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Appellate Court Date: 2020.12.29
10:51:04 -06'00'
Tranchita v. Department of Natural Resources, 2020 IL App (1st) 191251
Appellate Court TOMI TRANCHITA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT
Caption OF NATURAL RESOURCES; JOSHUA MOOI, Department of
Natural Resources Conservation Police Officer; COOK COUNTY,
ILLINOIS; and OTHER UNKNOWN POLICE OFFICERS,
Individually and as Agents of Cook County and/or the Department of
Natural Resources, Defendants-Appellees.
District & No. First District, Sixth Division
No. 1-19-1251
Filed May 1, 2020
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 2019-CH-05968;
Review the Hon. Franklin U. Valderrama, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Tracy McGonigle, of Woodstock, and G. David Tenenbaum, of
Appeal Beverly Hills, California, for appellant.
Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz,
Solicitor General, and Aaron T. Dozeman, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel), for appellees.
Panel JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Cunningham and Connors concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiff, Tomi Tranchita, appeals the order of the circuit court denying her motion for a
preliminary injunction. In her interlocutory appeal, plaintiff contends that she had a property
interest in her coyotes at the time they were seized by Officer Joshua Mooi of the Illinois
Department of Natural Resources (IDNR). Therefore, the court should have granted the
preliminary injunction. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶2 I. JURISDICTION
¶3 On May 17, 2019, the circuit court entered its order denying the preliminary injunction.
Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal on June 17, 2019. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017), governing interlocutory
appeals as of right.
¶4 II. BACKGROUND
¶5 The following facts are relevant to this interlocutory appeal. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged
that, for 13 years, she cared for four abused and abandoned coyotes. The senior coyotes, Sandy
and Luna, came to her through her work in animal rescue. The other two, Bella and Peyton,
came to plaintiff’s care from abusive situations. The coyotes were housed within a fully fenced-
in spacious backyard, ate appropriate food, and received medical care from a veterinarian.
Plaintiff possessed a United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Class C exhibitor’s
license, which is the license obtained by zoos to exhibit animals. According to plaintiff, this
license “imposes stringent restrictions on the licensee including unannounced annual
inspections by a veterinarian or specially trained animal expert.” Plaintiff asserts that she “has
never been cited for any USDA violation and has passed the inspections with flying colors.”
¶6 From 2011 to 2016, plaintiff also held a state permit as a fur-bearing mammal breeder,
pursuant to section 3.25 of the Wildlife Code. The provision states that “[t]he annual fee for
each fur-bearing mammal breeder permit shall be $25” and all such permits “shall expire on
March 31 of each year.” 520 ILCS 5/3.25 (West 2016). Plaintiff acknowledges that “the permit
lapsed in 2016 solely for lack of payment of a $25 annual fee.” Plaintiff was not given a notice
of license suspension or termination when her permit lapsed.
¶7 Early in the morning on April 24, 2019, the IDNR and Cook County animal control
conducted a raid on plaintiff’s premises pursuant to a search warrant obtained by Officer Mooi.
The coyotes were seized in the raid, as well as records and other documents. Plaintiff was
instructed to sign a relinquishment form, and she signed because she was told that, if she did
not, the coyotes would be euthanized or confined to a small space that “would kill them as a
result of being traumatized and stressed.” Plaintiff was cited for lacking proper permits. She
was also criminally cited for several violations of the Wildlife Code, including section 2.30 for
trapping or capturing a coyote out of season, section 3.26 for possessing a coyote without a
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“Hound running area permit,” and section 2.33(dd) for unlawfully retaining a coyote. Id.
§§ 2.30, 3.26, 2.33(dd).
¶8 The coyotes were transferred to Flint Creek Wildlife Rehabilitation for observation and
treatment. Since the seizure, three of the coyotes have died from what was believed to be
distemper, a viral disease affecting nonvaccinated animals. Luna remains at the facility.
¶9 Plaintiff soon thereafter filed a six-count complaint in which she alleged claims under the
fourth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. IV,
XIV). Plaintiff also filed an emergency motion for preliminary injunctive relief, arguing that
the coyotes’ lives were at risk if they were not returned. In the motion, plaintiff alleged that
she had a constitutionally protected property interest in the coyotes, pursuant to her federal
exhibitor license. As a result, she was entitled to notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior
to the seizure of the coyotes. She further claimed she would suffer irreparable harm without
the relief because the coyotes were unique creatures with no market value and no amount of
money could compensate for their loss. Plaintiff argued that she had a likelihood of success on
the merits because she had valid possession of the coyotes under Illinois law.
¶ 10 At the hearing on the motion, the trial court found that plaintiff did not have a protected
property interest in the remaining coyote because she did not possess the proper Illinois permit
at the time of the seizure. The court also found that plaintiff failed to show there was a
likelihood of success on the merits in the underlying complaint. Therefore, the trial court
denied plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff filed this timely appeal.
