NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 20 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PATRICE M. DANIELS, No. 20-55257
Plaintiff-Appellant, District Court No.
18-cv-09860-JVS-JEM
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 15, 2021**
Seattle, Washington
Before: CALLAHAN and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,*** District
Judge.
Appellant Patrice Daniels applied for Social Security disability insurance
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
benefits and supplemental security income in June 2015, claiming a disability onset
date of November 1, 2013 (prior to the June 30, 2014 date last insured). Daniels
claimed disability on account of diabetes mellitus, diabetic neuropathy, back
disorder, arthritis, thyroid disorder, depression, headaches, hypertension, and chest
pain / mitral valve disorder. The parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural
history is assumed.
This Court “review[s] a district court’s order upholding the Commissioner’s
denial of benefits de novo.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998).
The Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision (here, the ALJ’s decision) to ensure
it is free from harmful legal error, Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012),
and supported by substantial evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence
means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). “Where
the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which
supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v.
Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002).
First, the ALJ did not harmfully err by rejecting some aspects and giving little
weight to other aspects of the opinions of treating physicians Drs. Scott and Nazari.
The ALJ found that aspects of these doctors’ opinions were completely inconsistent
with medical evidence in the record, including the doctors’ own treatment notes. For
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example, the doctors’ opinions that Daniels could not sit, walk, or stand for more
than 2 hours were inconsistent with Dr. Scott’s treatment notes, which were
generally unremarkable with respect to range of motion, gait, and musculoskeletal
findings.
Second, the ALJ did not err in rejecting the lay opinions of licensed clinical
social worker Betty J. Smith and Daniels’s significant other, Charles Jackson. The
ALJ offered “germane” reasons supported by substantial evidence for rejecting this
lay evidence. Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001). For example, in
many different areas of mental capability Smith opined that Daniels had no useful
ability to function. The ALJ rejected this opinion because it was inconsistent with
the medical evidence and the fact that Daniels had never been under the care of a
psychiatrist.
Third, the ALJ did not harmfully err in assigning weight to the opinions of
certain non-treating physicians. Where the ALJ’s approach to weighing the experts’
opinions is rational and supported by substantial evidence, it is not the function of
this Court to reweigh expert opinions that all parties agree the ALJ should have
considered. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954 (“Where the evidence is susceptible to
more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the
ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.”); Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th
Cir. 1992) (“The trier of fact and not the reviewing court must resolve conflicts in
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the evidence[.]”).
Fourth, the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination (“RFC”) was
reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ reasonably concluded
that the RFC adequately accounted for all of Daniels’s functional limitations.
Daniels’s contrary arguments take issue with the ALJ’s interpretation of the
evidence, but Daniels has not demonstrated that the ALJ’s interpretation was
unreasonable.
Finally, the ALJ did not harmfully err in concluding, based on its RFC and
the testimony of a vocational expert, that Daniels is not disabled because there were
a significant number of jobs in the national economy that she could perform.
Daniels’s contrary arguments are derivative of her other arguments and fail for the
same reasons.
The Court has considered Daniels’s remaining arguments and finds them to
be without merit.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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