IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0064
Filed February 3, 2021
GREGORY DONALD HARRIS,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Coleman McAllister,
Judge.
Gregory Harris appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.
Agnes G. Warutere of Warutere Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Ankeny, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Greer, JJ.
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BOWER, Chief Judge.
On the morning his trial was to begin, in exchange for the State’s
recommendation that he be granted a suspended sentence and immediate release
on probation, Gregory Harris pleaded guilty to stalking in violation of a protective
order with a habitual-offender enhancement. He subsequently violated his
probation, and sentence was imposed.
Harris filed an application for postconviction relief (PCR), asserting—among
other things—that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to depose the complaining
witness prior to trial. Following a PCR trial, the district court rejected Harris’s
claims and denied relief. On appeal, Harris contends the PCR court erred in
rejecting his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to depose the
complaining witness.
We review PCR proceedings addressing claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel de novo. Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012). To
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Harris must show counsel
breached a duty and prejudice resulted. See State v. Boothby, 951 N.W.2d 859,
863 (Iowa 2020); Lamasters, 821 N.W.2d at 866. We affirm the denial of a PCR
application if either element is lacking. See Boothby, 951 N.W.2d at 863;
Lamasters, 821 N.W.2d at 866.
Counsel breaches a duty if counsel’s performance falls below the standard
of a “reasonably competent attorney,” and the requisite prejudice exists if “there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” Lamasters, 821 N.W.2d at 866
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984)). “We presume
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counsel performed competently unless the claimant proves otherwise by a
preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Booth-Harris, 942 N.W.2d 562, 577
(Iowa 2020).
Our review leads us to the same findings and conclusion as the PCR court,
which we adopt:
The record reveals [trial counsel] did not depose the State’s
witnesses. However, [trial counsel] did thoroughly investigate the
testimony of potential witnesses. He hired a private investigator to
interview each witness applicant identified as having potentially
helpful information for his case. The private investigator even spoke
to the [complaining witness].
....
. . . During his trial testimony, Mr. Harris did not identify any
specific witness other than the detective and the victim that he
claimed had information about his offense. Any claim that the victim
had recanted her testimony or allegations is not supported in the
record and is in fact flatly contradicted by [her submitted affidavit].
....
It is clear [trial counsel]’s investigation and efforts even without
deposing the State’s witnesses was thorough. As such, he did not
breach his essential duty to reasonably investigate applicant’s claim.
Nor can the court conclude that there was any showing of prejudice.
As set out above, the victim has not recanted her allegations or
testimony. [Trial counsel] credibly testified that he had his private
investigator interview all of the witnesses, including the victim, and
there was no need to depose any witness. In fact, [trial counsel]
credibly testified that conducting depositions might well have been
detrimental to applicant’s case as it would allow the State to prepare
their case more thoroughly for trial.
“[I]t is not always necessary for defense counsel to depose witnesses before
trial.” State v. Williams, 341 N.W.2d 748, 752 (Iowa 1983). “A claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel . . . can center on a defense attorney’s failure to adequately
investigate. To provide effective assistance of counsel during the investigatory
stage, counsel is required to conduct a reasonable investigation and to make
reasonable decisions regarding discovery.” State v. Russell, 897 N.W.2d 717, 730
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(Iowa 2017) (internal citation omitted). The reasonableness of counsel’s
investigation “must be judged in relationship to the particular underlying
circumstances.” Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 145 (Iowa 2001).
Here, trial counsel was aware of what the complaining witness had asserted
in her statements to police and to the private investigator. The complaining witness
had earlier testified in a civil contempt proceeding about Harris’s repeated
violations of a protective order and his threats to her. Trial counsel obtained that
transcript as “[o]ne of the first things [he] did.” Harris was aware of the evidence
against him—including his voicemail messages to the complaining witness, which
she shared with the police. Harris cannot establish trial counsel’s failure to depose
the complaining witness would have changed his decision to accept his favorable
plea deal (described by the plea-taking court as “the best break I have seen in a
really long time” and “a hell of a deal”).
Having failed to establish counsel was ineffective, we affirm the denial of
his application for PCR.
AFFIRMED.