FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 15, 2021
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
JEFFERY WAYNE METZLER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 20-1079
(D.C. No. 1:19-CV-00878-RM-KMT)
CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, a (D. Colo.)
municipality; ELIZABETH REID, in her
individual capacity; JOHN
CHADBOURNE, in his individual
capacity; CRAIG SIMPSON, in his
individual capacity; KEVIN CLARK, in
his individual capacity,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
_________________________________
Before HARTZ, KELLY, and EID, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Jeffery Wayne Metzler appeals the district court’s order dismissing his suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that asserts claims against the individual defendants for
unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution and against the City of Colorado Springs
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2): 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
(the City) under a theory of municipal liability. Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Because we are reviewing the dismissal of Mr. Metzler’s amended complaint
for failure to state a claim, we assume the truth of the well-pleaded factual
allegations in that pleading. See Wittner v. Banner Health, 720 F.3d 770, 774-75
(10th Cir. 2013). The allegations paint a picture of an incompetent police
investigation leading to the arrest and two-day incarceration of an innocent man.
The events giving rise to Mr. Metzler’s suit began in August 2017. Law-
enforcement personnel from the Colorado Springs Police Department (CSPD) and
investigators from the Department of Homeland Security Investigations were
conducting a joint sting operation to identify and arrest individuals seeking to
purchase sex with underage girls.
“As part of the operation, [Defendant CSPD] Detective Elisabeth Reid placed
multiple ads for prostitution services on . . . a . . . website known for advertising
prostitution services disguised as personal ads.” Aplt. App. at 36. When a potential
customer called, Detective Reid would pose as “Lizzie” and attempt to arrange for
the customer to have sex with her fictional 16-year-old sister. “If the customer
agreed . . ., Detective Reid would [meet him at a hotel],” confirm he was there to
have sex with a juvenile girl and had money, and then give him “a room key and
condom.” Id. at 37. “A team of other CSPD officers would surveil and cover
Detective Reid during th[e] transaction. When the customer arrived at the hotel
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room, a second team of uniformed officers would be waiting there to arrest him.” Id.
Defendant CSPD Detective John Chadbourne participated.
“On August 9 . . . a man who identified himself as ‘Rick’ called the phone
number listed in Detective Reid’s [ad]. . . . After a brief conversation with ‘Lizzie,’
Rick agreed to pay for sex with Lizzie’s 16-year-old sister.” Id. Later that day,
Detective Reid (posing as “Lizzie”) met Rick in the hotel parking lot. After speaking
with Rick and confirming that he had money, Detective Reid gave him a condom and
room key, and then directed him to where he could find her sister. “Rick started
walking up a flight of stairs toward the room. . . . However, . . . Rick stopped at a
landing, turned around, and walked back down the stairs into the hotel complex.” Id.
at 38. “After a brief search, the CSPD personnel gave up on finding Rick.” Id. at 39.
“[CSPD] Sergeant [Craig] Simpson [who was voluntarily dismissed as a
defendant] . . . instructed Defendant CSPD Analyst Kevin Clark to attempt to identify
‘Rick’ based on the phone number that had been used to contact Detective Reid.” Id.
Analyst Clark’s “search of a law enforcement database yielded that the phone number
. . . [was] listed to a Jeffrey Wayne Metzler.” Id. at 103. “CSPD personnel . . .
[then] pulled Mr. Metzler’s driver’s license information and accessed his personal
Facebook page to forward several photos of Mr. Metzler to the officers who had been
on scene at the [hotel].” Id. at 40. Detective Reid determined that Mr. Metzler’s
driver’s license photo “matched” the individual Rick, and on August 30 she sought a
warrant for his arrest. Id. at 103. But the phone number in the law-enforcement
database was outdated; it belonged to an employer-provided cell phone that
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Mr. Metzler had turned in when he left his employment and had not used in several
years.
After the arrest warrant had issued, CSPD Officer Drew Jeltes called the phone
number associated with Mr. Metzler to ask him to turn himself in. “A man answered,
and Officer Jeltes inquired as to whether he was Jeffrey Metzler; the man stated that
he was not. When Officer Jeltes identified himself as a police officer and asked if the
man could provide contact information for Mr. Metzler, the man ended the call.” Id.
at 43. “Later that day, Officer Jeltes and Detective Chadbourne went to Mr.
