Mountain Publishing Co. LLP d/b/a Daily Camera v. Regents of the University of Colorado

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
March 4, 2021

2021COA26

No. 20CA0691, Prairie Mountain Publishing Co. LLP d/b/a
Daily Camera v. Regents of the University of Colorado —
Government — Public Records — Colorado Open Records Act —
Colorado Sunshine Act — Open Meetings Law

A division of the court of appeals holds that a “finalist” under

the plain language of the Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) is a

person who is disclosed by the appointing entity as a finalist. The

division therefore reverses the district court’s judgment that would

have required the Regents of the University of Colorado to disclose

the names and interview materials of all the candidates that they

interviewed.

The dissent would hold that CORA requires appointing entities

to disclose multiple finalists. The dissent would therefore affirm the

district court’s judgment.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2021COA26

Court of Appeals No. 20CA0691
City and County of Denver District Court No. 19CV33759
Honorable A. Bruce Jones, Judge

Prairie Mountain Publishing Company, LLP, d/b/a Daily Camera,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Regents of the University of Colorado,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER REVERSED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE BERGER
Vogt*, J., concurs
J. Jones, J., dissents

Announced March 4, 2021

Maxfield Gunning, LLP, Robert R. Gunning, Eric Maxfield, Boulder, Colorado,
for Plaintiff-Appellee

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Michael Kotlarczyk, Assistant Attorney
General, Skippere Spear, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado,
for Defendant-Appellant

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Julie C. Tolleson, First Assistant Attorney
General, Isabel J. Broer, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for
Amicus Curiae Colorado Higher Education Institutions

Baker & Hostetler LLP, Marc D. Flink, Denver, Colorado; Killmer, Lane, &
Newman, LLP, Thomas B. Kelley, Denver, Colorado, for Amici Curiae Colorado
Freedom of Information Coalition, Joseph L. Brechner Center for Freedom of
Information, National Freedom of Information Coalition, News Leaders
Association, Society of Professional Journalists, Colorado Politics, Colorado SPJ
Pro Chapter, Colorado Press Association, Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press, Colorado Broadcasters Association, Denver Post, Colorado Springs
Gazette, Colorado News Collaborative and Colorado Sun

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2020.
¶1 This case arises under the Colorado Open Records Act (CORA)

and the Open Meetings Law (OML). Prairie Mountain Publishing

Company, LLP, d/b/a Daily Camera requested documents

regarding applicants for the presidency of the University of Colorado

(CU). CU refused the requests, and the Daily Camera sued. The

district court agreed with the Daily Camera and ordered disclosure

of the requested documents. Because we conclude the district

court exceeded its authority in rewriting the applicable statutes, we

reverse.

I. Background

¶2 When CU President Bruce Benson announced his retirement,

the CU Board of Regents (Regents) adopted procedures to select his

successor. The Regents appointed an internal search committee

and hired an outside search firm. Initially, the search firm received

more than one hundred referrals or applications for the position.

These candidates were winnowed down at various stages. The

search firm narrowed this list to twenty-seven candidates, and the

search committee decided to interview eleven, eventually

interviewing only ten after one withdrew. After those interviews, the

search committee reduced the remaining applicants to six, all of

1
 whom were interviewed by the Regents. After those interviews, the

Regents publicly announced that there was only one finalist —

Mark Kennedy.

¶3 Mr. Kennedy then went through an extensive public vetting

process, including personal meetings with various constituent

groups at all of CU’s campuses. During this vetting process, there

was considerable criticism heaped on the Regents regarding both

the search process itself and the Regents’ apparent selection of Mr.

Kennedy. Ultimately, the Regents voted 5-4 to appoint Mr.

Kennedy.

¶4 After Mr. Kennedy’s appointment, the Daily Camera requested

under CORA and the OML the names and application documents of

the candidates selected by the search committee and those

interviewed by the Regents.1 When CU declined to produce the

1 The names of the candidates selected by the search committee
were leaked to the press, even though that information was
confidential. Ultimately, CU released documents relating to five of
the six persons interviewed by the Regents (including Mr. Kennedy).
The dissent correctly observes that this case narrowly escapes
dismissal on mootness grounds.

2
 records (except those regarding Mr. Kennedy), the Daily Camera

sued in Denver District Court.2

¶5 The court ruled in favor of the Daily Camera, concluding that

the six candidates interviewed by the Regents were the finalists.

¶6 Proceedings before the Denver District Court confirmed that,

at least with respect to appointment of officers of public entities

(which all parties concede include CU and its Regents), both CORA

and the OML are seriously flawed. Despite many legislative

attempts over the years to reconcile competing public policy

interests, the statutes do a very poor job of precisely designating

which records regarding which people are subject to mandatory

disclosure.

¶7 Faced with these confusing statutes, the district court did a

yeoman’s job attempting to make sense of and bring clarity to them.

