United States v. Larry Speed

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 20-6753 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. LARRY KENNETH SPEED, a/k/a Kenneth Richard Godfrey, a/k/a Kenny Speed, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge. (2:00-cr-00092-RAJ-1) Submitted: February 18, 2021 Decided: March 9, 2021 Before FLOYD, THACKER, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Larry Kenneth Speed, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Larry Kenneth Speed appeals from the district court’s memorandum opinion and order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B), and § 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. The district court determined that Speed was eligible for relief under the First Step Act but declined to exercise its discretion to reduce Speed’s concurrent life sentences. We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s ruling on Speed’s First Step Act motion. See United States v. Jackson, 952 F.3d 492, 497, 502 (4th Cir. 2020). Based on our review of the record, we are satisfied that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief. See United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 2018) (explaining abuse of discretion standard). The district court provided an adequate explanation for denying Speed’s motion and appropriately determined that Speed’s significant evidence of post-sentencing rehabilitation did not outweigh the seriousness of his past violent conduct. See United States v. McDonald, 986 F.3d 402, __, No. 19-7668, 2021 WL 218888, at *8 (4th Cir. Jan. 22, 2021) (ruling that district court must provide individualized explanation allowing for “meaningful [appellate] review” when deciding First Step Act motion that relies on post-sentencing rehabilitation evidence). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of First Step Act relief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 2