FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JAN 15 2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RUTH X. ASCENCIO-RODRIGUEZ; No. 18-73331
JONATHAN S. RODRIGUEZ-
ASCENCIO; EDUARDO A. Agency Nos. A208-891-727
RODRIGUEZ-ASCENCIO, A208-891-728
A208-891-729
Petitioners,
v. MEMORANDUM*
JEFFREY A. ROSEN, Acting Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted January 13, 2021**
San Francisco, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: BYBEE and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and WHALEY,*** District
Judge.
Petitioner Ruth X. Ascencio-Rodriguez, a native and citizen of El Salvador,
petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision
affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her and her two minor sons’
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (CAT). Because the parties are familiar with the facts,
we will not recite them here. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We
deny the petition for review.
We review “denials of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief for
substantial evidence and will uphold a denial supported by reasonable, substantial,
and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Ling Huang v.
Holder, 744 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Factual findings,
including adverse credibility determinations, are also reviewed for substantial
evidence. Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2014). Under the
substantial evidence standard, an agency determination must be upheld “unless the
evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d
1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 & n.1
***
The Honorable Robert H. Whaley, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.
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(1992)). “Where, as here, the BIA reviewed the IJ’s credibility-based decision for
clear error and ‘relied upon the IJ’s opinion as a statement of reasons’ but ‘did not
merely provide a boilerplate opinion,’ we ‘look to the IJ’s oral decision as a guide
to what lay behind the BIA’s conclusion.’” Lai v. Holder, 773 F.3d 966, 970 (9th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Tekle v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008)).
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s adverse
credibility determination. The IJ based its conclusion on a number of
inconsistencies between Petitioner’s testimony at her individual hearing and other
record evidence. For example, Petitioner stated during her hearing that, in October
2015, a gang member held one of her sons outside a grocery store and would not
let go of him. But in her written application, she claimed that the October 2015
incident involved gang members coming to her home and holding a gun to her
head. Petitioner’s failure to mention the harm to her son—who is a rider to her
asylum application—is not a trivial detail but rather a new allegation that tells a
more compelling story of the persecution of her family by gang members. See
Silva-Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A]n adverse
credibility determination may be supported by omissions that are not ‘details,’ but
new allegations that tell a ‘much different—and more compelling—story of
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persecution than [the] initial application.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2011)).
Petitioner’s argument that the IJ erroneously relied on minor
inconsistencies also lacks merit. “Under the REAL ID Act, even minor
inconsistencies that have a bearing on a petitioner’s veracity may constitute the
basis for an adverse credibility determination.” Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079,
1089 (9th Cir. 2011). Petitioner provided multiple conflicting accounts regarding
the threat she allegedly received in February 2016. Taken together, these
inconsistencies indicate a pattern that the IJ was entitled to consider in assessing
her credibility. See, e.g., Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1047 (9th Cir. 2010)
(citations omitted) (“[Petitioner’s] inability to consistently describe the underlying
events that gave rise to his fear was an important factor that could be relied upon
by the IJ in making an adverse credibility determination.”).
Nor did the IJ err in finding Petitioner’s testimony internally inconsistent.
Despite Petitioner’s claimed fear of reporting her claims to the Salvadorian
government, her testimony indicated that the authorities investigated her husband’s
claim of extortion, patrolled her neighborhood, and encouraged her to file a police
report after the February 2016 incident. Thus, the record does not compel a
contrary conclusion; indeed, the record squarely supports the IJ’s reliance on
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Petitioner’s internally inconsistent testimony in making the adverse credibility
determination.
Finally, in her opening brief, Petitioner does not challenge the BIA’s
determination that she failed to establish eligibility for CAT relief. See Lopez-
Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2013) (issues not specifically
raised and argued in a party’s opening brief are waived). Petitioner has therefore
waived any challenge to the BIA’s denial of her claim for CAT relief.
PETITION DENIED.
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