UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-2371
SHARON LYNN DAVIS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF TAZEWELL, VIRGINIA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
Abingdon. James P. Jones, District Judge. (1:18-cv-00030-JPJ-PMS)
Submitted: December 28, 2020 Decided: January 21, 2021
Before MOTZ, KING, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas E. Strelka, L. Leigh R. Strelka, N. Winston West, IV, STRELKA LAW OFFICE,
PC, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. W. Bradford Stallard, Karissa H. Range, PENN,
STUART & ESKRIDGE, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In 2015, the Town of Tazewell, Virginia (“the Town”), hired Sharon Lynn Davis
for the position of Town Treasurer. Less than two years later, the Town Manager, Todd
Day, demoted Davis, prompting her to resign. According to Davis, her demotion and
constructive discharge resulted from Day’s discriminatory animus toward women, as
evidenced by, among other things, her lower salary relative to another department head,
Travis Barbee. The Town, on the other hand, considered the demotion justified based on
Davis’ frequent salary complaints and her unauthorized decision to leave early from an
important meeting.
Following her resignation, Davis commenced this action against the Town, alleging
gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. The district court granted
summary judgment to the Town, and, for the reasons that follow, we affirm.
“We review de novo a district court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary
judgment, construing all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the
nonmoving party.” Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 886 F.3d 346, 353 (4th Cir.
2018). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
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Under the familiar McDonnell Douglas ∗ framework, a plaintiff alleging
discrimination bears “the initial burden of proving . . . her prima facie case by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Abilt v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 848 F.3d 305, 315 (4th
Cir. 2017). If the plaintiff makes this showing, “[t]he burden of production then shifts to
the employer to . . . provide some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action.” Sharif v. United Airlines, Inc., 841 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2016)
(internal quotation marks omitted). If the employer satisfies this requirement, “the plaintiff
resumes the burden of persuading the factfinder that the employer’s proffered explanation
is merely a pretext for discrimination.” Id.
“To establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, a plaintiff must show:
(1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse
employment action; and (4) that similarly-situated employees outside the protected class
received more favorable treatment.” Gerner v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 674 F.3d 264, 266 (4th
Cir. 2012) (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). Under the fourth prong, “the
plaintiff must provide evidence that the proposed comparators are not just similar in some
respects, but similarly-situated in all respects.” Spencer v. Virginia State Univ., 919 F.3d
199, 207 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 381 (2019).
Relevant considerations include “whether the employees (i) held the same job description,
(ii) were subject to the same standards, (iii) were subordinate to the same supervisor, and
(iv) had comparable experience, education, and other qualifications—provided the
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McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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employer considered these latter factors in making the personnel decision.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Relying on Barbee as her sole comparator, Davis underscores that she received a
much lower salary than Barbee, even though they occupied equivalent positions in the
Town’s chain of command. But unlike Davis, Barbee had previously worked in local
government, an experience that Day found highly desirable. In addition, Barbee enjoyed
substantial leverage in the hiring process, as he filled a position that had been vacant for
roughly six months, thereby allowing him to request a highly competitive salary.
Conversely, Davis, who overlapped with the outgoing Town Treasurer, felt that she could
not negotiate her salary because the Town had been considering another candidate. Thus,
in light of the candidates’ prior experience, the competition for their respective positions,
and the opportunity—or lack thereof—to negotiate compensation, we conclude that Davis
was not similarly situated to Barbee. Consequently, Davis cannot establish a prima facie
case of gender discrimination.
Turning to Davis’ retaliation claim, “[a] prima facie case of retaliation requires
proof that: (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action, and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity
and the adverse action.” Ray v. Int’l Paper Co., 909 F.3d 661, 669 (4th Cir. 2018).
According to Davis, Day demoted her because she registered a genuine grievance
concerning gender-based pay disparity. Davis, however, fails to identify any evidence
substantiating her claim that, in complaining to Day, she intimated her belief that he was
engaging in unlawful discrimination. And although Davis suggests otherwise, we cannot
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agree that gender bias is part and parcel of any employment dispute involving unequal
treatment of coworkers who happen to be of the opposite sex. Thus, because Davis has not
shown that she tied her salary complaints to accusations of gender discrimination, we
conclude that she fails to establish that she engaged in a protected activity, thereby
defeating her retaliation claim.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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