We conclude, however, that the district court’s efforts were, in the

end, outside the proper role of our courts.

¶8 It is beyond argument that the district court’s construction of

CORA and the OML better advance the sunshine and open

2 CU’s executive offices are in Denver, making the district court for
the second judicial district a proper forum for the CORA proceeding.

3
 government principles that underlie those statutes. The statutes,

as construed by the district court are “better” in that sense,

although that value judgment may well depend on one’s point of

view. But making statutes clearer, easier to administer, or “better”

are not proper roles of this state’s courts. That is the job of the

General Assembly. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Idaho Springs, 192

P.3d 490, 494 (Colo. App. 2008) (“If a statute gives rise to

undesirable results, the legislature must determine the remedy.

Courts may not rewrite statutes to improve them.”) (citations

omitted).

¶9 Unlike a situation in which a court is tasked with interpreting

an ambiguous statute to comport with underlying constitutional

commands, there is no such baseline here. The rights involved here

are entirely statutory, and the power of the General Assembly to

establish, limit, and clarify those rights is plenary. It is in that

context that we review the district court’s judgment.

4
 II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review and Preservation

¶ 10 This case presents a question of statutory interpretation,

which we review de novo.3 Oakwood Holdings, LLC v. Mortg. Invs.

Enters. LLC, 2018 CO 12, ¶ 12. Courts “review de novo questions of

law concerning the correct construction and application of CORA.”

Harris v. Denver Post Corp., 123 P.3d 1166, 1170 (Colo. 2005).

“Likewise, interpreting the OML presents a question of law that we

review de novo.” Colo. Off-Highway Vehicle Coal. v. Colo. Bd. of

Parks & Outdoor Rec., 2012 COA 146, ¶ 22.

¶ 11 The issue of whether CORA and the OML require the

requested disclosure was preserved for appeal.

B. The Plain Language of the Statutes is Unambiguous

¶ 12 The overriding goal of statutory construction is to effectuate

the legislature’s intent. Dep’t of Revenue v. Agilent Techs., Inc.,

3 To the extent that CU argued in the district court that its
interpretation of CORA or the OML deserved deference, it has not
made that argument on appeal. Arguments not advanced on appeal
are generally deemed waived. Moody v. People, 159 P.3d 611, 614
(Colo. 2007). In any event, CU is not an agency or institution
charged with enforcing CORA or the OML, and thus we would not,
in any event, defer to its interpretation. See, e.g., Huddleston v.
Grand Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 913 P.2d 15, 17 (Colo. 1996).

5
 2019 CO 41, ¶ 16. In doing so, courts “look first to the statute’s

language, giving words and phrases their plain and ordinary

meanings.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t,

2020 COA 50, ¶ 14 (cert. granted Sept. 28, 2020). This requires

“reading applicable statutory provisions as a whole in order to

accord consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all their

parts.” People in Interest of W.P., 2013 CO 11, ¶ 11. However,

when the plain language is unambiguous, we look no further. Id.

¶ 13 The parties agree that disclosure is required only with respect

to finalists. Indeed, CORA prohibits CU and other state entities

from disclosing any “[r]ecords submitted by or on behalf of an

applicant or candidate for an executive position . . . who is not a

finalist.” § 24-72-204(3)(a)(XI)(A), C.R.S. 2020.

¶ 14 This is the question before us: Who is a finalist? CORA

defines a “finalist” as

an applicant or candidate for an executive
position as the chief executive officer of a state
agency, institution, or political subdivision or
agency thereof who is a member of the final
group of applicants or candidates made public
pursuant to section 24-6-402(3.5), and if only
three or fewer applicants or candidates for the
chief executive officer position possess the
minimum qualifications for the position, said

6
 applicants or candidates shall be considered
finalists.

Id. (emphasis added).

¶ 15 By the statute’s plain language, a “finalist” is a person who is

disclosed by the appointing entity as a finalist — who is “made

public.” Id.

¶ 16 Unlike earlier versions of CORA, which were abrogated by the

General Assembly, this definition of a “finalist” is confusing and

perhaps circular. The district court acknowledged this, saying that

it made no sense to allow the appointing entity to structure its

appointment process to require disclosure of only the single person

the entity intends to appoint. Such a process, according to the

district court and the Daily Camera, violates the open records and

open meetings principles underlying the statutes before us.

¶ 17 That may be true, but we hold this to be insufficient for us to

step in and write what some may consider to be better statutes

more attuned to concepts of open government. “Courts may not

rewrite statutes to improve them.” City of Idaho Springs, 192 P.3d

at 494.

7
¶ 18 The bottom line is that it is not impossible to enforce the

statutes as written. (If it were, principles regarding construction of

statutes by courts might come into play.) Doing so may or may not

provide the level of open records that many think essential to good

government. But that is not the test. Instead, we hold that the

district court overstepped its bounds in rewriting CORA to provide

that the Regents had a mandatory legal duty to disclose the records

of the six interviewees.