¶ 11 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 A preliminary injunction is an extreme remedy to be employed only where an emergency
exists and serious harm would result without an injunction. People ex rel. Klaeren v. Village
of Lisle, 202 Ill. 2d 164, 177 (2002). A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show “(1)
a clearly ascertained right in need of protection; (2) irreparable harm in the absence of an
injunction; (3) no adequate remedy at law for the injury; and (4) the likelihood of success on
the merits.” Id. The trial court’s grant or denial of an injunction is generally reviewed for abuse
of discretion. Mohanty v. St. John Heart Clinic, S.C., 225 Ill. 2d 52, 62-63 (2006). However,
the injunction question here is based on plaintiff’s claim that she had a property right in the
coyotes and, therefore, that she was entitled to notice and a predeprivation hearing before the
IDNR seized them. “A procedural due process claim presents a legal question subject to
de novo review.” Village of Vernon Hills v. Heelan, 2015 IL 118170, ¶ 31.
¶ 13 “Procedural due process claims challenge the constitutionality of the specific procedures
used to deny a person’s life, liberty, or property.” People v. Cardona, 2013 IL 114076, ¶ 15.
In a case alleging deprivation of property, “the threshold question is whether a protected
property interest actually exists.” Cole v. Milwaukee Area Technical College District, 634 F.3d
901, 904 (7th Cir. 2011); Phillips v. Graham, 86 Ill. 2d 274, 281 (1981). To demonstrate a
constitutionally protected property interest, plaintiff “may not simply rely upon the procedural
guarantees of state law or local ordinance.” Cain v. Larson, 879 F.2d 1424, 1426 (7th Cir.
1989). Rather, plaintiff must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to the property interest.
Khan v. Bland, 630 F.3d 519, 527 (7th Cir. 2010); Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education,
142 Ill. 2d 54, 107 (1990).
¶ 14 Protected property interests are generally created, and their dimensions defined, by state
statutes. Miller v. Retirement Board of Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 329 Ill. App. 3d
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589, 596 (2001). Therefore, we look to the relevant statutes to determine whether plaintiff had
a property interest in the coyotes.
¶ 15 Section 1 of the Domesticated Wild Animals Act provides that
“[a]ll birds and animals ferae naturae or naturally wild, including fur bearing animals
not native to this State, when raised or in domestication, or kept in enclosures and
reduced to possession, are hereby declared to be objects of ownership and absolute title,
the same as cattle and other property, and shall receive the same protection of law, and
in the same way and to the same extent shall be the subject of trespass or theft, as other
personal property.” 510 ILCS 60/1 (West 2016).
This provision clearly recognizes a property interest in coyotes “kept in enclosures and reduced
to possession.” Id. However, the statute further provides that “this Act shall not be held or
construed to repeal or modify the provisions of the ‘Wildlife Code of Illinois’ [Wildlife Code]
applicable to the breeding, raising, producing or marketing of any such birds or animals so
raised in captivity.” Id. § 3.
¶ 16 The Wildlife Code states that “[t]he possession of any wild bird or wild mammal protected
under this Act, is prima facie evidence that the same is subject to all the provisions of this Act,
including administrative rules, pertaining to the taking, possession and disposition thereof.”
520 ILCS 5/1.20 (West 2016). Coyotes are a protected species of wildlife designated as “fur-
bearing mammals” in the Wildlife Code. Id. §§ 2.2, 1.2g. The statute further provides that
“[b]efore any individual shall hold, possess or engage in the breeding or raising of live
fur-bearing mammals, he shall first procure a fur-bearing mammal breeder permit. Fur-
bearing mammal breeder permits shall be issued by the [IDNR]. The annual fee for
each fur-bearing mammal breeder permit shall be $25. All fur-bearing mammal breeder
permits shall expire on March 31 of each year.” Id. § 3.25.
Therefore, under Illinois law, a person must have a fur-bearing mammal breeder permit before
possessing or raising a coyote.
¶ 17 Plaintiff acknowledges that her fur-bearing mammal breeder permit lapsed in 2016 for
nonpayment of the $25 fee. She gives no reason why she stopped paying the fee in 2016 when
she had paid for the permit the previous five years. From the moment her permit lapsed,
plaintiff’s possession of the coyotes violated section 3.25 of the Wildlife Code. Wildlife
possessed “contrary to any of the provisions [hereof]” is contraband. Id. § 1.2c. No person or
party can assert legal ownership or right to possession of property that is contraband.
Dufauchard v. Ward, 51 Ill. App. 2d 42, 46 (1964).
¶ 18 Plaintiff, however, argues that at all times she possessed a federal Class C exhibitor’s
license and that section 48-10(b) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/48-10(b) (West
2016)) recognizes a “right of property” in her coyotes pursuant to her federal license. When
interpreting a statute, a court’s primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to legislative
intent. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479 (1994). The most reliable indicator
of that intent is the language of the statute itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id.
