NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 15 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHARON ROSE HOWELL, No. 17-35505
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 6:16-cv-00271-SB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael H. Simon, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 14, 2021**
Before: GOODWIN, CANBY, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
Sharon Rose Howell appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de novo, Attmore v.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016), and we affirm.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) provided specific and legitimate
reasons to discount the opinion of treating physician Dr. Bert as inconsistent with
and unsupported by the record. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041
(9th Cir. 2008) (inconsistency between physician’s opinion and the medical record
was a specific and legitimate reason to reject the opinion); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427
F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ need not accept an opinion that is
“inadequately supported by clinical findings”). The ALJ considered the requisite
factors and applied the correct legal standard in evaluating the medical opinion
evidence. See Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6)); Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d
1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in the
medical testimony).
The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons to discount the opinion of
examining psychologist Dr. Wahl as inconsistent with the medical record and
Howell’s activities. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041; Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1999) (no error where ALJ rejected a
physician’s opinion as inconsistent with the claimant’s activities). Any error in
discounting Dr. Wahl’s opinion as relying upon Howell’s subjective reports was
harmless. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (error is
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harmless where it is “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination”)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The ALJ proffered specific, clear, and convincing reasons to discount
Howell’s symptom testimony because she stopped work for reasons other than
disability; because her testimony that medication was not effective was
inconsistent with her statements to providers; and because her alleged limitations
were inconsistent with specific activities, including driving for two hours, reading
for pleasure, and regularly participating in activities at her church. See Molina,
674 F.3d at 1113 (claimant’s activities, which included attending church and
shopping, undermined her allegations of disabling social limitations); Tommasetti,
533 F.3d at 1040 (inconsistent symptom reporting was a clear and convincing
reason to discount testimony); Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir.
2001) (ALJ properly discounted claimant’s testimony because he left work for
reasons other than his impairments). Any error in the ALJ’s additional reasons
was harmless. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115.
The ALJ provided germane reasons to assign “some weight” to a lay witness
statement from Howell’s husband, Douglas Howell, as relying upon Howell’s
subjective complaints and unsupported by the record. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d
503, 512 (9th Cir. 2001) (no error in discounting lay evidence where limitations
alleged were not reflected in the medical record).
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Finally, the record does not support Howell’s contention that the ALJ erred
at Step Five. The ALJ determined that Howell had the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform light work with limitations, and the vocational expert
identified jobs in the light work category that an individual with Howell’s RFC
could perform. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 960-61 (9th Cir. 2002)
(ALJ properly relied on the testimony of a vocational expert to determine that jobs
existed in significant numbers in the national economy that a person with the
claimant’s RFC could perform).
AFFIRMED.
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