¶ 19 The problems with the district court’s construction in this

respect are several. First, how does a court determine who the

finalists are? That is, even if we were to agree with the district

court’s interpretation that the plain language requires the

disclosure of multiple finalists when more than three applicants

possess the minimum qualifications, what judicially manageable

standards exist to determine who the finalists are? Are they the

large group of persons vetted by the outside search firm, or the

smaller group identified by the internal search committee? Or are

the finalists only those persons that were interviewed by the search

8
 committee?4 Is a person a finalist because he or she was

interviewed by the Regents, even when the Regents, as a result of

those interviews, determine that one or more of the interviewees

were unsuitable for the job? Or are finalists limited to those

persons that, after the interviews, are actually considered by the

appointing entity for appointment, even when there is only one such

person?

¶ 20 In answering these questions, the district court concluded that

the finalists were those persons interviewed by the Regents, not the

larger groups. While that choice is reasonable — indeed, that is

precisely the choice made by the General Assembly in a prior, but

now abrogated, version of CORA — statutory language dictating

that choice is absent from the current versions of the statutes.

Compare § 24-72-204(3)(a)(XI)(A), C.R.S. 2020, with § 24-72-

204(3)(a)(XI)(A), C.R.S. 1994, and Ch. 286, sec. 3, § 24-72-

204(3)(a)(XI)(A), 2001 Colo. Sess. Laws 1073. Instead, that choice

4In fact, the Daily Camera requested the records of “the 28
candidates interviewed by the search committee.” It is immaterial
whether this request was in reference to the twenty-seven
candidates that were vetted by the search committee, or the ten
candidates actually interviewed by the committee.

9
 reflects a policy decision that is for the General Assembly, not the

courts.

¶ 21 The district court supported its interpretation with the

dictionary definition of a “finalist” as one who competes in the “final

round of competition,” and construed that to mean the interviews

with the Regents. But the General Assembly itself defined “finalist,”

and its statutory definition is not the same as the dictionary

definition. “[W]hen the legislature defines a term in a statute, that

definition governs.” Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Bill Boom Inc., 961 P.2d

465, 470 (Colo. 1998). The current statute does not define “finalist”

in terms of who receives an interview or rounds of competition.

¶ 22 Instead, the current provision defines a “finalist” as a person

“made public pursuant to section 24-6-402(3.5).” § 24-72-

204(3)(a)(XI)(A). There is no statutory requirement that an

institution name a minimum number of finalists, unless three or

fewer applicants “possess the minimum qualifications.” Id. In that

situation, all qualified applicants are finalists. Everyone agrees that

this case does not fall into this statutory exception. It is

undisputed that more than three applicants possessed the

minimum qualifications for CU president. Accordingly, by statute,

10
 only a candidate who was a “member of the final group of

applicants or candidates made public pursuant to section 24-6-

402(3.5)” of the OML is a finalist. Id.

¶ 23 Neither does section 24-6-402(3.5), C.R.S. 2020, of the OML

specify the number of finalists that must be named. It states:

The state or local public body shall make
public the list of all finalists under
consideration for the position of chief executive
officer no later than fourteen days prior to
appointing or employing one of the finalists to
fill the position. No offer of appointment or
employment shall be made prior to this public
notice. Records submitted by or on behalf of a
finalist for such position shall be subject to the
provisions of section 24-72-204(3)(a)(XI). As
used in this subsection (3.5), “finalist” shall
have the same meaning as in section 24-72-
204(3)(a)(XI).

Id.

¶ 24 Based on these statutory provisions, because Mr. Kennedy

was the only individual “made public pursuant to section 24-6-

402(3.5),” § 24-72-204(3)(a)(XI)(A), we conclude that CU acted

within its rights to treat him as the sole finalist.

¶ 25 The General Assembly could have said, but did not, that there

must be multiple finalists. “Where the legislature could have

chosen to restrict the application of a statute, but chose not to, we

11
 do not read additional restrictions into the statute.” Springer v. City

& Cnty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 804 (Colo. 2000). And we will not

second-guess the policy preferences of the legislature. Farmers Ins.

Exch., 961 P.2d at 469.

¶ 26 The district court also pointed to the words “member” and

“list” and their dictionary definitions as evidence that the General

Assembly intended that there be more than one finalist. These

words certainly permit a state entity to name multiple finalists. But

these words do not require multiple finalists. While the words

“member” and “list” can refer to multiple components they can also

refer to single components, like single-member LLCs, or a list

containing a single item. See Sedgwick Props. Dev. Corp. v. Hinds,

2019 COA 102, ¶ 17.

¶ 27 Although “group” usually denotes multiple individuals, we do

not think that term alone dictates rewriting the statute in the

manner done by the district court. We also point out that section

2-4-102, C.R.S. 2020, which governs construction of statutes,

provides that “[t]he singular includes the plural, and the plural

includes the singular.”

