FILE THIS OPINION WAS FILED
FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
IN CLERK’S OFFICE FEBRUARY 11, 2021
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON
FEBRUARY 11, 2021
SUSAN L. CARLSON
SUPREME COURT CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of ) No. 97689-9
CARL BROOKS )
) En Banc
Petitioner. )
) Filed :________________
February 11, 2021
__________________________________)
GONZÁLEZ, C.J.— Our state and federal constitutions recognize that
“children are different.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480, 132 S. Ct. 2455,
183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012); State v. Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67, 81-82, 428 P.3d 343
(2018); State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 18, 391 P.3d 409 (2017); WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 14; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. It is constitutionally significant that
children are less culpable than adults and have a greater capacity for change.
Miller, 567 U.S. at 472-73 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72-74, 130 S.
Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010)). As a result, children “warrant special
protections in sentencing.” Bassett, 192 Wn.2d at 81. Both this court and the
United States Supreme Court have recognized that under a constitutional
sentencing system, those who commit crimes as juveniles should rarely be
In re Pers. Restraint of Brooks, No. 97689-9
sentenced to die in prison and must be given a meaningful opportunity to obtain
release. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734, 193 L. Ed.
2d 599 (2016); Miller, 567 U.S. at 479; Graham, 560 U.S. at 74-75; Bassett, 192
Wn.2d at 90.
In the wake of Miller and to codify these constitutional protections, our
legislature revised current sentencing law so that those serving lengthy sentences
for crimes they committed as juveniles have a way to petition for release. LAWS OF
2014, ch. 130, § 9(3)(b); RCW 9.94A.730. We are asked whether RCW 9.94A.730
applies to the petitioner, Carl Brooks, who was sentenced as a juvenile under an
earlier sentencing system. We hold that it does.
BACKGROUND
In 1978, 17-year-old Brooks pleaded guilty to eight counts of first degree
robbery, first degree rape, first degree kidnapping, first degree assault, second
degree murder, and first degree burglary, all while armed with a deadly weapon.
Over the span of three days, Brooks carjacked, robbed, and raped a woman while
her son was present; attempted to rob a couple where gunfire between Brooks and
the male victim led to the shooting death of the victim’s wife; carjacked and
robbed a third woman; and threatened a fourth woman in her home, demanded
financial information, and assaulted her. Brooks had prior convictions in both
juvenile and adult court. These facts are not in dispute.
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At the time, sentencing in our state was “indeterminate.” See ch. 9.95 RCW.
Under that indeterminate sentencing system, trial courts sentenced offenders to the
maximum amount of time that could be served. But the amount of time the
offender would actually serve was largely controlled by the Board of Prison Terms
and Paroles (parole board) who would set the minimum term, taking into account
recommendations by the trial court and prosecutor. RCW 9.95.010, .030, .040.
The parole board also had the power to decide when an offender was fit to be
released. In this case, the trial court sentenced Brooks to a maximum term of life
on each count. The judge ordered five of the life sentences to run concurrently,
and the remaining three to run consecutively, effectively sentencing Brooks to four
consecutive “blocks” (or groupings) of life sentences.1 Both the prosecutor and the
court recommended that the parole board give Brooks minimum terms of life.
Departing from the recommendations slightly, the parole board set minimum terms
of 20, 25, 25, and 20 years for the four blocks, for a minimum total of 90 years.
Not long after Brooks’ sentencing, the legislature largely replaced our
indeterminate sentencing system with a determinate sentencing system, the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA). See LAWS OF 1981, ch. 137; ch. 9.94A
1
The first block consists of first degree robbery, counts I, VI, VII; first degree assault, count V;
and first degree burglary, count VIII (20 years). The second block consists of first degree
kidnapping, count III (25 years). The third block consists of first degree rape, count II (25
years). The fourth block consists of second degree murder, count IV (20 years). All of these
include being armed with a deadly weapon. The first block contains multiple counts because
those counts run concurrently with each other.
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RCW; RCW 9.94A.905 (applying to crimes committed after June 30, 1984). The
SRA eliminated parole hearings for most offenders. For those sentenced under the
former indeterminate sentencing system who are still incarcerated, the
Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB) (the successor to the parole board)
was directed to “attempt to make [parole] decisions reasonably consistent” with the
SRA. RCW 9.95.009(2).
Brooks has had a number of parole hearings and has been paroled from his
first sentencing block. Parole in this case did not mean release, and he is currently
serving the second sentencing block. In 2018, the ISRB denied him parole and
added 60 months to his current sentencing block. Brooks has now been in prison
for over 42 years. He has approximately 50 years remaining on his sentence until
he will be eligible for release.