Metzler’s house in Colorado Springs. They were unable to contact Mr. Metzler or
anyone else at his house, and instead began to interview his neighbors.” Id. One of
the neighbors gave him Mr. Metzler’s cell-phone number, which was different from
the one used by Rick to contact Detective Reid. The officers did not ask the
neighbors to confirm that Mr. Metzler looked like pictures taken of Rick or owned a
truck like the one Rick drove.
“Officer Jeltes called the number provided by the neighbor, and Mr. Metzler
answered the phone and immediately identified himself.” Id. at 44. Officer Jeltes
told Mr. Metzler that there was a warrant for his arrest related to an incident on
August 9 at a local hotel. “Officer Jeltes reported that Mr. Metzler sounded ‘puzzled’
and said that he was not familiar with the location of the alleged crime.” Id.
CSPD Officer Matthew Peterson was the watch commander on duty when
Mr. Metzler surrendered himself. He called Detective Reid to tell her Mr. Metzler
had turned himself in but did not want to be interviewed by a detective. Reid
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nevertheless went to the police station. While there she asked Peterson to review
video of the August 9 incident and still shots of the suspect from the video. Peterson
reported that “[t]he [man] in the video and photographs had similar characteristics to
that of [Mr.] Metzler and the voice sounded similar.” Id. at 42 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Mr. Metzler spent two days in jail before bonding out.
As the investigation continued, evidence emerged, including information
obtained through a search warrant for historical information for Rick’s phone and
interviews with former and current employers and co-workers, that called into
question Reid’s initial identification of Rick as Mr. Metzler. Ultimately, the district
attorney filed a motion to dismiss, which recited that “[w]hile probable cause existed
at the time of [Mr. Metzler’s] arrest and at [the] time of filing of charges, the District
Attorney . . . moves to dismiss all counts against . . . [Mr.] Metzler . . . without
prejudice. The People are unable to prove this case beyond a reasonable doubt at this
time.” Id. at 107.
Mr. Metzler then filed this suit in which he alleged that “[t]hrough a
combination of failures on the part of Defendants[,] . . . CSPD . . . misidentified Rick
as Mr. Metzler,” and “then misrepresented evidence to a judge in order to acquire an
arrest warrant.” Id. at 34. He further alleged that the CSPD had a history of arresting
suspects without probable cause and that the City’s failure to implement necessary
policies and properly train law-enforcement personnel led to his unlawful arrest.
The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Mr. Metzler
appeals. As we proceed to explain, a botched police investigation, even one leading
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to the arrest and confinement of an innocent man, does not necessarily violate the
Constitution.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss
based on qualified immunity.” Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163, 1166 (10th Cir.
2010). We likewise review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss a
claim for municipal liability. See Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 813 F.3d 912, 921
(10th Cir. 2015).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Qualified Immunity
“When a defendant raises the qualified-immunity defense, the plaintiff
must . . . establish (1) the defendant violated a federal statutory or constitutional right
and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s conduct.”
Ullery v. Bradley, 949 F.3d 1282, 1289 (10th Cir. 2020). “We may address the two
prongs of the qualified-immunity analysis in either order: If the plaintiff fails to
establish either prong of the two-pronged qualified-immunity standard, the defendant
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prevails on the defense.” Cummings v. Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1239 (10th Cir. 2019)
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
1. Unlawful Arrest
An arrest must be based on probable cause. “Probable cause is not a precise
quantum of evidence—it does not, for example, require the suspect’s guilt to be more
likely true than false. Instead, the relevant question is whether a substantial
probability existed that the suspect committed the crime, requiring something more
than a bare suspicion.” Stonecipher v. Valles, 759 F.3d 1134, 1141 (10th Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Even when an affidavit for an arrest warrant
states probable cause on its face (which is not disputed in this case), an arrest under
the warrant may be unlawful. On occasion, errors in the affidavit may invalidate the
warrant. An affiant seeking an arrest warrant violates the Fourth Amendment when
she knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, includes material false
statements in a supporting affidavit or omits information that, if included, would
prevent the warrant from lawfully issuing. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
171 (1978); Beard v. City of Northglenn, 24 F.3d 110, 114 (10th Cir 1994).
“The burden is on the plaintiff to make a substantial showing of deliberate
falsehood or reckless disregard for truth by the officer seeking the warrant.”