12
¶ 28 As noted, under a prior version of CORA, both the question

and answer were simple: disclosure was required for all finalists,

and anyone interviewed by the appointing entity was a finalist.

§ 24-72-204(3)(a)(XI)(A), C.R.S. 1994. That is what the district

court held here, but that provision of CORA no longer exists. Ch.

286, sec. 3, § 24-72-204(3)(a)(XI)(A), 2001 Colo. Sess. Laws 1073.

When the General Assembly amends a statute there is a

presumption that it “intended to change the law.” Union Pac. R.R.

Co. v. Martin, 209 P.3d 185, 188 (Colo. 2009).

¶ 29 We fully acknowledge that, as written and as we apply the

statutes, both CORA and the OML are subject to abuse by

appointing entities because they can structure their appointment

process to limit applicant disclosure to only one finalist. Many will

argue, more than plausibly, that such a structure is inimical to

principles of open government. And they might be right. But again,

absent underlying constitutional constraints, which do not exist

here, that is for the General Assembly to address, not the courts.

City of Idaho Springs, 192 P.3d at 494; People v. Ramirez, 2018 COA

129, ¶ 32 (“While the result mandated by the statutory language

13
 likely is undesirable to almost everyone, that does not give us a

license to improve or rewrite the statute.”).

¶ 30 The Daily Camera also points out, as did the district court,

that when there are three or fewer qualified applicants, CORA

requires disclosure of all of those applicants. If that is the law, they

say, how does it make sense that when there are more than three

qualified applicants, the appointing entity can designate only one

finalist? While this result may make little sense, it does not reach

the high bar of absurdity. “[T]he alleged absurdity must surmount

a high bar to be truly absurd.” Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing

Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2156-57 (2016)

(reviewing Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014)).

¶ 31 Under the plain language of the statute, there is no minimum

number of finalists if there are more than three minimally qualified

applicants. This construction incentivizes hiring institutions to

conduct broad, thorough searches of qualified candidates, at least

preliminarily. While we have no idea if this is what the legislature

intended — and we take no position on whether this is the right

policy choice — it is a plausible policy choice such that our

construction is not absurd. Had the General Assembly intended

14
 that a minimum number of finalists be disclosed when more than

three applicants possessed the minimum qualifications, it could

have, and presumably would have, said so. But it did not.

¶ 32 In conclusion, the plain language of both CORA and the OML

permitted the Regents to do exactly what they did. Whether that is

good policy or good government is not for us to decide. Accordingly,

we reverse the judgment of the district court.

C. Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 33 The Daily Camera requests recovery of its attorney fees and

costs on appeal under C.A.R. 39.1 and section 24-72-204(5)(b),

C.R.S. 2020.

¶ 34 Section 24-72-204(5)(b) provides, in part, that “[u]nless the

court finds that the denial of the right of inspection was proper, it

shall . . . award court costs and reasonable attorney fees to the

prevailing applicant in an amount to be determined by the court.”

¶ 35 Because we hold that CU’s refusal to disclose the records

sought by the Daily Camera was permissible under the plain

language of CORA and the OML, we deny the Daily Camera’s

request for attorney fees and costs on appeal.

15
¶ 36 We also reverse the district court’s order granting attorney fees

and costs to the Daily Camera. “[W]hen an underlying judgment is

reversed, an award that is dependent on that judgment for its

validity is also necessarily reversed and becomes a nullity.”

Bainbridge, Inc. v. Douglas Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 55 P.3d 271, 273

(Colo. App. 2002).

III. Conclusion

¶ 37 The district court’s judgment as well as its order awarding

attorney fees and costs are reversed.

JUDGE VOGT concurs.

JUDGE J. JONES dissents.

16
 JUDGE J. JONES, dissenting

¶ 38 This is a difficult case — made so because the relevant

portions of the Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) and the Open

Meetings Law (OML) are, in some respects, less than clear.

Certainly the relevant provisions — those relating to who is a

“finalist” who must be disclosed by an appointing state entity —

could stand some clarifying revision, and I join the majority’s call

for the General Assembly to amend them so that the expenditure of

time and resources relating to disputes such as this can become a

thing of the past.

¶ 39 The majority holds that under these statutes, a “finalist” for a

position is whomever the appointing entity deigns to label a finalist,

and if that is a single individual, so be it. Indeed, the majority

holds that this is the unambiguous meaning of the relevant

statutes. I respectfully don’t agree. As I see it, the relevant statutes

— section 24-72-204(3)(a)(XI)(A), C.R.S. 2020, of CORA, and section

24-6-402(3.5), C.R.S. 2020, of the OML — unambiguously

contemplate that, unless there is only one applicant for a position,

there will always be more than one “finalist.” Determining how

many finalists there are in a given case is where things get murky.

