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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
GABRIEL TYLER WOOD :
:
Appellant : No. 73 MDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 28, 2019
in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-SA-0000010-2019
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED DECEMBER 01, 2020
Gabriel Tyler Wood (“Wood”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his conviction of driving while operating privilege is
suspended or revoked.1 We affirm.
On October 16, 2018, at approximately 7:43 a.m., Pennsylvania State
Trooper Jeffrey Black (“Trooper Black”) was dispatched to a disabled vehicle,
which was pulled over to the side of Exit 77, Linglestown Road, on Interstate
81. When he arrived at the disabled vehicle, Trooper Black observed a single
male individual standing near the vehicle. Upon exiting his cruiser, and
approaching the disabled vehicle, Trooper Black spoke with the man, who
identified himself as Wood. Wood told Trooper Black that he was driving to
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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a).
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work when his vehicle broke down. After speaking with Wood, Trooper Black
checked the vehicle’s registration and Wood’s driving history. Upon doing so,
Trooper Black discovered that Wood’s license had been suspended2 and that
Wood had no insurance. Trooper Black issued Wood citations for both driving
while operating privilege is suspended or revoked and operation of a motor
vehicle without required financial responsibility.3
On January 10, 2019, Wood appeared before a magisterial district judge
and proceeded to a hearing on both citations. The magisterial district judge
found Wood guilty of the above-mentioned offenses and sentenced him to 30
days in the Dauphin County Prison.
Wood filed a timely summary appeal to the Court of Common Pleas,
challenging his conviction of driving while operating privilege is suspended or
revoked. On May 28, 2019, the trial court conducted a trial de novo, during
which Wood was represented by Elizabeth A. Close, Esquire (“Attorney
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2 Wood’s certified driving record reveals that his driver’s license was to be
restored on June 27, 2016. See Commonwealth Exhibit 1 (Certified Driving
Record), at 2. However, on June 25, 2016, Wood was charged with driving
while operating privilege was suspended or revoked and an additional one-
year suspension became effective on September 15, 2016. Id. Since that
violation, Wood’s driver’s license has been continuously suspended through a
series of four more incidents of driving while operating privilege is suspended
or revoked, among other Motor Vehicle Code violations. See id. at 2-5.
Wood’s certified driving record indicates that, prior to the instant case, his
license was suspended through October 5, 2021. Id. at 5.
3 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1786(f).
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Close”). The Commonwealth presented the testimony of Trooper Black and
admitted Wood’s certified driving record into evidence.
Wood presented the testimony of Hailey Mehaffie (“Mehaffie”), his then-
girlfriend. Mehaffie testified that she, not Wood, was driving the vehicle that
morning. Mehaffie stated that after the vehicle broke down, she called a friend
to pick her up and left the scene because she was late for work.
Wood also testified on his own behalf. In his testimony, Wood confirmed
that Mehaffie was driving the vehicle when it broke down, and that Mehaffie
had a friend pick her up from that location. Wood testified that he called for
a tow truck and elected to stay with the vehicle until the tow truck arrived.
Wood agreed that, sometime after he had called for the tow truck, Trooper
Black arrived on scene and issued the above-mentioned citations.
At the conclusion of the trial de novo, the trial court found Wood guilty
of driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked. On the same
day, the trial court sentenced Wood to a period of 60 days to 6 months in the
Dauphin County Prison, and ordered Wood to pay a fine of $1,000.00.
Wood, through Attorney Close, filed a Notice of Appeal on June 28,
2019. Attorney Close filed a Statement of Intent to file an Anders4 Brief in
lieu of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal. The trial court declined to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion. On August
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4 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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16, 2019, in a per curiam Order, this Court quashed Wood’s appeal as
untimely filed.
Subsequently, on August 26, 2019, James J. Karl, Esquire, entered his
appearance on behalf of Wood and timely filed a Petition for Relief pursuant
to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).5 The PCRA Petition alleged that
Attorney Close was per se ineffective for failing to file a timely notice of appeal
for Wood. On December 30, 2019, the PCRA court granted the PCRA Petition
and reinstated Wood’s post-sentence motion and direct appeal rights, nunc
pro tunc. After some deliberation, the trial court re-appointed the Dauphin
County Public Defender’s Office to represent Wood. Attorney Close re-entered
her appearance on behalf of Wood and filed the instant timely Notice of
Appeal.6, 7
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5 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
6 Attorney Close did not file a post-sentence motion on Wood’s behalf.
7 On January 8, 2020, Attorney Close filed a Statement of Intent to file an
Anders Brief in lieu of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal. Attorney Close subsequently filed, in this Court, an
Anders Brief and an Application to Withdraw as Counsel. During this Court’s
independent review of the record, we determined that a non-frivolous issue
existed as to whether Wood had actual notice that his license was suspended.
Commonwealth v. Wood, 73 MDA 2020 (Pa. Super. filed September 24,
2020) (unpublished memorandum at 11-12). We ordered Attorney Close to
file either an appellate brief, or a new application to withdraw from
representation and an Anders brief addressing this issue. Id. at 12. The
parties supplemented the record with Wood’s certified driving record.
Additionally, Wood has filed an appellate brief with this Court.
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Wood now presents the following claim for our review: “In a prosecution
for driving under suspension, was not the evidence insufficient to sustain the
conviction when the Commonwealth failed to prove that [Wood] had actual
notice of the suspension?” Brief for Appellant at 4 (some capitalization
omitted).
