NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 9 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LORA J. GREEN, No. 19-16092
Plaintiff-Appellant D.C. No. 3:18-cv-08018-DLR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 7, 2020**
Pasadena, California
Before: GRABER and BEA, Circuit Judges, and DORSEY,*** District Judge.
Lora J. Green appeals the district court’s order affirming an administrative
law judge’s (ALJ) decision to deny her application for Social Security disability
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Jennifer A. Dorsey, United States District Judge for
the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
benefits. Reviewing the ALJ’s decision de novo, Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d
664, 674 (9th Cir. 2017), we affirm.
1. The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons that are supported
by substantial evidence in the record to discount the contradicted opinion of
Green’s treating physician. Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987)
(citing Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987)). The ALJ found
that the treating physician’s check-box report—which characterized Green as
functionally bed-ridden and lacked explanation and support—was neither
supported by, nor consistent with, the record because it contradicted years of
reports that noted comparatively benign findings about a patient whose pain was
adequately controlled by medication. See Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1155 (9th
Cir. 2020) (holding that an “ALJ may permissibly reject check-off reports that do
not contain any explanation of the bases of their conclusions” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Thus the ALJ’s assignment of “little weight” to Green’s treating
physician was adequately detailed and supported by the record.1
2. The ALJ did not err in assigning partial weight to Green’s non-
treating physicians’ opinions because, contrary to Green’s assertion, the ALJ did
1
The ALJ erred when she discounted the treating physician’s opinion simply
because it rested in part on Green’s subjective complaints. Ghanim v. Colvin, 763
F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014). But because the ALJ also offered other valid
reasons, this error was harmless. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1042–43
(9th Cir. 2008).
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not offer a conclusion that conflicted with the non-treating physicians’ reports.
Additionally, Green’s examining physician had the “necessary background
information” about Green’s impairments to provide a consistent finding based on a
physical examination. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1517. And because the examining
physician offered “independent clinical findings that differ[ed]” from those offered
by Green’s treating physician, the examining physician’s opinion met the
substantial-evidence threshold. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Green’s remaining argument, that the ALJ
erred when explaining the factors under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527, is unpersuasive.
Green has not shown that the ALJ failed to consider the factors listed in
§ 404.1527(c)—even if she did not expressly list them all in her findings. See
Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 676 (finding error when an ALJ did not consider additional
relevant factors). And the ALJ noted the relevant factors for evaluating the
opinions of Green’s examining physician.
3. The ALJ did not err by discounting Green’s pain and symptom
testimony because she gave “specific, clear[,] and convincing reasons for doing
so.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Years of medical records indicating that
Green had a normal gait, station, range of motion, and strength, and that she was
not tender to palpation or percussion, undermined her testimony that she was
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severely limited in her ability to sit, stand, or walk. Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Contradiction with the medical record
is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s subjective testimony.”). The record
also reflects that medication and medical marijuana adequately controlled Green’s
pain. See Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that
“evidence of medical treatment successfully relieving symptoms can undermine a
claim of disability”). Finally, the ALJ legitimately considered the lack of objective
medical evidence to support Green’s testimony.2 Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676,
681 (9th Cir. 2005).
AFFIRMED.
2
Although the ALJ erred in relying on Green’s daily activities, Orn, 495
F.3d at 639, and by misstating the record about Green’s work performance,
medication compliance, and marijuana use, these were harmless errors because the
ALJ provided other substantial and valid reasons to discredit Green’s testimony.
Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162.
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