17
 The district court ruled that under the facts of this case the six

applicants who interviewed with the Board of Regents (Regents)

were the finalists for University of Colorado (CU) president. That

seems to me a reasonable application of CORA and OML.

Therefore, I would affirm the district court’s judgment and its order

awarding attorney fees and costs to the Daily Camera.

I. Facts

¶ 40 A search firm hired by the Regents identified more than one

hundred applicants for the job. In its judgment, twenty-seven of

those applicants met the qualifications for the position. The

Regents’ search committee (which didn’t comprise the entire board)

interviewed ten of those applicants. It then sent the names of six of

those applicants to the Regents. The Regents interviewed those six

applicants. They then voted unanimously to name Mark Kennedy

as the sole “finalist” pursuant to University of Colorado Board of

Regents, Regent Policy 3.E (rev. Sept. 2017),

https://perma.cc/KQ4T-7TS7,1 and they passed a resolution

stating as follows:

1 That policy says a “finalist” is

18
 Resolved that the Board of Regents announce
Mark R. Kennedy as a finalist for the
presidency of the University of Colorado. The
Board of Regents welcomes comments on Mr.
Kennedy’s candidacy and shall not take any
action to appoint or employ Mr. Kennedy for at
least fourteen days from the date of this
resolution.

¶ 41 Mr. Kennedy appeared at open fora at all four CU campuses

and the system administration offices. Individuals commented on

Mr. Kennedy on a CU website created for that purpose. A little

more than three weeks after the Regents named Mr. Kennedy a

finalist, they voted 5-4 to appoint him to the CU presidency.

¶ 42 The Daily Camera submitted a CORA request to CU for the

names and application documents of the twenty-seven applicants

whom the search committee had determined met the qualifications

[a] candidate who has agreed to be advanced
for final consideration and potential
appointment for the position of president or
chancellor. A person who is named as a
finalist shall be named in accordance with the
requirements of [the OML] C.R.S. 24-6-
402(3.5) and records pertaining to that person
shall be available for public inspection as
allowed by [CORA] C.R.S. 24-72-
204[(3)(a)](XI)(A-B).

Univ. of Colo. Bd. of Regents, Regent Policy 3.C.2 (rev. Nov. 2020),
https://perma.cc/KQ4T-7TS7.

19
 for the job and the six applicants the Regents had interviewed. The

Regents declined to provide the requested information for any

applicant other than Mr. Kennedy.

¶ 43 The Daily Camera sued under CORA and the OML. The

district court ultimately ruled that the six applicants the Regents

had interviewed were finalists, and it ordered CU to produce the

requested information for those individuals. After someone publicly

disclosed the identities of four of the other five persons interviewed,

CU produced the materials relating to those four and Mr. Kennedy.2

II. The Relevant Statutes

¶ 44 Section 24-72-203(1)(a), C.R.S. 2020, of CORA creates a

general rule that “[a]ll public records shall be open for inspection by

any person at reasonable times, except as provided in this part 2 or

as otherwise provided by law . . . .”3 One exception is at issue in

this case — that for “[r]ecords submitted by or on behalf of an

applicant or candidate for an executive position as defined in

2 Because one interviewed person hasn’t been publicly identified,
this case narrowly escapes dismissal for mootness.
3 “Public records” is defined in section 24-27-202(6), C.R.S. 2020.

There is no dispute that all the documents the Daily Camera seeks
are public records.

20
 section 24-72-202(1.3)[, C.R.S. 2020,] who is not a finalist.” § 24-

72-204(3)(a)(XI)(A). The position of president of CU is an executive

position as defined in section 24-72-202(1.3).

¶ 45 For purposes of this exception,

“finalist” means an applicant or candidate for
an executive position as the chief executive
officer of a state agency, institution, or political
subdivision or agency thereof who is a member
of the final group of applicants or candidates
made public pursuant to section 24-6-402(3.5),
and if only three or fewer applicants or
candidates for the chief executive officer
position possess the minimum qualifications for
the position, said applicants or candidates shall
be considered finalists.

§ 24-72-204(3)(a)(XI)(A) (emphasis added).

¶ 46 Section 24-6-402(3.5) is part of the OML. It directs the state

body to make public “the list of all finalists under consideration for

the position of chief executive officer no later than fourteen days

prior to appointing or employing one of the finalists to fill the

position.” Id. (emphasis added). It doesn’t separately define

“finalist”; instead, it says that for its purposes “‘finalist’ shall have

the same meaning as in section 24-72-204(3)(a)(XI),” the definition

for the relevant exception in CORA. Id.

21
¶ 47 Ultimately, then, the meaning of “finalist” for purposes of both

CORA and the OML turns on the meaning of the above-highlighted

portions of section 24-72-204(3)(a)(XI)(A), though, as discussed

below, sections 24-6-402(3.5) and 24-72-203(1)(a) have something

to say about the matter.

