Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed March 3, 2021.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D17-2529
Lower Tribunal No. F05-12002B
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Samuel Wright,
Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Marisa
Tinkler Mendez, Judge.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Andrew Stanton, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Linda Katz, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Before LINDSEY, MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.
LINDSEY, J.
Samuel Wright appeals from his convictions and sentences entered
after a jury found him guilty of armed robbery and burglary of a gas station,
attempted felony murder of the store clerk, and shooting a deadly missile.
Wright argues the trial court erred in allowing evidence of collateral crimes
and in permitting improper hearsay. Wright also argues the State engaged
in prosecutorial misconduct based on remarks made during the State’s
closing argument. 1 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2005, a robbery occurred at a Marathon Gas Station and
Market located on S.W. 216th Street. During the robbery, the clerk on duty
at the time, Mohammed Rashid, was shot by an assailant wearing a ski
1
Wright also challenged his arrest and subsequent confession. This Court
considered these same issues in a separate appeal and affirmed Wright’s
convictions and sentences. See Wright v. State, 300 So. 3d 296 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2020), review denied, SC20-386, 2020 WL 2316638 (Fla. May 11,
2020). Wright also argued the trial court failed to conduct a genuineness
analysis of the State’s peremptory challenge of a prospective juror. While
this appeal was pending, the Florida Supreme Court decided State v.
Johnson, 295 So. 3d 710, 712 (Fla. 2020), which held “that the party
opposing a peremptory strike must make a specific objection to the
proponent’s proffered race-neutral reason for the strike, if contested, to
preserve the claim that the trial court erred in concluding that the proffered
reason was genuine.” During oral argument in this case, counsel for Wright
commendably conceded that the issues related to the arrest, confession, and
jury selection have been resolved. We therefore affirm these issues without
further discussion.
2
mask. Rashid escaped by crawling into the walk-in refrigerator. Despite
being shot four times, he survived.
Wright was arrested the following month for possession of marijuana
and driving with a suspended license after a traffic stop. Upon searching the
trunk, officers found a pistol and a ski mask matching the description of the
mask used during the gas station robbery. Wright was taken to the police
station for further questioning. After waiving his Miranda rights, Wright
confessed to participating in several other robberies. With respect to the
robbery at issue in this case, Wright gave a detailed, recorded statement to
Detective Marcy Myrtle, the lead detective on the case. When asked if he
remembered what happened, Wright described going to the gas station with
co-defendant Alton Moses:
A. When we got into the gas station um, we both
exited, (yawns) excuse me, we both exited the
vehicle, I went around the back and Alton around
the front um, I stayed on the side of the building till
Alton told me to come in around and I came
around this way I shot the glass from his side.
Q. Do, do you remember Altor, Alton going to service
window and ordering something?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay, what did he order?
A. I believe it was a quart of oil.
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Q. Okay, was the clerk trying to get that?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay, so after Alton orders the motor oil and the
clerk went into the aisle is that when you shot out
the glass?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay, did Alton go inside the business or did he
stay outside?
A. Alton didn’t come in.
....
Q. Okay, and you went inside?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Okay, how many shots do you think you fired?
A. I said, maybe five, five or six.
Q. Okay, um, what happened to the clerk, where did
he go?
A. Clerk, he ran to the back.
Q. Okay.
A. I don’t know if it was in the freezer or what, but he
ran in the back.
Q. Okay, um, and you just kept firing and he ran?
A. Yes.
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Q. Okay, did you go around the counter, the service
counter?
A. Yes.
Q. And what did you do once you went behind the
counter?
A. I um, grabbed the money out of the register, put it
in my pocket, I was just looking around you know
looking for other things, but there wasn’t anything
else in there.
B. Okay, so then you went outside to the parking lot.
A. Yeah, yes.
Q. All right, did something else happen in the parking
lot?
A. Yes, when I came out the door, I seen uh, um, a
van riding by and that’s when I um, shot that one
shot outside the, the van didn’t go nowhere, but
you know, then we went and got into the car and
we left.
Q. Okay, um, how were you dressed that night do
you remember?
A. I don’t remember exactly what I had on, no.
Q. Did you have your face covered?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay, uh, what kind of mask did you have on your
face?
A. A black mask.
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Wright further told Detective Myrtle that the gun he used, a Tanfoglio pistol,
was taken during the robbery of a flower shop.
An audio recording of Wright’s confession was admitted into evidence
at trial. 2 The jury found Wright guilty on all counts. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Wright contends he is entitled to a new trial based on the following
three errors: (1) the lower court committed reversible error in allowing the
State to introduce collateral crimes evidence; (2) the lower court improperly
admitted hearsay evidence; and (3) the State made improper arguments
during closing arguments. We address each issue in turn.
A. Collateral Crimes Evidence
Prior to trial, the State noticed its intent to present evidence of three
collateral crimes: (1) A robbery at a flower shop on February 11, 2005; (2) a
robbery-murder at a Marathon Food Center on February 21, 2005; and (3)
an armed robbery at the Gould’s Market on March 9, 2005. 3 The State
asserted that ballistic analysis in all cases matched.