¶ 19 Section 48-10(b) provides:
“(b) Dangerous animal or primate offense. No person shall have a right of property
in, keep, harbor, care for, act as custodian of or maintain in his or her possession any
dangerous animal or primate except at a properly maintained zoological park, federally
licensed exhibit, circus, college or university, scientific institution, research laboratory,
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veterinary hospital, hound running area, or animal refuge in an escape-proof
enclosure.” 720 ILCS 5/48-10(b) (West 2016).
A plain reading of section 48-10(b) shows a general intent to preclude a person from having a
property right in dangerous animals such as coyotes. Having a property right is an exception
to the rule, and section 48-10 specifically sets forth the exceptions that apply. Relevant here,
section 48- 10(b) refers to “a right of property in” a dangerous animal “at a properly maintained
*** federally licensed exhibit.” Id. There is no indication, however, that the mere possession
of a federal exhibitor’s license satisfies this requirement.
¶ 20 Furthermore, nothing in section 48-10(b) negates the requirement of section 3.25 of the
Wildlife Code that a person possessing a coyote must have a fur-bearing mammal breeder
permit. “Under the doctrine of in pari materia, two statutes dealing with the same subject will
be considered with reference to each other, ‘so that they may be given harmonious effect.’ ”
Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10 v. Regional Board of School Trustees of
St. Clair County, 218 Ill. 2d 175, 185 (2006) (quoting Land v. Board of Education of the City
of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2002)). We find that section 48-10(b) does not give plaintiff
a property right in coyotes possessed without a valid fur-bearing mammal breeder permit.
¶ 21 Plaintiff also contends that the IDNR should be estopped from arguing that the coyotes are
contraband where she was led to believe she lawfully possessed them. The IDNR never
informed plaintiff that her coyote habitat was illegal due to the lapse of her permit for
nonpayment of the fee. Plaintiff understood the IDNR’s silence to mean it expressly approved
of her habitat without the permit. She contends that she invested thousands of dollars in reliance
upon the IDNR’s approval.
¶ 22 To claim equitable estoppel, plaintiff must show that the other party misrepresented or
concealed material facts and she did not know the representations were untrue when they were
made. Geddes v. Mill Creek Country Club, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 302, 313 (2001). The requirements
for lawfully possessing a coyote in Illinois are clearly set forth in the Wildlife Code, and the
statute expressly states that animals held in violation of its provisions are contraband. See 520
ILCS 5/3.25, 1.2c (West 2016). We have long recognized that “ ‘[a]ll citizens are
presumptively charged with knowledge of the law.’ ” People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 104
(2002) (quoting Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1985)). In fact, plaintiff did know the law
because she paid the fee to renew her permit from 2011 to 2016. She asserted that “[s]he did
what any law-abiding citizen would be expected to do” by following the IDNR’s instructions
and “obtain[ing] a Fur-bearing permit.” Plaintiff contends the IDNR misrepresented the fact
that a permit was required, yet she has known since 2011 that under Illinois law she needed a
valid fur-bearing mammal breeder permit for her coyotes. Plaintiff’s equitable estoppel claim
is therefore without merit.
¶ 23 Plaintiff contends that, subsequent to the seizure of her coyotes, she obtained a fur-bearing
mammal breeder permit and she should now be permitted to possess Luna. If plaintiff has since
been issued a permit, there is no indication that this fact was presented to the trial court. This
is an interlocutory appeal in which “the only question before the reviewing court is whether
there was a sufficient showing made to the trial court to sustain its order granting or denying
the interlocutory relief sought.” Keefe-Shea Joint Venture v. City of Evanston, 332 Ill. App. 3d
163, 168 (2002). The only issue raised in this appeal is plaintiff’s procedural due process claim.
Thus, we will not determine at this time whether plaintiff could or should regain possession of
Luna, based on the fact she now has a valid permit, or on the merits of any pending claims in
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proceedings below. See Postma v. Jack Brown Buick, Inc., 157 Ill. 2d 391, 399 (1993) (finding
that an interlocutory appeal “may not be used as a vehicle to determine the merits of a
plaintiff’s case”).
¶ 24 Before the trial court was the fact that plaintiff did not have a valid fur-bearing mammal
breeder permit at the time the IDNR seized her coyotes. Pursuant to the Wildlife Code, coyotes
possessed without such a permit are contraband. Without a legitimate claim of entitlement to
the property, plaintiff had no right to a property interest protected by due process when her
coyotes were seized. Khan, 630 F.3d at 527. Therefore, the trial court properly denied her
motion for a preliminary injunction. Klaeren, 202 Ill. 2d at 177.
¶ 25 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 26 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶ 27 Affirmed.
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