While Brooks has been serving his time, the United States Supreme Court
held that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Miller, 567 U.S. at
465. In response, our legislature enacted a series of changes to juvenile sentencing
known collectively as the Miller-fix statute. LAWS OF 2014, ch. 130. This
included a provision authorizing a juvenile convicted of one or more crimes to
petition the ISRB for early release after serving at least 20 years of confinement.
RCW 9.94A.730(1). If the ISRB grants release, the defendant is subject to
4
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Department of Corrections (DOC) community custody for a period of time
determined by the ISRB, up to the length of the court-imposed term of
incarceration. RCW 9.94A.730(5).
The ISRB determined that Brooks is “not eligible for the ‘Miller’ fix.”
Answer to Mot. for Discr. Review, App. 3 (ISRB Decisions and Reasons) at 7.
Acting pro se, Brooks filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) arguing that he is
unlawfully restrained and must be given a hearing under RCW 9.94A.730 of the
Miller-fix statute. The Court of Appeals denied Brooks’ PRP, concluding that
because Brooks committed his crimes before the SRA was enacted, the “provisions
of the SRA, including RCW 9.94A.730, do not apply.” Order Dismissing PRP, In
re Pers. Restraint of Brooks, No. 79757-3-I, at 2 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2019).
We granted Brooks’ motion for discretionary review and appointed counsel.
Amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, Columbia Legal
Services, Juvenile Law Center, King County Department of Public Defense, Fred
T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, National Juvenile Defender Center,
Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and Washington Defender
Association collectively submitted a brief in support of Brooks.
ANALYSIS
Brooks bears the burden of showing he is under unlawful restraint. In re
Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 175 Wn.2d 186, 195-96, 283 P.3d 1103 (2012) (citing
5
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RAP 16.4). Here, that requires him to show he is entitled to a Miller hearing under
RCW 9.94A.730. RAP 16.4(c)(6). Questions of statutory interpretation are
reviewed de novo. State v. Scott, 190 Wn.2d 586, 591, 416 P.3d 1182 (2018)
(citing State v. Bunker, 169 Wn.2d 571, 577, 238 P.3d 487 (2010)).
When interpreting a statute, we first consider the statute’s plain language. In
re Adoption of T.A.W., 186 Wn.2d 828, 840, 383 P.3d 492 (2016) (citing State v.
Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007)). If a statute’s language is
plain and subject to only one interpretation, that ends the inquiry because plain
language does not require construction. Id. (quoting HomeStreet, Inc. v. Dep’t of
Revenue, 166 Wn.2d 444, 451, 210 P.3d 297 (2009)). To determine a statute’s
plain meaning, we may look to the entirety of the statute in which the provision is
found, related statutes, or other provisions within the same act. Id. (citing Dep’t of
Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)). We also
frequently consider the court cases that led the legislature to enact the statute. E.g.,
In re Pers. Restraint of Meirhofer, 182 Wn.2d 632, 638, 343 P.3d 731 (2015);
Lummi Indian Nation v. State, 170 Wn.2d 247, 251, 241 P.3d 1220 (2010).
The language of RCW 9.94A.730 is plain and unambiguous. The statute
provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, any person convicted of
one or more crimes committed prior to the person’s eighteenth birthday may
petition the indeterminate sentence review board for early release after
serving no less than twenty years of total confinement, provided the person
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In re Pers. Restraint of Brooks, No. 97689-9
has not been convicted for any crime committed subsequent to the person’s
eighteenth birthday, the person has not committed a disqualifying serious
infraction as defined by the department in the twelve months prior to filing
the petition for early release, and the current sentence was not imposed
under RCW 10.95.030 or 9.94A.507.
RCW 9.94A.730(1) (emphasis added). The statute plainly applies to “any person”
who meets the conditions set forth. The statute also clearly says who is excluded:
individuals convicted of subsequent crimes after the age of 18, individuals who
have committed a disqualifying serious infraction in the year prior to filing a
petition for early release, and those sentenced to aggravated first degree murder or
specified sex crimes.
The ISRB argues that the statute does not apply to Brooks because RCW
9.94A.730 is part of the SRA and states, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
this chapter.” However, while chapter 9.94A RCW is colloquially known as the
SRA, the actual legislative act modified other sections of our criminal code outside
of chapter 9.94A RCW, including sections within chapter 9.95 RCW, the
indeterminate sentencing section. See LAWS OF 1981, ch. 137, §§ 24, 32-33, 39.