Wood argues that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
evidence that Wood had actual notice of his license suspension. Id. at 15-17.
Wood acknowledges that his driving record reveals that the Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”) mailed him a notice of license
suspension. Id. at 21. However, Wood, relying on this Court’s decision in
Commonwealth v. Crockford, 660 A.2d 1326 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc),
asserts that merely demonstrating that the notice of license suspension was
mailed is insufficient to establish actual notice. Brief for Appellant at 16-18.
Additionally, Wood asserts that the “rebuttable presumption” set forth in
Crockford8 is inapplicable to his case and, instead, this Court should view the
“totality of the evidence.” Id. at 20-21. Wood claims that the
Commonwealth’s only evidence is his certified driving record. Id. at 19. Wood
acknowledges that he did not present a driver’s license to Trooper Black, but
contends that this is not dispositive of his claim, because the “Commonwealth
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8 In Crockford, this Court applied a rebuttable presumption analysis to
determine whether the Commonwealth had proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant had actual notice of his license suspension. Crockford,
660 A.2d at 1334.
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… did not produce any evidence concerning [] Wood’s possession or non-
possession of a driver’s license at the scene.” Id.
When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
adhere to the following standard of review:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
is whether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not
weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-
finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt
may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
considered. Finally, the [trier] of fact[,] while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced
is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 790 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted).
In order to establish a violation of driving while operating privilege is
suspended or revoked, section 1543(a) of the Motor Vehicle Code provides
that, “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b), any person who drives a motor
vehicle on any highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth after the
commencement of a suspension, revocation or cancellation of the operating
privilege and before the operating privilege has been restored is guilty of a
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summary offense[.]” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a). Additionally, the
Commonwealth must demonstrate that the defendant had actual notice that
his license was suspended or revoked. Commonwealth v. Baer, 682 A.2d
802, 805 (Pa. Super. 1996); see also Commonwealth v. Kane, 333 A.2d
925, 927 (Pa. 1975) (stating that it is necessary for the Commonwealth to
prove that the accused had actual notice of suspension in order to sustain a
conviction of driving while under suspension); Commonwealth v.
McDonough, 621 A.2d 569, 572 (Pa. 1993) (explaining that the Kane Court’s
holding applies to the current statute, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543).
In determining what factors may be considered to determine whether
an individual had actual notice of license suspension, our Supreme Court has
stated the following:
Factors that a finder of fact may consider in determining
circumstantially or directly whether a defendant had actual notice
of his or her suspension include, but are not limited to, evidence
that the defendant was verbally or in writing apprised of the
license suspension during the trial or a plea, statements by the
accused indicated knowledge that he or she was driving during the
period in which his or her license had been suspended, evidence
that PennDOT sent by mail the notice of the suspension to
appellant’s current address, evidence that PennDOT’s notice of
suspension was not returned as undeliverable, attempts by the
accused to avoid detection or a citation, and any other conduct
demonstrating circumstantially or directly appellant’s knowledge
of the suspension or awareness of guilt.
Commonwealth v. Zimmick, 653 A.2d 1217, 1221 (Pa. 1995) (citation
omitted); see also Kane, 333 A.2d at 926 (stating that mailing the notice of
suspension, without more, is insufficient to prove actual notice). Actual notice
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“may take the form of a collection of facts and circumstances that allow the
fact finder to infer that a defendant has knowledge of suspension.”
Crockford, 660 A.2d at 1330-31.
Here, at the trial de novo, Wood did not challenge whether the
Commonwealth had presented sufficient evidence that Wood had actual notice
of his license suspension. The Commonwealth presented a single piece of
evidence regarding notice of Wood’s suspension: his certified driving record.
See N.T. (Summary Appeal), 5/28/19, at 9; see also Commonwealth Exhibit
1 (Certified Driving Record), at 5. Wood’s certified driving record reveals a
history of six license suspensions and indicates that all of the notices of
suspension were mailed to Wood. See Commonwealth Exhibit 1 (Certified
Driving Record), at 1-5; see also Commonwealth v. Harden, 103 A.3d 107,
114 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that an appellant’s history of suspensions for
previous violations, as detailed in his driving record, supports an inference of
actual knowledge of his license suspension). Additionally, Wood testified in
his defense, and stated that he did not produce a driver’s license to Trooper
Black when requested. See N.T. (Summary Appeal), 5/28/19, at 25; see
also Commonwealth v. Dietz, 621 A.2d 160, 162-63 (Pa. Super. 1993)
(holding that a defendant’s failure to possess a current license at the time of
the incident is presumptive knowledge of suspension); Harden, 103 A.3d at
114-15 (stating that sufficient evidence of actual notice existed where the
defendant “had a long history of license suspensions, [had] failed to present
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a driver’s license during the traffic stop” and the certified driving record
reflected that notice of the driver’s license suspension had been mailed to the
defendant).
Evidence that PennDOT mailed the notice of suspension to Wood,
together with the surrounding circumstances, is sufficient to establish that
Wood had actual notice that his license was suspended. See Smith, supra;
Crockford, 660 A.2d at 1330-31; Harden, 103 A.3d at 114-15. Accordingly,
we cannot grant Wood relief on this claim.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Olson joins the memorandum.
Judge Bowes concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/1/2020
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