UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JORDAN GLOGAU,
Plaintiff
v. Civil Action No. 20-2803 (CKK)
UNITED STATES,
Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(December 4, 2020)
Plaintiff Jordan Glogau, appearing pro se, brings this action seeking, among other things,
to “void” the 2016 presidential election, bar President Donald J. Trump and Vice President
Michael R. Pence from running for public office, put the United States government into
receivership, and void all laws, treaties, and appointments undertaken during President Trump’s
tenure in office. The Court shall DISMISS the Complaint for the reasons set forth below.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff sues the United States government. 1 See Compl. § IV. Plaintiff claims that the
presidential election in 2016 was a “Coup d’etat by the Russian Government” and therefore
should be “voided.” Id. § V. In addition to “annulling” the results of the 2016 presidential
election, id. § I, Plaintiff asks the Court to:
• Install “the Speaker of the House as the temporary President,” id. § I;
• Put the United States government “into receivership under Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code,” id.;
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Plaintiff also suggests that his lawsuit is against President Barack Obama and Senator Mitch
McConnell, but indicates that those individuals are “stand-ins for the Federal Government as a
whole, not individuals.” Compl. § VII; see also id. § IV (“The Federal Government is the
defendant[.]”). Accordingly, the Court construes Plaintiff’s Complaint as a suit against the
United States.
1
• Give “[President] Trump, his running mate, his children, his siblings and their estates
full pardons,” id.;
• Mandate that “[President] Trump and [Vice President] Pence agree not to run and/or
enter into public office[,]” id.; and
• Vacate “all executive orders, laws, treaties, and appointments done by [President
Trump’s] administration . . . including the two recent Supreme Court appointees,” id.
Plaintiff’s claims appear to be based on his belief that such actions are necessary because “[o]ur
Country is in the middle of turmoil” and in a “state of collapse and disrepair.” Id. §§ I, XI. In
addition, Plaintiff indicates that “one major reason” for his lawsuit is “the totally unfair tax law
that burdens high tax states like New York and California.” Id. § I. Plaintiff appears to be a
resident of New York. See Compl. (caption).
Plaintiff notes that he previously filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York in which he “attempted to sue Donald Trump for treason.”
Compl. § V. That action was dismissed by the court sua sponte for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, as the Court concluded that Plaintiff did not have standing to sue. See Order of
Dismissal, ECF No. 4, Glogau v. Trump et al., 17-CV-2376 (CM) (S.D.N.Y.). In the present
action, Plaintiff contends that “the whole idea of standing only makes sense when we’re talking
about normal circumstances. This is NOT the present circumstance, this is an emergency.”
Compl. § VI. Plaintiff then lists a number of parties that “can join the suit” if “needed for
standing” including, among others, former presidents of the United States, members of President
Trump’s family; and active and retired military generals. Id.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts must assure themselves of jurisdiction
over any controversy they hear. See Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
For that reason, doubts about “subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even by the
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court sua sponte.” Jerez v. Republic of Cuba, 777 F. Supp. 2d 6, 15 (D.D.C. 2011); see also G.
Keys PC/Logis NP v. Pope, 630 F. Supp. 2d 13, 15 (D.D.C.2009) (“When it perceives that
subject matter jurisdiction is in question, the Court should address the issue sua sponte.”). “If the
court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). “Subject-matter jurisdiction can never be waived or forfeited.”
Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012).
Although the Court must liberally construe pro see complaints, see United States v.
Byfield, 391 F.3d 277, 281 (D.C. Cir. 2004), a pro se plaintiff must still meet his burden of
proving that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims. See, e.g., Glaviano v. JP
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2013 WL 6823122, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 27, 2013) (dismissing pro se
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Caldwell v. Kagan,777 F.Supp.2d 177, 178-79
(D.D.C. 2011) (sua sponte dismissing pro se complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Rule 12(h)(3)).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3). “Federal courts . . . possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute” and
it is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s Complaint plainly falls
outside the Court’s limited jurisdiction.
First, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States may be sued only upon
consent, which must be clear and unequivocal. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538
(1980) (citation omitted). A waiver of sovereign immunity “must be unequivocally expressed in
statutory text, and [it cannot] be implied.” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citations
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omitted). “Therefore, absent a congressional waiver of sovereign immunity, federal courts do not
have jurisdiction to entertain a suit against the United States.” Goldstein v. United States, 2003
WL 24108182, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 2020) (dismissing pro se suit against the United States).
Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that sovereign immunity has been abrogated. See
Jackson v. Bush, 448 F. Supp. 2d 198, 200 (D.D.C. 2006). Here, Plaintiff offers no basis in the
Complaint to identify any waiver of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Griffin v. United States, 2019
WL 4644022, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2019) (concluding that Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction where pro se plaintiffs failed to “identify a statute expressly waiving immunity”).
Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s claims against the United States.
In addition, Plaintiff lacks standing. 2 To establish the “irreducible constitutional
minimum of standing,” a plaintiff must show that (1) he has suffered “an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual and imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) his injury is “fairly . . .[t]race[able] to the challenged action of
the defendant”; and (3) “it must be likely . . . that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). The party bringing the action has the burden to establish his standing. Id.
If a plaintiff lacks standing, a federal court has no subject matter jurisdiction.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to articulate any “concrete and particularized” and “actual and
imminent” injury he has suffered or will suffer because of the results of the 2016 presidential
election and the other actions of which he complains. Plaintiff must demonstrate that he
“personally has been injured,” not that “injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members
2
Plaintiff appears to concede that he lacks standing to sue, and instead resorts to listing others
who “can join the suit” if “OTHER parties are needed for standing.” See Compl. § V. None of
those listed are parties to the suit.
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of the class to which [he] belongs.” Wilson v. Geithner, 968 F. Supp. 2d 275, 279 (D.D.C. 2013)
(emphasis added) (citations and quotation marks omitted). At most, Plaintiff articulates “general
grievances” based on his view of the state of the country. See, e.g., Compl. §§ I (noting the
“totally unfair tax law that burdens high tax states like New York and California”); VIII (alleging
“sabotage of the USPS” as a “blatant attempt to sway the election”); XI (“Our Country is in the
middle of turmoil”). But it is axiomatic that “a plaintiff raising only a generally available
grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper
application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly
benefits him than it does the public at large” lacks standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74. Because
Plaintiff fails to allege any injury beyond a “generalized grievance,” Plaintiff lacks standing to
bring this suit and the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over his claims. 3
Although subject matter dismissals generally are without prejudice, a dismissal with
prejudice is warranted upon determining that “the allegation of other facts consistent with the
challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Jarrell v. United States Postal
Serv., 753 F.2d 1088, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The Court finds that no additional facts could cure
the deficiencies of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Dismissal with prejudice is warranted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
United States District Judge
3
Plaintiff suggests that the constitutional doctrine of “standing” does not apply in “emergency”
situations. See Compl. § VI. That is incorrect. “Subject-matter jurisdiction can never be waived
or forfeited.” Gonzalez, 565 U.S. at 141.
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