Stonecipher, 759 F.3d at 1142 (internal quotation marks omitted). Proof of “reckless
disregard in the presentation of information to a . . . judge [requires] evidence that the
officer in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [her] allegations.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “The failure to investigate a matter fully, to
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exhaust every possible lead, interview all potential witnesses, and accumulate
overwhelming corroborative evidence rarely suggests a knowing or reckless
disregard for the truth. To the contrary, it is generally considered to betoken
negligence at most.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “A
reviewing judge may infer recklessness from circumstances evincing obvious reasons
to doubt the veracity of the allegations . . . ; [b]ut this is not a mandatory or automatic
inference.” Kapinski v. City of Albuquerque, 964 F.3d 900, 908 (10th Cir. 2020)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
We can quickly dispose of the claims against Detective Chadbourne and
Analyst Clark. “[I]n order for liability to arise under § 1983, a defendant’s direct
personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right must be
established.” Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1327 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Such responsibility includes “set[ting] in motion a series
of events that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known would cause
others to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights.” Buck v. City of
Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1279-80 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The gist of the claim against Chadbourne appears to be only that if he had
performed his job better, he would have discovered evidence of Mr. Metzler’s
innocence in time to prevent the arrest. But there is no allegation that he participated
in the preparation of the affidavit for the arrest warrant or was otherwise directly
personally responsible for the detention. As for Clark, he was the one who reported
that Rick’s phone number belonged to Mr. Metzler. The amended complaint,
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however, gives us no reason to believe that Clark (who had no possible motive for
misidentifying the owner of the cell-phone number) did not check the law-
enforcement database, that he misread the database, or that he was anything more
than merely negligent if he did misread the database. Therefore, the claims against
Chadbourne and Clark were properly dismissed.
Turning to Detective Reid, Mr. Metzler failed to establish any deliberate
falsehoods in her affidavit. To the contrary, Reid truthfully described the sting
operation, her interaction with Rick, Analyst Clark’s search of the law-enforcement
database, and her identification of Mr. Metzler as Rick from his driver’s license
photo.
We also reject Mr. Metzler’s further argument that Reid knowingly or
recklessly omitted material facts in her affidavit—most notably that she had “doubts”
about her identification of Mr. Metzler as Rick, Aplt. Opening Br. at 15, and “sought
to arrest [him] not because she believed she had probable cause to believe he was
Rick, but rather for the sole purpose of identification—to determine whether [he] was
Rick,” id. at 16-17 (internal quotation marks omitted). This contention is based on
Detective Reid’s actions following Mr. Metzler’s arrest when she showed Officer
Peterson the video of her encounter with Rick and still shots from the video so that he
could confirm that Mr. Metzler was Rick.
To be sure, if the affiant for a warrant possesses information that would cast
substantial doubt on the existence of probable cause, that information should not be
intentionally withheld from the judge asked to approve the warrant. But Detective
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Reid’s affidavit discloses how she made the identification, so any weaknesses of the
procedure were apparent to the judge. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200
(1972) (setting forth factors to be considered in assessing accuracy of eyewitness
identification of suspect). Here, Reid, by asking Peterson to look at the video, was
performing the sort of double-check that Mr. Metzler (properly) contends should
have been conducted throughout the investigation. We do not think that Reid’s
request to Peterson can support a reasonable inference that she had sufficient doubt
about her identification to undermine the probable cause stated in her affidavit—
particularly in light of the (now-known-to-be incorrect) attribution of Rick’s phone
number to Mr. Metzler.
Because there was no Fourth Amendment violation, Detective Reid was
entitled to qualified immunity.
2. Malicious Prosecution
“We have repeatedly recognized in this circuit that, at least prior to trial, the
relevant constitutional underpinning for a claim of malicious prosecution under
§ 1983 must be the Fourth Amendment’s right to be free from unreasonable
seizures.” Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 914 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The seizure requirement is incorporated into a Fourth Amendment-
based malicious-prosecution claim under § 1983, which includes the following
elements: “(1) the defendant caused the plaintiff’s continued confinement or
prosecution; (2) the original action terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) no
probable cause supported the original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution;
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(4) the defendant acted with malice; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damages.”
Stonecipher, 759 F.3d at 1146 (internal quotation marks omitted). As previously
explained, there was probable cause to arrest Mr. Metzler, and therefore his
malicious-prosecution claim necessarily failed.
B. Municipal Liability
Mr. Metzler alleged that the City, as “policymaker” for the CSPD, Aplt. App.
at 56, failed to implement policies or adequately train its law-enforcement officers to
overcome a pattern of arresting suspects without probable cause, which in turn led to
the violation of his constitutional rights. But “a municipality . . . may not be held
liable where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers.”
Donahue v. Wihongi, 948 F.3d. 1177, 1199 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Because we conclude that there was no constitutional violation,
Mr. Metzler failed to state a claim for municipal liability.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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