J-S52003-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JEFFREY LITTLE :
:
Appellant : No. 105 EDA 2020
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 13, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011677-2011
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 21, 2020
Jeffrey Little appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas on December 13, 2019, dismissing his petition filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9541-
9546 as untimely. For the reasons discussed below, we find the PCRA court
properly denied Little relief and affirm.
On April 9, 2014, Little entered a negotiated guilty plea to third-degree
murder and robbery.1 The trial court imposed the negotiated aggregate
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The trial court had previously conducted a hearing, on October 7, 2013, on
Little’s motion to suppress a statement he made to police. On November 4,
2013, the court issued an order and opinion denying the motion.
J-S52003-20
sentence of thirty to sixty years’ incarceration. Little did not file post-sentence
motions or a direct appeal.
On March 13, 2015, Little filed a timely pro se PCRA petition and shortly
thereafter filed a supplemental petition. PCRA counsel was appointed who
subsequently filed a petition to withdraw and a Finley2 no-merit letter. After
issuing notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing pursuant
to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the PCRA court dismissed the petition.
On August 28, 2019, Little filed a “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence
Merger Issues”, contending his sentences for third-degree murder and robbery
should have merged. While that petition was still before the PCRA court, Little
filed another petition, on October 28, 2019, framed as a petition for writ of
habeas corpus, in which he claimed his sentence was illegal because the
sentencing court violated the double jeopardy clause by not merging the
sentences on both counts.
The PCRA court, concluding that Little’s claims asserted the illegality of
his sentence, correctly treated his petitions as PCRA petitions subject to the
PCRA’s timeliness provisions. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 803 A.2d
1291, 1293 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“[T]he PCRA provides the sole means for
obtaining collateral review, and … any petition filed after the judgment of
sentence becomes final will be treated as a PCRA petition”); see also
____________________________________________
2 Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
-2-
J-S52003-20
Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007) (stating the PCRA
incorporates the remedy of habeas corpus if it offers the petitioner a remedy
pursuant to that Act). On that basis, the PCRA court determined that Little’s
petitions were untimely, and that he had not pled an exception to the time
bar. As such, the court issued notice, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, of its
intent to dismiss his petitions, and subsequently dismissed the petitions as
untimely. This timely appeal followed.
Prior to reaching the merits of Little’s claims on appeal, we must first
consider the timeliness of his PCRA petition3. See Commonwealth v. Miller,
102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014).
A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be
filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of
sentence becomes final, unless he pleads and proves one of the
three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1). A
judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review by this
Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the expiration of
the time for seeking such review. The PCRA’s timeliness
requirements are jurisdictional; therefore, a court may not
address the merits of the issues raised if the petition was not
timely filed. The timeliness requirements apply to all PCRA
petitions, regardless of the nature of the individual claims raised
therein. The PCRA squarely places upon the petitioner the burden
of proving an untimely petition fits within one of the three
exceptions.
____________________________________________
3Since both of Little’s petitions seek the same relief on essentially the same
arguments, we conclude that his second petition constitutes a supplement to
his previous filing. See Commonwealth v. Bauhammers, 92 A.3d 708, 730-
31 (Pa. 2014).
-3-
J-S52003-20
Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16-17 (Pa. 2012) (internal citations
and footnote omitted).
Since Little did not file a post-sentence motion or a direct appeal, his
judgment of sentence became final on May 9, 2014, when his time for seeking
direct review with this Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3)
(judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review … or
at the expiration of time for seeking the review”). The instant petition – filed
over five years later – is patently untimely. Thus, the PCRA court lacked
jurisdiction to review Little’s petition unless he was able to successfully plead
and prove one of the statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
The PCRA provides three exceptions to its time bar:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Exceptions to the time-bar must be pled in
the petition, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also
-4-
J-S52003-20
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the lower court are
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). Further,
Although this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed
by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special
benefit upon an appellant. Accordingly, a pro se litigant must
comply with the procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania
Rules of the Court. This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if
an appellant fails to conform with the requirements set forth in
the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 251–52 (Pa. Super. 2003)
(citations omitted).
Even liberally construed, Little has failed to plead and prove that any of
his claims constitute a valid exception to the PCRA time-bar. In fact, Little
failed to make any attempt to plead an exception in either of his filings. See
Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence Merger Issues, filed 8/28/2019; see also
Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed 10/28/2019. Even on appeal, he makes no
attempt to argue that a time bar exception applies; he merely contends that
his petition should not have been treated as a PCRA petition. See Appellant’s
Brief, at 21 (unnumbered). As noted above, the court properly classified
Little’s petition as a PCRA petition. See West. Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA
court’s order denying Little’s petition as untimely.
Order affirmed.
-5-
J-S52003-20
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/21/20
-6-