III. Standard of Review

¶ 48 Because this case turns on the interpretation of CORA and the

OML, we review de novo. Denver Publ’g Co. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs,

121 P.3d 190, 195 (Colo. 2005) (CORA); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v.

Costilla Cnty. Conservancy Dist., 88 P.3d 1188, 1192 (Colo. 2004)

(the OML).4

IV. Principles of Statutory Interpretation

¶ 49 To achieve our ultimate goal of determining and giving effect to

the General Assembly’s intent, we begin by attributing to the words

and phrases used in the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.

Hassler v. Account Brokers of Larimer Cnty., Inc., 2012 CO 24, ¶ 15;

Battle N., LLC v. Sensible Hous. Co., 2015 COA 83, ¶ 30. But we

4 I agree with the majority that since CU isn’t an agency tasked with
implementing CORA or the OML — but is only an institution
subject to those laws — we don’t owe any deference to its
interpretation of the relevant statutes.

22
 don’t consider words and phrases in isolation; rather, we consider

them “in context — both in the context of the statute of which the

words or phrases are a part and in the context of any

comprehensive statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.”

People v. Berry, 2017 COA 65, ¶ 13, aff’d, 2020 CO 14; see

Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Gerganoff, 241 P.3d 932, 935

(Colo. 2010). At the same time, we strive to give consistent,

harmonious, and sensible meaning to all of a statute’s language.

And we must avoid any interpretation that would lead to an illogical

or absurd result. Schaden v. DIA Brewing Co., LLC, 2021 CO 4M,

¶ 32; Ferguson v. Spalding Rehab., LLC, 2019 COA 93, ¶ 10.

Indeed, the General Assembly’s manifest intent must prevail over a

literal meaning of the statute if that literal meaning would lead to

an absurd result. Henisse v. First Transit, Inc., 247 P.3d 577, 579

(Colo. 2011); Battle N., ¶ 30.

¶ 50 If, after applying these principles, we determine that the

statutory words and phrases are unambiguous, we enforce them as

written. Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083, 1089 (Colo.

2011). But it isn’t always so easy. Sometimes application of these

principles doesn’t yield a clear meaning; sometimes the statutory

23
 language is ambiguous — that is, susceptible of more than one

reasonable interpretation. When that is the case — and only when

that is the case — we may look to other rules of statutory

interpretation to resolve the ambiguity. Berry, ¶¶ 13-14; see § 2-4-

203, C.R.S. 2020. There are many such rules, and which ones

apply in a given case will vary. Id. at ¶ 14.

¶ 51 But given CORA’s broad, general policy favoring public

disclosure of public records, we are also guided by two other,

related principles. First, we must narrowly construe CORA’s

exceptions. City of Westminster v. Dogan Constr. Co., Inc., 930 P.2d

585, 589 (Colo. 1997); City of Fort Morgan v. E. Colo. Publ’g Co., 240

P.3d 481, 486 (Colo. App. 2010).5 And second, the party claiming

that an exception applies has the burden of showing that the

documents in question fall within the claimed exception. Shook v.

Pitkin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2015 COA 84, ¶ 6; City of Fort

5 In challenging this principle, the Regents cite to Benefield v.
Colorado Republican Party, 2014 CO 57, ¶ 25. But that citation is
to a dissent. The Regents didn’t acknowledge that in their opening
brief or even in their reply brief after the Daily Camera’s answer
brief noted it.

24
 Morgan, 240 P.3d at 486; Zubeck v. El Paso Cnty. Ret. Plan, 961

P.2d 597, 600 (Colo. App. 1998).6

V. Analysis

¶ 52 The majority quotes section 24-77-204(3)(a)(XI)(A) and

immediately concludes, without intervening analysis, that “[b]y the

statute’s plain language, a ‘finalist’ is a person who is disclosed by

the appointing entity as a finalist — who is ‘made public.’” Supra at

¶ 15. It then notes that “this definition of ‘finalist’ is confusing and

perhaps circular.” Supra at ¶ 16. And later in the opinion, the

majority observes that the statute requires the naming of all

applicants when there are three or fewer applicants, and that it

therefore makes “little sense” that an appointing entity can

designate one finalist when there are more than three applicants.

Supra at ¶ 30. Nonetheless, the majority holds that the “confusing

6 We must also interpret the OML broadly to further its intent to
give citizens a greater opportunity to become fully informed on
issues of public importance. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Costilla Cnty.
Conservancy Dist., 88 P.3d 1188, 1193 (Colo. 2004); Cole v. State,
673 P.2d 345, 347, 349 (Colo. 1983). And, as with CORA, we must
strictly construe exceptions to the OML’s requirement of public
access to meetings at which the public’s business is discussed.
Gumina v. City of Sterling, 119 P.3d 527, 532 (Colo. App. 2004).

