D. W. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-20-00347-CV D. W., Appellant v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee FROM THE 146TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY NO. 307,559-B, THE HONORABLE JACK WELDON JONES, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION D.W. appeals from the trial court’s final decree terminating her parental rights to her child. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001. Following a jury trial, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds for terminating her parental rights existed and that termination of those rights was in the child’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (2). On appeal, D.W.’s court-appointed attorney has filed a motion to withdraw supported by an Anders brief, concluding that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (approving use of Anders procedure in appeal from termination of parental rights). The brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced. See 386 U.S. at 744; Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646-47 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied). D.W.’s counsel has certified to this Court that he has provided D.W. with a copy of the Anders brief and motion to withdraw and advised her of her right to examine the appellate record and to file a pro se brief. To date, appellant has not filed a pro se brief. The Department of Family and Protective Services has filed a response to the Anders brief, stating that it will not file a brief unless this Court requests one. We have conducted an independent review of the record, including the Anders brief submitted on D.W.’s behalf. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988); Taylor, 160 S.W.3d at 647. We have found nothing in the record that might arguably support an appeal, and we agree that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decree terminating D.W.’s parental rights. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is denied.1 __________________________________________ Chari L. Kelly, Justice Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Baker and Kelly Affirmed Filed: December 3, 2020 1 The Texas Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel in suits seeking the termination of parental rights extends “to all proceedings in [the Texas Supreme Court], including the filing of a petition for review.” See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). Accordingly, counsel’s obligation to D.W. has not yet been discharged. See id. If D.W., after consulting with counsel, desires to file a petition for review, counsel should timely file with the Texas Supreme Court “a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See id. at 27-28. 2