2
Wright’s recorded statements were generally consistent with Rashid’s
testimony at trial.
3
The State did not introduce evidence at trial with respect to the Gould’s
Market robbery.
6
Evidence relevant to a material fact at issue, except where the sole
relevancy is character or propensity of the accused, is generally admissible
unless precluded by some specific exception or rule of exclusion. Williams
v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 663 (Fla. 1959). 4 The Florida Legislature codified
this Rule in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes:
(2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS.—
(a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material
fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is
relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.
“The admissibility of collateral crime evidence is within the discretion of the
trial court, and the trial court’s ruling shall not be disturbed upon review
absent an abuse of that discretion.” Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 357
(Fla. 2003).
Wright argues the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the
State to introduce “Williams Rule” evidence of the flower shop robbery and
the robbery-murder at the Marathon Food Center. The State contends the
evidence was properly admitted, not to show bad character or propensity,
4
This principle has come to be known as the Williams Rule, which governs
the admission of collateral crimes evidence.
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but to prove identity based on the distinctive firearm that was used in the
commission of the collateral crimes and the robbery at issue here. The State
further contends that in light of Wright’s admissible confession to the subject
offense, any potential error would be harmless as there is no reasonable
possibility that the error affected the verdict. 5
This Court has allowed collateral crimes evidence to prove identity
when the same firearm is used. See Silver v. State, 278 So. 3d 337, 343 n.5
(Fla. 3d DCA 2019), review denied, SC19-1712, 2020 WL 1847636 (Fla. Apr.
13, 2020) (“We have held previously that when the same firearm is used in
multiple robberies, ‘the only inquiry for the trial court to make was whether
such evidence of collateral crimes, which included both physical evidence
and eyewitness testimony, was relevant to the issue of the perpetrator’s
identity–not whether the evidence revealed uniquely similar factual
situations.’” (quoting State v. Williams, 992 So. 2d 330, 333 (Fla. 3d DCA
2008))); Fernandez v. State, 722 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
(holding that evidence of a collateral crime was admissible where “both
crimes occurred in the same area, and involved the same gun and the same
automobile”). Here, Wright confessed that the firearm from the flower shop
5
Wright did not file a Reply Brief addressing the State’s harmless error
arguments.
8
was used in the subject offense and the robbery-murder at a Marathon Food
Center. Moreover, a ballistics expert testified, based on projectiles and
casings, that the firearm used during the robbery-murder at the Marathon
Food Center matched the firearm used in the subject crime.
However, to the extent evidence of the collateral crimes was not
admissible, we agree with the State that any error would be harmless in light
of Wright’s confession because, based on the record before us, there is no
reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. See State
v. Diguilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla. 1986).
B. Detective Myrtle’s Testimony Pertaining to Rashid’s
Statements
Wright argues that the trial court improperly admitted Detective
Myrtle’s hearsay testimony of Rashid, the store clerk. Irrespective of the
hearsay issues, which we need not address, the State argues that the error
is harmless because Wright confessed that he shot Rashid and Rashid
himself testified at trial. We agree. See id.
C. The State’s Closing Argument
“In order for a prosecutor’s comments to merit a new trial, the
comments must be of such nature: (1) so as to deprive appellant of a fair
and impartial trial; (2) materially contribute to his conviction; (3) be so harmful
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or fundamentally tainted so as to require a new trial; or (4) be so inflammatory
that they might have influenced the jury to reach a more severe verdict than
that which they would have reached otherwise.” Lopez v. State, 555 So. 2d
1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). “The control of the prosecutor’s comments is
within a trial court’s discretion, and that court’s ruling will not be overturned
unless an abuse of discretion is shown.” Esty v. State, 642 So. 2d 1074,
1079 (Fla. 1994) (citing Durocher v. State, 596 So. 2d 997, 1000 (Fla. 1992)).
Wright argues the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct based
on remarks made during the State’s closing argument. Where there is an
allegation of improper comments by a prosecutor, we do not consider the
comments themselves in a vacuum; rather, we view the allegedly wrongful
comments in context. McKenney v. State, 967 So. 2d 951, 955 (Fla. 3d DCA
2007). Under the principles of “fair reply” or “invited response,” defense
counsel’s comments are examined as well. Id.
The record before us is over 2100 pages of transcript. In addition to
the testimony of detectives from the Miami-Dade Police Robbery
Intervention Detail, the evidence consisted of Wright’s confession, testimony
of the victim, and a forensics expert, who concluded that the gun used in this
case was the same gun used in other crimes tied to Wright. Any issues
concerning the validity of the confession have been resolved by a prior panel
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of this Court in Wright v. State, 300 So. 3d 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). In short,
we cannot find that any of the errors of which Wright complains warrant
reversal under either the abuse of discretion or the harmless error analysis.
III. CONCLUSION
The trial that occurred in this case may not have been a perfect trial.
It need not be, however, to withstand appellate review. While a defendant
in a criminal trial is entitled to a fair trial, he or she is not entitled to a perfect
trial. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974). As such, for the reasons
detailed above, we affirm.
Affirmed.
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