IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MICAH J. SMITH, §
§
Defendant Below, § No. 148, 2020
Appellant, §
§
v. § Court Below–Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§ Cr. ID No. 1512004476 (N)
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
§
Submitted: December 4, 2020
Decided: February 15, 2021
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; TRAYNOR and MONTGOMERY-REEVES,
Justices.
ORDER
After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it
appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Micah J. Smith, appeals the Superior Court’s denial of
his motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.
(2) In March 2016, a Superior Court grand jury charged Smith by
indictment with one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child, one count of second
degree sexual abuse of a child by a person in a position of trust, and four counts of
first degree unlawful sexual contact (together, “the Sex Charges”). Following a five-
day trial in May 2017, a Superior Court jury found Smith guilty of one count of
continuous sexual abuse of a child, one count of second degree sexual abuse of a
child by a person in a position of trust, and three counts of first degree unlawful
sexual contact. Smith was acquitted of the remaining count of unlawful sexual
contact. Following a presentence investigation, the Superior Court sentenced Smith
to fifty-seven years of Level V incarceration, suspended after ten years for
decreasing levels of supervision. We affirmed Smith’s convictions and sentence on
direct appeal.1
(3) On June 4, 2018, Smith filed a timely motion for postconviction relief
raising a single claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Superior Court
appointed counsel to assist Smith with the postconviction proceedings.
Postconviction counsel later moved to withdraw, indicating that, after a careful
review of the record, she had not identified any potential grounds for postconviction
relief. After expanding the record with briefing and directing trial counsel to file an
affidavit addressing Smith’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Superior
Court granted postconviction counsel’s motion to withdraw and denied Smith’s
motion for postconviction relief.2 This appeal followed.
1
Smith v. State, 2018 WL 2427594 (Del. May 29, 2018).
2
State v. Smith, 2020 WL 1287762 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2020).
2
(4) We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for
abuse of discretion.3 We review de novo claims of constitutional violations,
including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.4 In order to prevail on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that (i) trial
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,5 and (ii)
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.6 Although not insurmountable, there is a
strong presumption that counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.7 “If
an attorney makes a strategic choice after thorough investigation of the law and facts
relevant to plausible options, that decision is virtually unchallengeable.”8
(5) On appeal, Smith raises the same argument that he raised below: trial
counsel mishandled a statement made by the Mother during direct examination.9 At
trial, the evidence showed that, after the victim disclosed to her mother (“the
Mother”) that Smith had sexually assaulted her, the Mother demanded that Smith—
who had been living in the victim’s family’s basement for years—move out of the
3
Baynum v. State, 211 A.3d 1075, 1082 (Del. 2019).
4
Id.
5
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
6
Id. at 694.
7
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988).
8
Hoskins v. State, 102 A.3d 724, 730 (Del. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
9
Smith also filed a motion to amend the appendix to his opening brief. The State has not
objected to the motion. Accordingly, we grant the motion to amend.
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residence. The State endeavored to establish through the Mother’s testimony when
the victim had visited with her paternal grandmother in California after Smith had
ceased residing in the victim’s home. When the Mother attempted to recall when
this visit to California occurred, she spontaneously noted that Smith was in prison at
the time (“the Jail Comment”). On cross-examination, trial counsel questioned the
Mother about the Jail Comment, and she confirmed that Smith was in jail at the time
because he had had been arrested for the Sex Charges—not because of some other
arrest or conviction.
(6) Smith contends that trial counsel’s handling of the Jail Comment both
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and resulted in prejudice.
Specifically, Smith argues that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to object
to the Jail Comment, move to strike it, and request a curative instruction about it
because this failure permitted the jury to speculate (i) that Smith had previously been
convicted of the Sex Charges and the convictions had been reversed on appeal or (ii)
that Smith had previously pled guilty to the Sex Charges and later successfully
moved to withdraw his plea. Smith’s arguments are unavailing.
(7) After careful consideration of the entire record—including trial
counsel’s affidavit wherein he expressed his concern about drawing additional
attention to the Jail Comment by objecting to it—we find it evident that the Superior
Court correctly concluded that trial counsel’s performance was objectively
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reasonable. That is, counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to cross-examine
the Mother about the Jail Comment instead of objecting to the Jail Comment, moving
to strike it, and requesting a curative instruction about it. We also agree that the
Superior Court rightly decided that Smith has failed to show that trial counsel’s
allegedly deficient performance prejudiced the trial outcome. Although Smith
makes a conclusory argument that trial counsel’s performance resulted in prejudice,
he does not even suggest that the outcome of the trial would have been different if—
as he alleges counsel’s performance enabled it to do—the jury had speculated that
he had previously been convicted of or pled guilty to the Sex Charges. In short, we
agree with the Superior Court that Smith has failed to satisfy either prong of the
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel analysis. To the contrary, trial counsel’s
performance was objectively reasonable, and any alleged professional shortcoming
did not affect the trial outcome.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Tamika R. Montgomery-Reeves
Justice
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