Perhaps more importantly, chapter 9.94A RCW is the portion of the revised code
of Washington where the vast majority of our sentencing statutes are codified.
While scattered sentencing provisions are found in many other chapters, it is the
sensible place to locate general sentencing statutes.
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The ISRB also argues that Brooks is not entitled to a Miller-fix hearing
because he is already entitled to parole hearings. 2 But these hearings are not the
functional equivalents of each other. A hearing under RCW 9.94A.730 includes a
statutory presumption of early release. The ISRB “shall order the person released”
unless the ISRB determines “by a preponderance of the evidence” that it is “more
likely than not that the person will commit new criminal law violations if
released.” RCW 9.94A.730(3) (emphasis added). This statutory presumption is a
duty that limits the discretion of the ISRB. By contrast, a parole hearing under
RCW 9.95.100 places the burden on the incarcerated person to demonstrate
rehabilitation, and the ISRB “shall not” grant parole unless it finds “rehabilitation
has been complete and he or she is a fit subject for release.” RCW 9.95.100
(emphasis added). While the ISRB “shall give public safety considerations the
highest priority” in both types of hearings, the consideration of public safety does
not override the presumption of release in RCW 9.94A.730 and is, in fact, related
to it. Compare RCW 9.95.100, with RCW 9.94A.730(3).
We stress that a hearing under RCW 9.94A.730 is not a resentencing.
Instead, an early release hearing looks to the future and focuses on one’s likelihood
2
The ISRB also argues that applying RCW 9.94A.730 to Brooks does not serve the purpose of
the statute, which is to remedy the constitutional problem of mandating life sentences without the
possibility of parole for children. But while that was clearly the impetus of the statute, the
legislature did not limit it to only those sentences that would have been unconstitutional under
Miller.
8
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of reoffending. See State v. Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d 106, 122, 456 P.3d 806 (2020)
(discussing United States v. Briones, 929 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 2019)). We
also note that the statute does not guarantee that the petitioner will be released.
But in light of Miller, our legislature plainly intended to provide a meaningful
opportunity for early release.3 567 U.S. at 479.
Based on the Miller-fix statute’s plain language, we conclude that it applies
to Brooks. Under the plain language of RCW 9.94A.730, “any person” who was
convicted of one or more crimes prior to their 18th birthday is entitled to a release
hearing so long as they have served at least 20 years under the statute and do not
meet any of the express exclusions. Brooks meets these requirements.
Accordingly, Brooks must be afforded a release hearing under RCW 9.94A.730.4
3
As our understanding of the differences between children and adults for sentencing purposes
has evolved, so too have our statutes and case law. A number of Washington cases previously
upheld life sentences without the possibility of parole for juveniles. State v. Stevenson, 55 Wn.
App. 725, 737-38, 780 P.2d 873 (1989) (holding that a mandatory life sentence without the
possibility of parole for a juvenile is “not an unconstitutional punishment” under the Eighth
Amendment); State v. Cummings, 44 Wn. App. 146, 153-54, 721 P.2d 545 (1986) (affirming a
mandatory life sentence without parole and holding that a juvenile defendant has no right to have
mitigating factors like her youth considered at sentencing); State v. Forrester, 21 Wn. App. 855,
870-71, 587 P.2d 179 (1978) (holding that a mandatory life sentence without parole did not
violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment). These holdings
from Stevenson, Cummings, and Forrester are no longer good law after Miller and subsequent
Washington cases. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (the Eighth Amendment forbids a juvenile to be
sentenced to mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole); Bassett, 192 Wn.2d at 90
(sentencing juveniles to life without parole or early release is cruel punishment under art. I, § 14
of the Washington constitution); Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 21 (courts must consider
mitigating qualities of youth at juvenile sentencing).
4
Given our resolution on statutory grounds, we do not resolve the parties’ constitutional
arguments. We grant Brooks’ motion to strike “Argument D” of the ISRB’s supplemental brief
discussing a 2018 psychological evaluation that was never submitted by the parties nor included
9
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CONCLUSION
Our legislature enacted special protections for juveniles sentenced to lengthy
prison terms. By its plain language, RCW 9.94A.730 applies to Brooks’ sentence.
The ISRB must provide Brooks with a hearing under RCW 9.94A.730 that
presumes release. Accordingly, we grant the PRP, reverse the Court of Appeals,
and remand to the ISRB for a hearing consistent with this opinion.
____________________________
WE CONCUR:
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in the record. We also deny the ISRB’s request to supplement the record with the missing
appendix as it is not relevant to issues before us.
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In re Pers. Restraint of Brooks
Combined Opinion