NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 26 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JASMIN IDALIA SOLARES GONZALEZ, No. 19-72319
Petitioner, Agency No. A206-007-060
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting
Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 8, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: HURWITZ and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and CORKER,*** District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Clifton L. Corker, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.
Jasmin Idalia Solares Gonzalez1 (“Solares”), a citizen of Guatemala, petitions
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her
appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her application for
withholding of removal. We previously remanded for the BIA to consider (1)
whether Solares’ proposed social group is cognizable and (2) whether her social
group was a “reason” for her persecution. Gonzalez-Solares v. Whitaker, 742 F.
App’x 277, 278 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 360
(9th Cir. 2017)). On remand, the BIA determined that the proposed social group
was “young, single women who are targeted for harm in Guatemala.” It found this
group not cognizable and further found no nexus between this proposed social group
and Solares’ claimed persecution.
This Court has jurisdiction to review immigration proceedings under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252. We deny the petition for review.
1. We review denials of withholding of removal for substantial evidence
and will uphold the denial if it is supported by “reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003,
1007 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). The substantial evidence
1
Although Petitioner’s name is spelled differently in Petitioner’s and
Respondent’s brief, we will use the spelling of Petitioner’s name as it appears in the
Guatemalan national register of persons, both decisions of the BIA, and our previous
opinion on this matter, Gonzalez-Solares v. Whitaker, 742 F.App’x 277 (9th Cir.
2018).
2
standard is “highly deferential” and the petitioner must show that “the evidence not
only supports . . . but compels reversal.” Pedro-Mateo v. INS, 224 F.3d 1147, 1150
(9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The question of whether a
proposed social group is cognizable is a matter of law which we review de novo.
Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2020); Pirir-Boc v. Holder,
750 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2014).
2. In his initial opinion, the IJ defined the proposed social group as
“young, single women who are targeted for harm in Guatemala.” Solares did not
challenge this definition in her appeal to the BIA. On remand from this Court, the
BIA limited its consideration to the IJ’s construction of the group. Solares contends
that the BIA improperly conducted its own fact-finding in concluding that the
proposed social group was not cognizable [Pet. Br. 7]. But, whether a group
constitutes a “particular social group” is a question of law. Mendoza–Alvarez v.
Holder, 714 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 2013). Moreover, the BIA relied completely
on the IJ’s construction of the social group.
3. The BIA concluded that the proposed social group was not cognizable
because it was defined by the harm suffered. Solares did not raise a challenge to
this ruling in her opening brief and has therefore forfeited it. See Nguyen v. Barr,
983 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2020); Kohler v. Inter-Tel Techs., 244 F.3d 1167,
1182 (9th Cir. 2001).
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4. Solares next argues that she is entitled to withholding of removal
because her status as a “young, single woman” was “a reason” she was persecuted.
See Barajas-Romero, 846 F.3d at 360. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
denial of this claim. The IJ “specifically found” that the persecutor was motivated
by money, not because Solares was a “young, single woman.” The BIA correctly
found no clear error in that finding. Indeed, Solares’ own testimony was consistent
with that finding. At the hearing, she never suggested that she believed the extorter
was motivated by her status as a young, single woman. Instead, she only testified to
his demands for money.
The BIA also conducted its own review of the record as a whole and found
that it supported the IJ’s denial of withholding. Though the extorter mentioned that
Solares was a “very pretty girl,” the BIA found that his “focus” in calling her was to
“get[] money.” The BIA independently applied the Barajas-Romero standard and
determined that Solares’ claimed social group status was not “a reason” she was
targeted. Although there was some evidence from which the BIA could have found
that Solares’ status as a young, single woman was “a reason” she was targeted, the
record did not compel that conclusion.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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