tax:
A. That the pecuniary consideration or compensation which Petitioner derived from salaried employment is not the proper subject from whence to exact a federal excise tax.
B. That Petitioner did not receive income within the sense and meaning*381 of the
The petition also contained a series of questions concerning the constitutional basis of the income tax which were addressed to the Internal Revenue Service.
Respondent's answer denies the substantive allegations of the petition and further answered as follows:
25. FURTHER ANSWERING the petition, and in support of the determination that a part of the underpayment of tax required to be shown on the petitioner's income tax return for the taxable year 1979 is due to fraud, the respondent alleges:
(a) During the taxable year 1979 the petitioner used the cash method of accounting.
(b) During the taxable year 1979 the petitioner was employed by RICH's of New Hampshire, Inc.
(c) The petitioner failed to file a federal income tax return for the taxable year 1979 or pay any income tax liability for said year.
(d) During the taxable year 1979, the petitioner received wages of $11,132.86 and a profit-sharing distribution of $2,891.75.
(e) The petitioner's taxable income for the taxable year 1979 was $14,024.61.
(f) The income tax liability due and payable by the petitioner for the taxable year 1979 is $2,485.00.
(g) The petitioner's failure*382 to file an income tax return and to report his correct taxable income for the taxable year 1979 was due to fraud with intent to evade tax.
(h) The petitioner's failure to pay his income tax liability for 1979 was due to fraud with intent to evade tax.
(i) A part of the underpayment of tax which the petitioner was required to show on an income tax return for the taxable year 1979 was due to fraud.
26. FURTHER ANSWERING the petition, and in support of the respondent's claim for damages under
(a) The petitioner in the above-entitled proceeding was also the petitioner in Goodrich v. Commissioner, docket number 20018-80"S", which concerned a deficiency in income tax for the taxable year 1978.
(b) The case at docket number 20018-80"S" was tried at Concord, New Hampshire on June 22, 1981. No opinion has been served upon the respondent as of the date of this answer.
(c) During the trial on June 22, 1981, the petitioner refused to address the issues in the case but instead raised a variety of frivolous, redundant*383 and irrelevant arguments.
(d) During the trial on June 22, 1981, the court advised the petitioner that his arguments were invalid, and that the income tax is constitutional.
(e) During the trial on June 22, 1981, the Court explained the provisions of
(f) The petition in the above-entitled case was filed July 14, 1981.
(g) The petition filed in this case does not give fair notice of any matter in controversy but merely raises additional frivolous arguments which are wholly without merit.
(h) The petitioner instituted the above-entitled proceedings before the Tax Court merely for delay.
Petitioner failed to file a reply to respondent's answer. Respondent, pursuant to Rule 37(c), moved for entry of an order that the undenied allegations in the answer be deemed admitted. The motion and notice of a hearing on the motion were served on petitioner in November, 1981. Petitioner did not appear at the January 6, 1982, hearing. However, he filed a "motion for definite statement and response to respondent's answer" on December 11, 1981. The Court determined*384 in an order dated January 6, 1982, that petitioner's written response did not constitute a reply to the affirmative allegations in the answer. Accordingly, the Court ordered that "the undenied allegations of fact set forth in paragraph 25(a) through 25(i), and in paragraph 26(a) through 26(h) of the answer are hereby deemed admitted." A copy of that order was served on petitioner on January 19, 1982.
Respondent filed his motion for summary judgment on March 1, 1983. A hearing on the motion was held in Boston, Massachusetts, on April 25, 1983. Petitioner appeared and made a presentation during the hearing. Petitioner introduced no questions of fact at the hearing. He merely restated the legal questions presented in his petition.
Summary judgment is appropriate in this case because there is no genuine issue of fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(b). We will consider the deficiency, the
Deficiency
Petitioner alleges that respondent's determination "was based on the arbitrary assumption of an agent of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, without*385 verification, substantiation or basis." This Court will generally not look behind a deficiency notice to examine evidence used or the propriety of the respondent's motive or the administrative policy or procedures involved in making the deficiency determination.
Petitioner also alleges "[t]hat no expenses or exemption were allowed by respondent of know [sic] expenses and deductions." This action by the respondent, however, does not render the deficiency determination arbitrary or unreasonable where the petitioner refuses to cooperate with the agent conducting the tax investigation.
Petitioner also argues that his wages and profit-plan distributions were not subject to tax. Such arguments have been repeatedly rejected by the courts.
Because there is*387 no dispute concerning the amounts received by petitioner and because we reject petitioner's legal arguments, we hold that petitioner is liable for the deficiency as determined by the respondent.
Petitioner alleges that respondent asserted the
Respondent has the burden of proof as to the
Whenever it appears to the Tax Court that proceedings before it have been instituted by the taxpayer merely for delay, damages in an amount not in excess of $500 shall be awarded to the United States by the Tax Court in its decision.
The deemed admissions in this case establish that the petition only raises frivolous arguments which are wholly without merit and that petitioner instituted this proceeding merely for delay. The fact that petitioner allowed these contentions to become deemed admitted through the duly noticed process of this Court indicates sufficient lack of interest in the proceeding to imply that he in fact instituted this case merely for delay. Further, as discussed earlier, petitioner raises only arguments which have been rejected and discounted*389 as frivolous many times in the past. See, e.g.,
An appropriate order an decision will be entered.
Footnotes
1. All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, in effect during the year in issue.↩
2. We note that Congress recently increased the amount of damages permissible under
sec. 6673↩ from $500 to $5,000 for frivolous or groundless proceedings brought to this Court after December 31, 1982. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, sec. 292(b), 96 Stat. 324, 574.