FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NOV 27 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAKOTA WADE TIDWELL, No. 19-17329
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:18-cv-08083-DLR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 16, 2020**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: BYBEE, MURGUIA, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Dakota Tidwell appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social
Security Administration’s denial of his application for disability insurance benefits
(DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI). Tidwell argues that the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) improperly weighted the assessments of his
treating psychiatrist, Dr. Gibson, and erroneously discounted his testimony
regarding the severity of his symptoms. The district court had jurisdiction under
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review the district court’s decision de novo. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995,
1010 (9th Cir. 2014). The ALJ’s disability determination will stand if it is free
from legal error and supported by evidence that a “reasonable person might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 1009 (citing Lingenfelter v. Astrue,
504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007)). We affirm.
1. The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons to discount the
assessments of Tidwell’s treating psychiatrist that were supported by substantial
evidence. Though the assessments of treating physicians are entitled to some
deference, Lester v. Chatter, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995), those assessments
are not “necessarily conclusive as to either a physical condition or the ultimate
issue of disability.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989).
Where, as here, the opinions of a treating physician are contradicted by other
medical evidence, the ALJ is tasked with resolving the conflict. See Benton ex rel.
Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003). The ALJ may credit the
opinions of non-treating doctors over treating doctors if she provides specific and
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legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Chaudhry v. Astrue,
688 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 2012).
The ALJ reasonably found that the assessment of agency psychiatrist Dr.
Steingard contradicted Dr. Gibson’s assessment that Tidwell could not work due to
marked and extreme limitations. Whereas Dr. Gibson found that Tidwell’s
obsessive behaviors would cause him to be off task up to 15% of the day, Dr.
Steingard determined that Tidwell’s obsessive rituals took no more than “a few
minutes a day.” The ALJ also pointed out that Tidwell’s other treatment notes
contradicted Dr. Gibson’s conclusion that Tidwell’s mania and anxiety would
make it impossible for him to work. For instance, treatment notes throughout the
alleged disability period stated that “[Tidwell’s] moods were good, his obsessions
and anxiety remained but they were variable and manageable.” The ALJ also
observed that, despite Tidwell’s behavioral impairments, “[his] depression, bipolar
disorder, and anxiety [were] well controlled with medication,” and were
“manageable and stable.” The record supports the ALJ’s observation.
The ALJ also cited the opinions of non-examining agency doctors Yandell
and Zuess who reviewed Tidwell’s medical records and determined that he could
perform light, semi-skilled work. The non-examining doctors’ opinions were
consistent with the record, which showed that Tidwell’s moods were stable, and his
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anxiety and obsessions were legitimate but manageable. Thus, the ALJ provided
specific and legitimate reasons, which were supported by substantial evidence, for
granting little weight to Dr. Gibson’s assessments.1
2. The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons to discount Tidwell’s
testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms. The ALJ is responsible for
evaluating the claimant’s credibility, resolving conflicts in the evidence, and
clarifying ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995).
Absent evidence of malingering, an ALJ may reject a claimant’s subjective
symptom testimony only if there are specific, clear and convincing reasons to do
so. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492–93 (9th Cir. 2015). To meet that
standard, the ALJ must “specify which testimony she finds not credible, and then
provide clear and convincing reasons, supported by evidence in the record, to
support that credibility determination.” Id. at 489.
1
Inasmuch as Tidwell contends that the ALJ erroneously interpreted the
medical evidence based on a misunderstanding of the medical definition of
Tidwell’s “stable” condition, that argument is unavailing. Although the term
“stable” may have a technical meaning in the treatment context, the record is clear
that Tidwell’s impairments were both stable and manageable with medication. See
Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Impairments
that can be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose
of determining eligibility for SSI benefits.”).
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The ALJ outlined the portions of Tidwell’s testimony she found inconsistent
with the overall record: Tidwell’s anxiety made it impossible to work when he was
around other people, his difficulties concentrating prevented him from completing
tasks efficiently, and his inability to follow instructions precluded any meaningful
work. But as the ALJ observed, Tidwell’s treatment history and his own testimony
undercut such expansive limitations. Treatment notes from Southwest Behavioral
Health showed that Tidwell had learned to employ coping strategies to manage his
anxiety, and treatment notes from Little Colorado Behavioral Health Center
revealed Tidwell “was doing the best he [had] in years.” As the ALJ noted, those
treatment records demonstrated that Tidwell’s “depression, bipolar disorder, and
anxiety [were] well controlled with medication and [were] manageable and stable.”
Tidwell’s own testimony revealed that he had the capacity to volunteer at his
church, work in the church library, perform household chores, cook simple meals,
and tend to his pets. Those treatment records and activities contradicted Tidwell’s
testimony. Therefore, specific, clear and convincing reasons supported the ALJ’s
decision to discount Tidwell’s subjective testimony.
AFFIRMED.
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