12/22/2020
DA 19-0591
Case Number: DA 19-0591
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2020 MT 323N
JACOB SMITH,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondent and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. DDV-2018-929
Honorable James P. Reynolds, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jacob Smith, Self-Represented, Deer Lodge, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Katie F. Schulz, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Leo Gallagher, Lewis and Clark County Attorney, Fallon Stanton, Deputy
County Attorney, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: November 12, 2020
Decided: December 22, 2020
Filed:
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__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Jacob Smith, representing himself, appeals from an order, entered in the
First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, denying Smith’s motions to set a
schedule for amending his petition for postconviction relief and to amend his petition for
postconviction relief. We affirm.
¶3 On February 14, 2017, Smith pleaded guilty to felony bail jumping and felony
criminal possession of dangerous drugs. The District Court sentenced Smith for both
offenses based on his written and oral guilty pleas. Smith filed a postconviction petition
and supporting brief on July 30, 2018, alleging his guilty pleas were not voluntary
because his assigned counsel had threatened and coerced him into pleading guilty. Smith
provided no further explanation or supporting documentation for these claims.
¶4 The District Court reviewed the merits of Smith’s claim and issued an Order
denying Smith’s petition on October 19, 2018.1 The court found that Smith had signed
an “extensive and detailed” acknowledgment and waiver of rights that explicitly
confirmed he was pleading voluntarily and not as a result of force, threats, or promises
made. The District Court explained it had engaged in a “thorough” and “comprehensive”
1
The District Court entered a duplicate order on November 1, 2018.
2
colloquy with Smith at the time he entered his pleas to ensure Smith was proceeding
intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily. During the colloquy, the District Court
confirmed Smith was satisfied with his attorney’s services. In its Order, the
District Court concluded that Smith presented only conclusory allegations against his
counsel in his petition, which were insufficient to grant relief on his alleged claim that his
pleas were involuntary. 2
¶5 On November 5, 2018, Smith filed a motion to set a scheduling deadline to amend
his original petition for postconviction relief. Smith conceded in his supporting brief that
his original petition was deficient. On June 3, 2019, Smith filed a motion for leave to file
an amended petition. The State opposed Smith’s motions, arguing Smith was not
permitted to file an amended petition because the postconviction proceeding had closed
when the District Court issued its October 19, 2018 Order denying postconviction relief.
¶6 On June 17, 2019, Smith filed a 117-page Amended Verified Petition for
Postconviction Relief and Brief in Support (Amended Petition) asserting issues of
ineffective assistance of counsel. He alleged that his attorneys failed to interview
2
The District Court also denied Smith’s petition on grounds that it was not timely filed. Smith
argues on appeal that this was in error, however, § 46-21-102(1), MCA, requires a petition for
postconviction relief be filed within one year of the date that the petitioner’s conviction becomes
final. Smith’s conviction became final as of April 15, 2017, and his petition was filed on
July 30, 2018, more than three months after the required April 15, 2018 deadline. Therefore, the
District Court was mandated to dismiss the petition unless Smith demonstrated it was based upon
newly discovered evidence per § 46-21-102(2), MCA. The District Court correctly concluded
that Smith’s “vague assertions” about unspecified issues he had with the prison mailroom,
without “any documentation or other evidence to support [this] allegation,” were insufficient to
excuse the untimeliness of his petition. Further, Smith did not assert he was actually innocent of
either of the crimes to which he pleaded guilty as is required by § 46-21-102(2), MCA. The
District Court properly concluded that Smith’s petition was time-barred and the exception to the
time bar did not apply.
3
witnesses, investigate the case, and file certain motions as requested by Smith. In his
Amended Petition, Smith reiterated his claim that his pleas were not voluntary. The State
responded to the Amended Petition on August 28, 2019, arguing that because the original
petition had been denied, another petition would not be an “amended petition,” but rather
a “second or subsequent” petition that would be considered untimely under
§ 46-21-105(1)(b), MCA. On September 9, 2019, the District Court issued an order
denying both Smith’s pending motions, concluding Smith did not rely on newly
discovered evidence and he offered no facts or explanations that were not known to him
prior to entering his guilty pleas. The District Court explained that its previous order,
which found Smith’s petition meritless and procedurally barred, concluded the matter.
¶7 The District Court correctly denied Smith’s request to file an amended petition
because its October 19, 2018 Order concluded the matter. Accordingly, the only issue on
appeal is whether the District Court correctly determined Smith’s pleas were voluntary—
the singular issue raised in Smith’s first petition. This Court reviews “a district court’s
denial of postconviction relief to determine if the court’s findings of fact are clearly
erroneous and if its conclusions of law are correct.” Lacey v. State, 2017 MT 18, ¶ 13,
386 Mont. 204, 389 P.3d 233 (citation omitted). As this Court observed in
Griffin v. State, 2003 MT 267, ¶ 10, 317 Mont. 457, 77 P.3d 545, “[a] person requesting
postconviction relief has the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
facts justify relief. If a postconviction petition fails to state a claim for relief, a district
court may dismiss the petition as a matter of law” pursuant to § 46-21-201(1)(a), MCA.
4
¶8 We look to the record in the underlying case to determine whether a guilty plea
was entered into voluntarily. State v. Wright, 2001 MT 282, ¶ 14, 307 Mont. 349,
42 P.3d 753. In Wright, the petitioner alleged his trial counsel coerced him into pleading
guilty. Wright, ¶ 14. The record in Wright was sufficient to evaluate the voluntariness of
the plea, and we determined “the voluntary nature of Wright’s plea was squarely
addressed in the underlying proceeding and was well-documented.” Wright, ¶ 16. Thus,
this Court declined to disturb the district court’s conclusion that Wright’s plea was
voluntary and not the result of coercion. Wright, ¶ 20.
¶9 Likewise, the record here demonstrates Smith’s pleas were voluntary. Smith
signed an extensive and detailed acknowledgment of waiver of rights, acknowledging he
was entering his pleas voluntarily and not as the result of force, threats, or promises. In
its order denying relief, the District Court specifically recalled and described its colloquy
with Smith at his change of plea hearing as “thorough” and “comprehensive.” During
that colloquy, Smith acknowledged he was satisfied with his attorney’s services, that he
understood his right to proceed to trial, and that he was voluntarily and knowingly
waiving certain rights by entering his guilty pleas. Smith affirmed he was not acting
under any threats or coercion. The District Court’s October 19, 2018 Order was detailed
and it did not fail to address Smith’s claim that his pleas were involuntary. Smith’s claim
that he pleaded guilty due to coercion is undermined not only by the acknowledgment of
rights and thorough colloquy, but because he received a very beneficial plea agreement—
seven felonies and one misdemeanor were dismissed, reducing his maximum exposure
from 81 to 15 years. The voluntary nature of Smith’s pleas was addressed by the
5
underlying proceedings and we decline to disturb the District Court’s conclusion that his
pleas were voluntary.
¶10 The District Court also correctly concluded that Smith’s conclusory statements
and mere citations to cases and constitutional provisions were insufficient to meet the
pleading requirements of Montana’s postconviction statutes, and we agree that Smith did
not rely on newly discovered evidence. See § 46-21-102(2), MCA. As the District Court
noted, everything recited in Smith’s Amended Petition was information available to him
at the time he entered his guilty pleas in this matter.
¶11 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of
our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion
of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear
application of applicable standards of review.
¶12 Affirmed.
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
We concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ JIM RICE
6
J. Smith v. State
Combined Opinion