FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 19, 2021
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
SHER B. CHHETRI,
Petitioner,
v. No. 19-9502
(Petition for Review)
JEFFREY A. ROSEN, Acting United
States Attorney General, *
Respondent.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
_________________________________
Before PHILLIPS, McHUGH, and EID, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Sher B. Chhetri, a native and citizen of Nepal, petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of his applications for asylum, restriction on removal,
and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We deny the petition for
review.
*
On December 24, 2020, Jeffrey A. Rosen became Acting Attorney General of
the United States. Consequently, he has been substituted for William P. Barr as
Respondent. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I
Mr. Chhetri entered the United States on August 14, 2015. At an initial interview,
an immigration official determined he had a credible fear of returning to Nepal and issued
him a Notice to Appear (NTA) before an immigration judge (IJ). The NTA charged
Mr. Chhetri with attempting to enter the U.S. without valid entry documents. See
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Mr. Chhetri conceded the charge but applied for asylum,
restriction on removal, and CAT protection based on his political opinion.
Before the IJ, Mr. Chhetri testified that he was an active member of the Nepali
Congress Party (NCP) for ten years. He stated that he attended NCP meetings, oversaw
its programs, assisted with its campaign efforts, and spoke about its development
initiatives. He testified, however, that he received several threats from the opposition
Maoist Party. The first threat was from an anonymous caller who instructed
Mr. Chhetri’s father to tell him to join the Maoists. After the call, Mr. Chhetri left home
and stayed with a friend. When he returned the next day, his father told him the Maoists
had come to their home wearing scarves on their faces, looking for him. Mr. Chhetri
became afraid, so he moved to Kathmandu, where he thought he would be more secure.
But in Kathmandu, Mr. Chhetri received a second threat from another anonymous
caller. This caller told him the Maoists had repeatedly instructed both him and his father
to join the Maoist party, but they insisted on supporting the NCP. The caller said when
the Maoists found him, they would kill him.
Mr. Chhetri changed his telephone number but doing so did not stop the threats.
Mr. Chhetri testified that at some point, a third caller told him the Maoists were at his
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residence and he should open the door. This made him afraid, so he turned off the lights
and put down the phone, but no one came to his door. After this incident, he decided to
relocate again.
Mr. Chhetri moved to a place called Manmaiju, where he received a fourth
telephone threat. This time, the caller told him that even though he was running from one
place to another, the Maoists would find and kill him. Mr. Chhetri’s landlord overheard
the call and forced him to leave. Mr. Chhetri moved yet again, staying with a friend in a
town called Banianyatar. There, his previous landlord contacted him and informed him
that the Maoists had come to his residence and were making problems. The landlord told
Mr. Chhetri that if he discovered his whereabouts, he would report him to the Maoists.
Mr. Chhetri testified that at that point, he realized it would be difficult to survive
in Nepal. He explained that the Maoists were spread throughout the country and they had
threatened his father on four other occasions. He therefore fled Nepal and subsequently
learned the Maoists continued to ask his father and his wife about him. He testified that
he feared he would be killed if he were forced to return to Nepal. He further stated he did
not contact the police after any of these incidents because he did not know the telephone
number for the police, nor did he have any proof that these threats were made. He also
suggested the police would not help him because the Maoists are part of the government.
After considering this and other evidence, the IJ denied relief. The IJ determined
that Mr. Chhetri was credible, but that several anonymous telephone threats and one visit
to his father over the course of eight years was insufficient to show past persecution or a
well-founded fear of future persecution. Moreover, noting Mr. Chhetri’s testimony that
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he declined to contact the police, the IJ ruled there was insufficient evidence to indicate
the Nepali government was unable or unwilling to protect him, adding that while there
was evidence of some general political violence in Nepal, the political parties had
co-existed peacefully since 2006 and 2007, especially in the Kathmandu area. Finally,
the IJ determined there was insufficient evidence the Nepali government would torture
him or acquiesce to his torture. The IJ thus ordered Mr. Chhetri removed to Nepal.
