NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 23 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LARRY DONNELL DUNLAP, No. 20-15532
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00295-DJH-DMF
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CORIZON HEALTH, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
CHARLES L. RYAN; et al.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 17, 2021**
Before: FERNANDEZ, BYBEE, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Larry Donnell Dunlap, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo the district court’s ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment. Guatay
Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011).
We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for Corizon Health,
Inc., on Dunlap’s deliberate indifference claim because under any potentially
applicable standard, Dunlap failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether any policy or custom of Corizon caused him to suffer a constitutional
injury. See Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073-76 (9th Cir.
2016) (en banc) (discussing requirements to establish liability under Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc.,
698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (a private entity is liable under § 1983 only if
the entity acted under color of state law and a constitutional violation was caused
by the entity’s official policy or custom); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08
(9th Cir. 2011) (requirements for establishing supervisory liability).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by striking Dunlap’s first
amended complaint or by denying Dunlap’s motions for subpoenas because
Dunlap failed to comply with the local rules governing amended pleadings and
issuance of subpoenas for pro se litigants. See D. Ariz. R. 15.1, G.O. 18-19; Bias
2 20-15532
v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth standard of review
and explaining that this court gives “[b]road deference” to a district court’s
interpretation of its local rules).
We reject as without merit Dunlap’s contention that the district court
violated his due process rights.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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