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 and perhaps circular” definition of “finalist” that it adopts — that is,

a finalist is whomever the appointing entity says is a finalist — is

the definition that it must enforce even though it doesn’t make

sense. Supra at ¶¶ 16, 18, 30. I can’t agree.7

¶ 53 This interpretation runs afoul of several basic principles of

statutory construction. First, it contravenes the principle that we

must interpret a statute as a whole to give it “sensible” effect.

Schaden, ¶ 32; Ferguson, ¶ 10. Adopting a construction that the

majority concedes doesn’t make sense can’t be squared with that

principle.

¶ 54 Second, even if the majority were correct that a literal

construction of the statute leads to its interpretation of the meaning

of “finalist” (a conclusion with which I don’t agree, as explained

7 The district court relied heavily on the commonly understood
meaning of “finalist.” Like the majority, I don’t go there because the
term is defined in the statute. But I do observe that the commonly
understood meaning of that term undercuts the majority’s
interpretation. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
851 (2002) (a “finalist” is “any of the contestants who meet in the
final round of a competition”); see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-24 (1992) (when faced with a statutory
definition of a term that is essentially circular and unhelpful, a
court should assume the legislature intended the accumulated
settled meaning under the common law).

26
 below), that interpretation shouldn’t be adopted because it leads to

an absurd result. See Henisse, 247 P.3d at 579 (the General

Assembly’s intent must prevail over a literal meaning that would

lead to an absurd result). It is absurd because, as the majority

recognizes, it allows for less disclosure when there are more than

three applicants than when there are three or fewer applicants (a

result which, as noted, the majority says doesn’t make sense). And

it leads to an absurd result because it allows each appointing entity

unfettered power to determine who is a finalist. Different

appointing entities can take different approaches and can

manipulate their procedures to shield information from disclosure

in spite of the policies served by CORA and the OML. In other

words, under the majority’s interpretation, “finalist” really has no

meaning at all — it’s just whatever an appointing entity says it is.

¶ 55 Third, the majority fails to read the statutory provisions as a

whole and in context. The majority simply skips over the phrase

“who is a member of the final group of applicants or candidates.”

To me, this phrase unambiguously contemplates multiple finalists.

The majority, however, says all the plural words in that phrase can

be read as singular. I disagree. Reading them as singular certainly

27
 isn’t the most natural way to read them, and Colorado courts have

long favored the most natural reading of statutory language. See,

e.g., Qwest Corp. v. Colo. Div. of Prop. Tax’n, 2013 CO 39, ¶ 35M,

abrogated on other grounds by Warne v. Hall, 2016 CO 50; In re

Petition of S.O., 795 P.2d 254, 259 (Colo. 1990); U.S. Fid. & Guar.

Co. v. People, 44 Colo. 557, 567, 98 P. 828, 832 (1908); Markus v.

Brohl, 2014 COA 146, ¶ 37. Nor, in a similar vein, is such a

reading consistent with the commonly understood meanings of

these terms. See Ybarra v. Greenberg & Sada, P.C., 2018 CO 81,

¶ 10 (term that isn’t defined “must be understood according to its

ordinary meaning”); OXY USA, Inc. v. Mesa Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs,

2017 CO 104, ¶ 16 (we must give words and phrases in a statute

“their commonly accepted and understood meanings”). That the

plural meaning is intended by the General Assembly is further

borne out by its stringing together of multiple plural terms, as well

as the clause addressing the situation when there are three or fewer

applicants.

¶ 56 The majority justifies its treatment of multiple plural terms as

including the singular in two ways. It says first that while “‘group’

usually denotes multiple individuals,” the use of that “term alone”

28
does not “dictate[] rewriting the statute in the manner done by the

district court.” See supra at ¶ 27. But the word “group” is always

— not usually — plural.8 A group is “two or more figures . . .

forming a distinctive unit complete in itself or forming part of a

larger composition”; “a relatively small number of individuals

assemble or standing together”; “a number of individuals bound

together by a community of interest, purpose, or function”; or some

other collection made up of at least two elements. Webster’s Third

New International Dictionary 1004 (2002). And so to construe

“group” as plural is not to rewrite the statute, but to enforce it as

written.9

8 In this way, “group” is like “a few,” “several,” or “many.” It isn’t a
singular noun transformed into a plural form of the noun merely by
adding an “s.”
9 The case cited by the Regents in their opening brief, A.N. ex rel.

Ponder v. Syling, 928 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2019), for the proposition
that “group” can be singular actually supports the notion that a
group is more than one person. It says, “[a]n equal protection claim
may be asserted with respect to a group or a ‘class of one.’” Id. at
1196 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). (The Regents omit the
internal quotation marks in this quote when quoting this statement
in their opening brief.) The case A.N. cites for this proposition, A.M.
v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2016), expressly distinguishes
between groups, which comprise more than one person, and classes
of one, which do not. Id. at 1166.