The BIA affirmed, ruling that Mr. Chhetri’s receipt of a limited number of
anonymous threats, mostly via telephone over a period of years, did not amount to
persecution. The BIA acknowledged the Maoists’ behavior was distressing, but it ruled
that Mr. Chhetri was never physically harmed and all of his problems consisted entirely
of threats. Moreover, the BIA found no clear error in the IJ’s conclusion that Mr. Chhetri
failed to show a well-founded fear of persecution. Last, the BIA ruled that the IJ did not
clearly err in finding that he failed to show it was more likely than not that he would be
tortured upon removal.
II
We review legal questions de novo and agency factual findings for substantial
evidence. Karki v. Holder, 715 F.3d 792, 800 (10th Cir. 2013). ‘“[T]he administrative
findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
conclude to the contrary.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). “Our review is
confined to the reasoning given by the agency, and we will not independently search the
record for alternative bases to affirm.” Ritonga v. Holder, 633 F.3d 971, 974 (10th Cir.
2011) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
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To obtain asylum, an alien must show he “‘is unable or unwilling to return to [his
country of nationality] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.’” Hayrapetyan v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 1330, 1335 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). There is a rebuttable presumption that an alien who suffered
past persecution has a well-founded fear of future persecution. See id. at 1335-36 (citing
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)). Absent this presumption, “[a]liens basing their asylum claims
upon a well-founded fear of future persecution must show both a genuine, subjective fear
of persecution, and an objective basis by credible, direct, and specific evidence in the
record, of facts that would support a reasonable fear of persecution.” Karki, 715 F.3d at
801 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Such persecution may be inflicted by the
government itself or by a non-governmental group that the government is unwilling or
unable to control.” Hayrapetyan, 534 F.3d at 1337 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The test for restriction on removal is . . . more demanding than the ‘well-founded
fear’ standard applicable to an asylum claim.” Ritonga, 633 F.3d at 978 (internal
quotation marks omitted). To obtain restriction on removal, an alien must show his “life
or freedom would be threatened in the country proposed for removal because of” a
statutorily protected ground. Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The
alien must show either that he suffered past persecution or that “it is more likely than not
that he . . . would be persecuted on one of the specified grounds upon returning to the
proposed country of removal.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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An alien seeking CAT protection “must demonstrate it is more likely than not that
he . . . would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). He need not show torture on account of a statutorily protected
ground, but he must show the torture would be “by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Chhetri contends he was persecuted in Nepal and the death threats he received
indicate he is likely to be tortured if returned there. But our cases do not support his
contention. “[P]ersecution requires the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who
differ (in race, religion, or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive and must
entail more than just restrictions or threats to life and liberty.” Hayrapetyan, 534 F.3d at
1337 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Mere denigration, harassment, and threats” do
not constitute persecution. Pang v. Holder, 665 F.3d 1226, 1231 (10th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Chhetri’s experiences—four telephone threats
and one vague, in-person threat made to his father—do not constitute persecution.
Compare Ritonga, 633 F.3d at 976 (holding record did not compel finding persecution
where, in addition to general violence and unrest, alien sustained minor injuries during a
home invasion, the police investigated the crime and apprehended its perpetrators, and
the alien was separately attacked in her car but suffered no injuries), and Sidabutar v.
Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116, 1124 (10th Cir. 2007) (agreeing with BIA’s conclusion that
alien was not persecuted where he was repeatedly beaten on account of his religion, twice
resulting in serious injury; he was repeatedly confronted by people who demanded
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money; and once, when he had no money to give, he was struck and his motorcycle was
burned), with Karki, 715 F.3d at 797-98, 804-05 (holding record compelled finding
persecution where, in addition to receiving threats, the alien’s aunt was killed in a house
bombing, he was the target of a lethal car bombing that killed five of his colleagues, his
real property was confiscated, and he was hospitalized by a severe beating that rendered
him semi-unconscious), and Hayrapetyan, 534 F.3d at 1333-34, 1337-38 (concluding
there was sufficient evidence of persecution where, in addition to being threatened, the
alien was imprisoned on two occasions, slapped, knocked to the ground, kicked, and
injured when nearly run over by a vehicle; her husband was severely beaten twice, one
time requiring a fifteen-day hospitalization; her daughter was nearly abducted; and she
was fired from her job).
Because Mr. Chhetri did not suffer past persecution, he was not entitled to a
presumption that he has a well-founded fear of persecution. Nonetheless, he could still
show an objectively well-founded fear of persecution with evidence that he will be
singled out for persecution in the future. See Ritonga, 633 F.3d at 976. But if he could
avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the county, and it would be reasonable
to do so, his fear of persecution is not well-founded. See id. at 976-77.
