16-4150
Singh v. Rosen
BIA
Christensen, IJ
A205 585 883
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 29th day of December, two thousand twenty.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
8 BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 JARNAIL SINGH,
14 Petitioner,
15 v. 16-4150
16 NAC
17
18 JEFFREY A. ROSEN, ACTING UNITED
19 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.*
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Jackson Heights,
24 NY.
25
26 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
27 Attorney General; Russell J. E.
28 Verby, Senior Litigation Counsel;
29 John D. Williams, Trial Attorney,
30 Office of Immigration Litigation,
* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set
forth above.
1 United States Department of
2 Justice, Washington, DC.
3
4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
7 is DENIED.
8 Petitioner Jarnail Singh, a native and citizen of India,
9 seeks review of a November 16, 2016 decision of the BIA
10 affirming a December 16, 2015 decision of an Immigration Judge
11 (“IJ”) denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of
12 removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
13 (“CAT”). In re Jarnail Singh, No. A205 585 883 (B.I.A. Nov.
14 16, 2016), aff’g No. A205 585 883 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec.
15 16, 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
16 underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
17 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
18 both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of
19 completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d
20 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review
21 are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei
22 Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018).
23 In reviewing credibility, the agency must “[c]onsider[]
24 the totality of the circumstances,” and may base a finding on
2
1 an applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the
2 plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies or omissions
3 in his or his witness’s statements, “without regard to
4 whether” they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”
5 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s
6 credibility determination unless . . . it is plain that no
7 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility
8 ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.
9 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial
10 evidence supports the agency’s determination that Singh was
11 not credible as to his claim that members of the Congress
12 Party in India twice attacked him on account of his membership
13 in Akali Dal Mann.
14 First, the agency reasonably relied on the inconsistency
15 between Singh’s testimony and his parents’ statements
16 regarding his medical treatment after the first attack. See
17 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Singh testified that his
18 family members bandaged him and that he did not go to a
19 doctor. But his parents’ statements assert that Singh was
20 treated by a doctor. The agency was not required to credit
21 Singh’s explanation—that his mother put a bandage on him—
22 because it did not explain the inconsistency about whether he
23 had been treated by a doctor. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430
3
1 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than
2 offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements
3 to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-
4 finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal
5 quotation marks omitted)). Singh now contends that his
6 parents’ statements are unreliable because they were prepared
7 in English, which his parents do not speak. Even if Singh
8 had proffered this explanation before the agency, the agency
9 would have been entitled to reject it because Singh had the
10 burden of proof and he submitted the letters to support his
11 claim. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (placing
12 burden of proof on asylum applicant).
13 Second, the agency also reasonably based the credibility
14 determination on Singh’s omission from his application of any
15 reference to his five-day hospital stay. See Xiu Xia Lin,
16 534 F.3d at 166 n.3. Singh testified that he was beaten so
17 severely during the second attack that he was admitted to the
18 hospital for five days. But his application stated that he
19 lost consciousness after being hit and then fainted, that
20 people threw water on him and took him home, and that he was
21 treated by a doctor. The agency was not required to credit
22 Singh’s explanation that he thought mentioning the doctor
23 would be enough because, as the IJ observed, the fact that
4
1 Singh was beaten so severely that he required five days of
2 hospitalization is a detail that would be expected to appear
3 in his application. See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78-79
4 (“[I]n assessing the probative value of the omission of
5 certain facts, an IJ should consider whether those facts are
6 ones that a credible petitioner would reasonably have been
7 expected to disclose under the relevant circumstances.”); id.
8 at 82.
9 Third, the agency reasonably relied on Singh’s shifting
10 testimony about whether he was threatened prior to the
11 attacks. See 8 U.S.C. S 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Singh initially
12 testified that he was asked to join the Congress Party in
13 November 2012, then that he was threatened at the same time,
14 but then backtracked and said he was not threatened then.
15 Accordingly, Singh’s assertion that he never shifted his
16 testimony is contradicted by the record.
17 Lastly, the agency reasonably found Singh’s
18 corroborating evidence insufficient to rehabilitate his
19 credibility. Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d
20 Cir. 2007). The IJ properly accorded diminished weight to
21 statements from Singh’s village head and party because they
22 were vague. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir.
23 2013) (“We generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the
5
1 weight to be afforded an applicant’s documentary evidence.”).
2 The IJ also reasonably declined to credit the statements from
3 Singh’s parents because they were nearly identical,
4 inconsistent with Singh’s testimony concerning his medical
5 treatment, and authored by interested witnesses not subject
6 to cross examination. Id. at 332, 334.
7 Given the foregoing findings, the “totality of the
8 circumstances” supports the adverse credibility
9 determination. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The
10 adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum,
11 withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three
12 claims are based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v.
13 Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
14 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
15 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
16 stays VACATED.
17 FOR THE COURT:
18 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
19 Clerk of Court
20
6