29
¶ 57 The majority also relies on section 2-4-102, C.R.S. 2020,

which says that “[t]he singular includes the plural, and the plural

includes the singular.” But statutes such as this should be applied

to further legislative intent, not to undermine it. Put another way,

they should be applied when necessary to carry out the evident

intent of a statute. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri,

263 U.S. 640, 657 (1924); Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp. v. Schieffer,

648 F.3d 935, 938 (8th Cir. 2011); Toy Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v.

Consumer Prods. Safety Comm’n, 630 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1980),

abrogation on other grounds recognized by Prestop Holdings, LLC v.

United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 244 (2010); see also 2A Norman J. Singer

& J. D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory

Construction § 47:34, at 506-07 (7th ed. 2014). In my view, the

evident intent of the statute — as expressed by the General

Assembly’s repeated and connected uses of plural terms in section

24-72-204(3)(a)(XI)(A) and (as discussed below) other statutory

provisions — is that “group” means (as it always does) more than

one person. Therefore, section 2-4-102 doesn’t apply.

¶ 58 The majority also fails to recognize the full import of the clause

of section 24-72-204(3)(a)(XI)(A) addressing the situation where

30
 there are three or fewer applicants. That clause follows immediately

after the “group” clause and provides that all applicants are

considered “finalists” if there are three or fewer applicants. Id. As

the majority concedes, it makes no sense to require disclosure of all

applicants in that circumstance but allow an appointing entity to

designate only one “finalist” where there are more than three

applicants. But rather than accepting the most logical implication

of that incongruity, the majority creates a possible rationale for it

that not even the Regents put forward. In my view, the General

Assembly’s inclusion of that clause is most naturally regarded as a

further indication that it intended the plural terms in the preceding

“group” clause to be applied as commonly understood.

¶ 59 Apart from the text of section 24-72-204(3)(a)(XI)(A) itself,

section 24-6-402(3.5) of the OML also indicates that the General

Assembly intended that, except in the case of a single applicant,

there would always be more than one finalist. It speaks in terms of

“the list of all finalists under consideration” and “one of the finalists”

for the position. § 24-6-402(3.5) (emphasis added). The natural

meaning, or common understanding, of this phrasing is obviously

that there will be more than one finalist. See Kuhn v. Williams,

31
 2018 CO 30M, ¶ 49 (statutes relating to the same subject should be

read together).10

¶ 60 In the end, the majority’s interpretation contravenes the

supreme court’s admonition that exceptions to CORA’s general rule

of disclosure must be narrowly construed. By holding, in essence,

that section 24-72-204(3)(a)(XI)(A) leaves it up to each appointing

entity to determine for itself what “finalist” means, the majority

allows appointing entities to shield persons and documents from

disclosure almost without limitation, contrary to the policy of

transparency underlying both CORA and the OML.11

¶ 61 Considering the language of section 24-72-204(3)(a)(XI)(A) in

accordance with the common understanding of that language, the

context, other related statutes, and our obligation to narrowly

construe exceptions to CORA’s disclosure requirement, I conclude

10 All this isn’t to say that the phrase “made public pursuant to
section 24-6-402(3.5)” does no work in section 24-72-
204(3)(a)(XI)(A), C.R.S. 2020. That phrase, considered in
conjunction with section 24-6-402(3.5), C.R.S. 2020, dictates that
all finalists be made public within the time specified by section 24-
6-402(3.5) (“no later than fourteen days prior to appointing or
employing one of the finalists to fill the position”).
11 The only limitation is that one person must be disclosed.

32
 that it unambiguously requires an appointing entity to identify

more than one “finalist” in all cases, save where there is only one

applicant.12

¶ 62 But how many finalists must an appointing entity identify if

there are more than three applicants? The statute doesn’t say.

Nor, as currently written, does it give many clues, giving rise to a

host of questions (as the majority points out). Try as I might, I can’t

resolve this ambiguity. But I think the answer will vary from case

to case, depending on the number of applicants, the nature of the

process involved, and the appointing entity’s substantive bases for

winnowing the field of candidates.

¶ 63 In this case, I believe the district court reasonably concluded

that the six persons the Regents interviewed were finalists. I would

therefore affirm the district court’s judgment and its award of

attorney fees to the Daily Camera. And I would grant the Daily

12Because I believe the statute is unambiguous on this score, I
don’t look to other sources of legislative intent, such as legislative
history. In any event, I didn’t find any of the legislative history
recounted by the parties to be particularly enlightening. Nor do I
consider the Regents’ policy arguments apart from CORA and the
OML. Such arguments are best directed to the General Assembly.
Sharon v. SCC Pueblo Belmont Operating Co., LLC, 2019 COA 178,
¶ 21.

33
Camera its reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal. See § 24-

72-204(5)(b).

34