Mr. Chhetri seems to contend he will be singled out for persecution because there
is evidence the Maoists will find him no matter where he goes in Nepal. He points out
that they contacted him in various locations and warned him they would find him and kill
him, regardless of where he relocated. He says the IJ failed to consider this evidence or
make any findings concerning whether he had well-founded fear of persecution, relying
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instead exclusively on his failure to show past persecution. Consequently, he contends
the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s determination that he did not show a well-founded fear
of persecution.
The record does not support Mr. Chhetri’s arguments. After finding that he failed
to show past persecution, and therefore was not entitled to a rebuttable presumption of a
well-founded fear of future persecution, the IJ determined that Mr. Chhetri also failed to
show, independently, a well-founded fear of persecution. See Admin. R. at 60-61. The IJ
reasoned that Mr. Chhetri might experience threats similar to those previously made
against him, but this was insufficient to satisfy his burden of proof. The IJ also explained
that there was insufficient evidence that the government was unable or unwilling to
protect him, particularly given that Mr. Chhetri declined to contact the police. The IJ
added that although there was evidence of some continuing political violence, the various
political parties in Nepal have peacefully coexisted since 2006 and 2007, especially in the
Kathmandu area. These findings adequately support the IJ’s determination that
Mr. Chhetri did not show a well-founded fear of persecution. See Ritonga, 633 F.3d at
977 (holding that IJ adequately supported his determination that alien lacked a
well-founded fear of persecution by referencing facts in evidence and announcing
decision in terms sufficient to permit review); see also Ismaiel v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d
1198, 1207 (10th Cir. 2008) (recognizing the agency need not “write an exegesis on
every contention” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
To the extent Mr. Chhetri asserts there is no evidence “that the government of
Nepal is able to protect [him],” Pet’r Br. at 17, it was his burden to establish his eligibility
8
for asylum by showing, among other things, that the government of Nepal could not
protect him, see Pang, 665 F.3d at 1230 (“The applicant bears the burden of proof of
establishing eligibility for asylum.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a). 1 As the BIA explained,
Mr. Chhetri offered “no persuasive argument that the information contained in the
background evidence establishes clear error in the [IJ’s] predictive findings of fact.”
Admin. R. at 4. The BIA therefore affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that Mr. Chhetri did not
meet his burden to establish his eligibility for asylum. Mr. Chhetri fails to show that any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach a contrary conclusion.
Mr. Chhetri’s “failure to satisfy the burden of proof for asylum necessarily
constitutes a failure to meet the more stringent burden of proof for restriction on
removal.” Dallakoti v. Holder, 619 F.3d 1264, 1268 (10th Cir. 2010) (ellipsis and
internal quotation marks omitted). He also failed to establish that he is likely to be
tortured if removed to Nepal. Indeed, the BIA ruled that Mr. Chhetri’s “[CAT] claim is
based on a speculative chain of assumptions and a fear of what might happen, rather than
on evidence that meets his burden of demonstrating that it is more likely than not he will
be subjected to torture.” Admin. R. at 5. In his petition for review, Mr. Chhetri cites no
1
To support this argument, Mr. Chhetri relies in part on new evidence
submitted to the BIA that indicated the Maoists were successful in the 2017 Nepali
elections. He argued to the BIA that this new evidence demonstrated the government
could not protect him. But this evidence was not before the IJ. And the BIA
determined that Mr. Chhetri “ha[d] not made a persuasive argument that, if the record
were remanded to consider in the first instance the new background evidence
(regarding events that occurred after the date of his hearing), the result of the
proceedings would change.” Admin. R. at 4-5. The BIA therefore denied
Mr. Chhetri’s motion for remand, and Mr. Chhetri does not challenge that ruling.
9
record evidence to support his contention that he is likely to be tortured if removed to
Nepal; instead, he relies again on speculation. See Pet’r Br. at 21 (arguing that the
Maoists threatened his life and “death would certainly constitute torture”). Accordingly,
we see no error in the denial of Mr. Chhetri’s CAT claim.
III
The petition for review is denied.
Entered for the Court
Allison H. Eid
Circuit Judge
10