United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT October 30, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-50412
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BILLY JOEL GIBSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 3:04-CR-1731-ALL
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Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Billy Joel Gibson pleaded guilty to one charge of possession
of 100 or more kilograms of marijuana with intent to distribute
and was sentenced to serve 60 months in prison and a four-year
term of supervised release. Proceeding pro se, Gibson appeals
his conviction and sentence.
Gibson contends that his plea was involuntary because he was
rendered incompetent by his medications and because he was not
given sufficient time to read the plea agreement. Because this
claim was not presented to the district court, we review it for
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 05-50412
-2-
plain error only. See United States v. Brown, 328 F.3d 787, 789
(5th Cir. 2003). Gibson has failed to adduce sufficient facts to
show that there is reason to doubt his competence or to show that
his plea was otherwise involuntary. See Blackledge v. Allison,
431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977); United States v. Williams, 819 F.2d 605,
609 (5th Cir. 1987) (competency standard).
Gibson also argues that his plea agreement was breached
because he did not receive the sentence he was promised and
because the Government did not make certain sentencing
recommendations. These arguments, which are reviewed for plain
error only, are unavailing. See United States v. Reeves, 255
F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 2001). The plea agreement makes no
promise of a certain sentence, and the Government complied with
the agreement’s provisions concerning sentencing recommendations.
See id.; see also United States v. Price, 95 F.3d 364, 367 (5th
Cir. 1996). Gibson has failed to carry his burden of showing a
breach of the plea agreement. See Price, 95 F.3d at 367.
Gibson raises several claims challenging his sentence. As
the Government notes, these claims are precluded by the appellate
waiver clause in Gibson’s plea agreement. Because the record
reflects that Gibson validly waived his appellate rights, it is
appropriate to enforce the clause. See Blackledge, 431 U.S. at
74; United States v. Baymon, 312 F.3d 725, 729 (5th Cir. 2002).
We thus decline to consider Gibson’s sentencing claims.
No. 05-50412
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Gibson argues that the district court erred by failing to
inform him that he was ineligible for parole. The district court
had no duty to inform Gibson of his parole eligibility vel non.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. Consequently, there is no error in
connection with this omission.
Gibson contends that his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights
were violated in connection with his arrest and that the evidence
was insufficient to support his guilty plea. These claims were
waived by the entry of Gibson’s plea. See United States v.
Hanyard, 762 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (5th Cir. 1985). We thus decline
to consider them. We likewise decline to consider Gibson’s claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel in this direct criminal
appeal. See United States v. Miller, 406 F.3d 323, 335-36 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 207 (2005).
Gibson has shown no error in connection with the district
court’s judgment. Accordingly, that judgment is AFFIRMED.