In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-20-00146-CR
___________________________
WALLACE WAYNE BOWMAN JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 97th District Court
Montague County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2008-0000143M-CR
Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Wallace Wayne Bowman Jr.’s appeal may be construed as either a
collateral attack on his conviction or as an appeal of an unappealable order. In either
event, we lack jurisdiction, and we therefore dismiss the appeal.
In 2010, Bowman pleaded guilty to capital murder and was sentenced to life
imprisonment. When he attempted to appeal in 2013, we held that we lacked
jurisdiction because his appeal came three years too late. Bowman v. State, Nos. 02-13-
00374-CR, 02-13-00375-CR, 2013 WL 4679986, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug.
29, 2013, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
In June 2020, Bowman filed in the trial court a pro se “Motion to Call into
Question Trial Court’s Jurisdiction with Incorporated Memorandum.” Therein,
Bowman asserted that some sort of fraud had been perpetrated against the court ten
years prior and that, therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him.
Bowman did not say exactly what that fraud might have been, but he quoted Fifth
Circuit caselaw explaining that fraud against the court is typified by “the most egregious
misconduct, such as bribery of a judge or members of a jury.” First Nat’l Bank of
Louisville v. Lustig, 96 F.3d 1554, 1573 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Rozier v. Ford Motor Co.,
573 F.2d 1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1978)).
On August 25, 2020, the trial court denied the motion in an order explaining that
its plenary power had long since expired.
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On September 9, 2020, Bowman appealed. In his notice of appeal, Bowman
disclaimed any intent to appeal his conviction or the validity of his plea bargain. Instead,
he maintained that he was solely appealing the trial court’s recent denial of his motion
contesting jurisdiction.
On October 19, 2020, we notified Bowman of our concern that we lacked
jurisdiction. We explained that unless he or any other party filed a response showing
grounds for continuing the appeal, it may be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See
Tex. R. App. P. 44.3.
In his response, Bowman argued that his appeal was viable because his motion
had challenged jurisdiction, which may be raised at any time. As Bowman observes,
Marin v. State recognized that jurisdictional requirements are absolute and nonwaivable,
851 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), and that any violation of such a
requirement may “be raised for the first time on appeal.” Id. at 280. According to
Bowman, Marin allows a defendant to appeal the trial court’s jurisdiction at any time.
Not so. Marin held that a complaint concerning lack of jurisdiction is excused
from error preservation. It did not exempt such a complaint from the requisites of
appellate jurisdiction: “any party entitled to appeal is authorized to complain that an
absolute requirement or prohibition was violated, and the merits of his complaint on
appeal are not affected by the existence of a waiver or a forfeiture at trial.” Id. (emphasis
added).
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Thus, while it is said that “a challenge to a court’s jurisdiction may be raised at
any time,” such a challenge must still “be brought to a court through an appropriate
vehicle.” In re V.T., 479 S.W.3d 517, 518–19 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2015, no pet.).
“Even a challenge to the authority of a trial court that may be raised at any time must
be made to a court with jurisdiction to hear the complaint.” Currie v. State, No. 09-06-
225-CR, 2006 WL 2506419, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 30, 2006, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication). For instance, in Carter v. State, the defendant was
convicted in 1990, and in 2004, he attempted to challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction
to convict him years before. No. 07-04-0076-CR, 2004 WL 1064167, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo May 12, 2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
The court held that because the appeal was untimely, it lacked jurisdiction to address
the merits and could take no action other than to dismiss the appeal. See id. (citing Slaton
v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam), and Olivo v. State, 918
S.W.2d 519, 523–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
We reach a similar conclusion here. Bowman has disavowed any intent to appeal
his 2010 conviction,1 but nonetheless, the substance of his argument is that his
1
Nor could he appeal his conviction at this juncture, ten years after the notice of
appeal was due, see Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a), and after we affirmed that judgment in a
prior appeal, for “only one appeal can be made from a verdict and judgment of
conviction in any case.” Hines v. State, 70 S.W. 955, 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1902);
Arabzadegan v. State, No. 03-19-00728-CR, 2020 WL 370880, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin
Jan. 23, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
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conviction is void for want of jurisdiction. To the extent that Bowman’s appeal is a
challenge to the validity of the final judgment, it is a collateral attack, and this court
generally lacks jurisdiction over collateral attacks on final felony convictions. Darby v.
State, No. 02-19-00409-CR, 2020 WL 241969, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 16,
2020, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see Ater v. Eighth
Ct. of Appeals, 802 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (orig. proceeding). In Decker
v. State, for example, the defendant attempted in 2019 to challenge his 1994 conviction,
arguing that the conviction was void for an alleged judicial fraud, much like Bowman
argues here. No. 02-20-00088-CR, 2020 WL 4248680, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
July 23, 2020, pet. filed) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We
held that Decker’s appeal was an attempt to collaterally attack the 1994 conviction and
that we therefore lacked jurisdiction. Id. Thus, insofar as Bowman’s appeal is a
collateral attack, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider it.
But even assuming that Bowman had adhered to his disclaimer of intent to
challenge his 2010 conviction, this court would still lack jurisdiction. To the extent that
Bowman’s appeal may be construed as an attempt to appeal the outcome of a motion
unrelated to his 2010 conviction, he has attempted to appeal an unappealable order. Cf.
Wright v. State, 969 S.W.2d 588, 589–90 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.) (cataloging
Rather than prosecuting a successive, untimely appeal, Bowman would have to
raise any jurisdictional errors by way of habeas corpus. See McCain v. State, 67 S.W.3d
204, 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (explaining that jurisdictional errors may be raised by
writ of habeas corpus).
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appealable orders). We do not have jurisdiction to review a trial court’s orders unless
that jurisdiction has been expressly granted by law. Ragston v. State, 424 S.W.3d 49, 52
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014). The order from which Bowman attempts to appeal is not a
final judgment of conviction, nor is it a nonfinal order that has been made appealable
to this court. See Carter, 2004 WL 1064167, at *1. Thus, insofar as Bowman’s appeal is
not a collateral attack, this court lacks jurisdiction regardless.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P.
43.2(f).
/s/ Wade Birdwell
Wade Birdwell
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: December 17, 2020
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