NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 11 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHEILA M. OWEN, No. 19-35684
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:18-cv-05694-JRC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
J. Richard Creatura, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 9, 2020**
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and MOSMAN,*** District
Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Michael W. Mosman, United States District Judge for
the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.
Sheila M. Owen appeals the district court’s decision affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for supplemental
security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. We have
jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district
court’s order affirming the denial of social security benefits by the administrative
law judge (“ALJ”) de novo and reverse only if the ALJ’s decision was not supported
by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154,
1159 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.
1. This court has “no jurisdiction to review” Owen’s request to re-open her
prior determination. Krumpelman v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1985).
The “decision to not re-open a previously adjudicated claim . . . is purely
discretionary and is therefore not considered a ‘final’ decision within the meaning
of § 405(g).” Id. (quotations omitted); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.1403(a)(5).
2. The ALJ did not err in evaluating the medical opinions in the record. The
ALJ had substantial evidence to credit the opinions of Drs. Wheeler, Lewis,
Fligstein, and Robinson over the opinions of Drs. Krueger, Weiss, Normoyle, and
Carter. “If a treating or examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another
doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and legitimate
reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d
648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017). The ALJ went over the medical opinions of each witness
2
in detail, comparing that evidence against the medical records and other evidence
available and explaining why it was discounting some opinions and crediting others.
See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1013 (9th Cir. 2014); 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.927(c)(4) (stating that “the more consistent a medical opinion is with the
record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that medical opinion”).
Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in its determination to credit some of the medical
opinions over others.
3. The ALJ also did not err by discounting Owen’s “testimony about the
severity of the symptoms” because the ALJ offered “specific, clear and convincing
reasons” for discounting Owen’s testimony. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104,
1112 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded by regulation on other grounds (quotations
omitted). The ALJ cited multiple reasons for discounting Owen’s testimony:
inconsistencies in Owen’s representations, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(4), “symptom
magnification,” equivocal testimony from medical experts, id., and conflicts
between Owen’s testimony and the objective medical evidence in the record, see
Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the
claimant’s subjective testimony.”). The ALJ also explained that Owen’s activities
were inconsistent with her alleged symptoms. These reasons are supported by
substantial evidence in the record.
3
4. Finally, the ALJ did not err in finding substantial evidence supported its
residual functional capacity assessment (“RFC”). “[T]he ALJ is responsible for
translating and incorporating clinical findings into a succinct RFC.” Rounds v.
Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015). The ALJ’s finding
that Owen’s RCF reasonably accounted for all the limitations in her ability to
perform work-related activities is supported by inferences reasonably drawn from
the record. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111. Moreover, there is no “obvious or apparent”
“conflict” between the vocational expert’s testimony and the Department of Labor’s
DOT/SCO. Gutierrez v. Colvin, 844 F.3d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 2016); see U.S. Dep’t
Labor, Semi-conductor dies loader, DOT#726.687-030, available at 1991 WL
679637. “Extreme heat” is not considered a hazard under the SCO, see SSR 96-9p,
1996 WL 374185, at *9 (interpreting U.S. Dep’t Labor, SCO at App. D); and, in any
event, the vocational expert listed at least three occupations that did not involve
exposure to extreme heat or any enumerated hazards.
5. For the foregoing reasons, Owen’s request for remand is not warranted.
AFFIRMED.
4